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A COURSE OF THE BELLES LETTRES: OR THE PRINCIPLES OF LITERATURE.

Tranſlated from the French of the

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BY

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ERRATA in this Volume.

Page 3, l. 3, *for* walks *read* works.
7, l. ult. *for* act *read* art.
8, l. 1 & 2 *for* act *read* art.
11, l 11, *after* terms *dele* may.
14, l. 8, *for* or *read* are.
118, l. 2, *for* places *read* spaces.
140, l. 6, *for* Lucully *read* Lucullus.
170, l. 1, *for* relates *read* relate.
—, l. 19, *for* superstition *read* suspension.
176, l. 14, *for* Euryclus *read* Euryalus.
190, l. 18, *for* any *read* only.
194, l. 1, *for* meaning *read* moving.
214, l. antepenult. *after* own, *place* a comma.
240, l. ult. *for* chances *read* chains.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF LITERATURE.

PART III.

Concerning the ſeveral kinds of proſe.

BEFORE entering upon this third part of our work, we think ourſelves obliged to obviate an objection which may be made to us. Whence comes it, ſome of our readers will perhaps ſay, that in a work of this kind, wherein you undertake to reduce every thing to the imitation of nature, you did not begin with eloquence and narrative, which indiſputably approach the neareſt to nature of any of the

other kinds, and ſeem in ſome meaſure to have been the firſt models of poetry? It is moſt natural to proceed from the ſimple to the complex, and to deſcribe the ordinary gradation of the human mind, before we ſtudy the intricacies and fineſſes of an art. Not only ſo, but the language of proſe did moſt certainly precede that of poetry, the latter having been always indebted to the former for the materials of its ſtructure. Conſequently the putting books of poetry at firſt into the hands of thoſe whom we propoſe to introduce to an acquaintance and commerce with the muſes, is, in fact, reverſing the order of things, and beginning the edifice from the roof inſtead of the foundations.

We will allow, that, if the intention of this work had been merely to lead to the knowledge of a language, we ought doubtleſs to have begun with proſe; as it is certain, that the true genius, and eſſential character of any language, are to be found in that only. In poetry, the conſtraint, inſeparable from verſe, muſt occaſion an alteration in the natural ſtructure of the words, and ſometimes even in their commou acceptation. It would therefore be repugnant to reaſon and good ſenſe, to ſet out with learning a language from the wirtings of its poets. We may read Horace and Virgil for ever, but, if we go no farther, we ſhall never be able to ſpeak like Cicero.

But

But our deſign is not to teach the art of ſpeaking, but that of reading and judging. Now to learn, how to judge in matters of literature, we muſt begin by exerciſing ourſelves in thoſe walks, where beauties or defects, by being more ſenſible, give the greater hold on them to the taſte and mind, and where the art does not aim at concealing itſelf; and when once we are able to diſcover this art as it really is, and are convinced that we have made ourſelves maſters of its true principles, then we may endeavour to diſcover it likewiſe in thoſe productions where it is accuſtomed to hide itſelf the moſt.

The order we have followed then, will be found to be the very ſame with that obſerved by the human mind, which firſt of all lays hold of what is the moſt apparent and ſenſible, and by this means attains to the knowledge of what is leſs ſo.

This is ſo natural a progreſſion, that we have only to conſult the hiſtory of poetry and oratory, and we ſhall find that this latter did not come into exiſtence till after the other.

There is a wide difference between the language of mere neceſſity and that of eloquence. The firſt was, without all doubt, prior to poetry. It is the moſt eſſential inſtrument of ſociety; and mankind have always been the moſt attentive to the things of neceſſity. But the language of oratory, which unites all the ſeveral reſources of

art and natural genius, where all the machines and ſprings which can aſſiſt perſuaſion, are prepared, diſplayed, and managed with the trueſt intelligence and diſcernment; this language was not ſubjected to the exactneſs of rules, till after the great ſucceſſes of poetry.

Poetry has borrowed from plain nature her great ſimplicity, and her ſtriking beauties. Theſe ſhe has cloathed with every ornament, of which the imagination and harmony could furniſh the addition. Eloquence, though conſtitutionally more modeſt, conceived, from the example of her ſiſter poetry, that there was an artful manner of preſenting objects, ſo as to captivate the ear and warm the ſoul. Her own experience had made her ſenſible, that however powerful truth may be in itſelf, yet it is not always ſure of ſucceſs, if its defence is left to a blind talent, or kind of treatment, which often makes a bad uſe of the treaſures it is poſſeſſed of, and that it was conſequently the wiſeſt method to ſtudy the conduct of the genius, and to marſhal its powers with prudence and œconomy.

The works of the moſt celebrated writers were then conſulted; theſe were the poets. Their ſteps were remarked, their proceedings analyzed, and, what had been obſerved in them was tried to be put in practice; the ſucceſs that followed, ſoon added a new degree of authority to the models

dels which were choſen. Homer was looked upon not only as the prince of poetry, but the father of eloquence, hiſtory, philoſophy, and all the arts. From him Herodotus learnt how to record the deeds of heroes; Iſocrates how to charm the ſenſes, while he would convince the mind. By him were Demoſthenes, Æſchylus, Socrates, and Plato, inſtructed in the true method of painting, moving, reaſoning, and narration. The care he had taken to follow nature in the moſt ſcrupulous manner, even in the midſt of fictions and falſities, taught them what they were to do, eſpecially when they repreſented truth. They conſtantly then kept attached to the ſame principle as he had done. They ſtudied nature, and ſtrove to preſent her in every thing ſuch as ſhe might and ought to be preſented, according to the different kinds of ſubjects they had embraced, and to the ends they propoſed to themſelves.

It was poetry then that cleared the way for oratory, and ſerved as its guide, light, and model. That pointed it out its true object, and ſhewed it the ſource and principle of all its rules, and taught it, that, like herſelf, its only office was that of painting, and that its utmoſt merit conſiſted in doing this forcibly and juſtly, to expreſs nature, and to make her be felt. By theſe ſteps have all the great orators, both ancient and modern, attained their glory; by having, if I

may venture thus to expreſs myſelf, been poets in their orations, as the poets had been orators in their poetry.

But what then becomes of the difference between the two arts? for that there is a difference, is moſt certain.

It conſiſts in the end propoſed, and in the means employed to attain that end.

The object of poetry, as we have obſerved elſewhere, is to pleaſe: If at the ſame time ſhe inſtructs, it is when the uſeful happens to be one of the means neceſſary to the attaining her end. Eloquence acknowledges no other object than that of inſtruction; if at any time it attempts to pleaſe, it is from knowing that the moſt direct road to perſuaſion, is that which is ſtrewed with flowers.

Poetry makes uſe of every thing that can any wiſe miniſter to her end: truth, fiction, fable, hiſtory, the wonderful, the natural, the poſſible and impoſſible, all are alike welcome to her. Her very reaſon may be termed fury and tranſport. She builds without laying any foundation; a trifle, that the leaſt breath of air deſtroys, occupies her as ſeriouſly as the welfare of a nation. Eloquence, on the contrary, always ſober and exact, employs itſelf only on matters of real utility; reaſon is its ſupport, and good ſenſe its inſeparable companion.

Such are the bounds and licences of theſe two empires, both which extend their juriſdiction over all

all nature, with this only difference, that in the one truth holds the ſceptre, in the other taſte, to whoſe deſpotic laws every thing is reſpectively ſubject. But to reſume the thread of our work.

This third part will be divided into four ſections. The firſt ſhall treat of oratory, the ſecond of hiſtory, the third of the epiſtolary ſtile, and the fourth and laſt of the manner of tranſlating. Theſe ſeveral heads, added to thoſe which we have already treated of in the two preceding parts, appear to us to include the whole literary part of education.

SECT. I.

Of ORATORY.

WE ſhall begin by explaining in a few words the nature and matter of oratory. In the next place we ſhall, in three ſeveral articles, treat of oratorial invention, diſpoſition, and expreſſion. This latter article will include elocution and pronunciation.

CHAP. I.

The nature of oratory.

RHETORIC, logic, and grammar, are three arts which ſhould always accompany each other. Logic is the act of thinking juſtly,

grammar is the act of ſpeaking properly, rhetoric the act of ſpeaking well. To think juſtly, is to put exactneſs and clearneſs into our ideas, circumſpection into our judgments, connexion and order into our reaſonings. To ſpeak proper, is to make uſe of the generally received terms and grammatical conſtructions, to avoid barbariſm in words and ſoleciſm in phraſe. To ſpeak well, is to ſpeak in ſuch a manner as to make ourſelves heard, and to perſuade thoſe who hear us. Theſe are the three univerſal inſtruments, that is to ſay, their uſefulneſs extends to all kinds, whether of ſcience or literature, and which in thoſe where they are ſeen to meet are the infallible marks of a good education, of a juſt way of thinking, and a fertility of genius.

The term *Oratory* has a very extenſive ſignification, if conſidered only etymologically: for it ſignifies every thought that is expreſſed by ſpeech, *ore ratio expreſſa*, and in this ſenſe it is made uſe of by grammarians. In this place it ſignifies a diſcourſe prepared with art, whoſe end is perſuaſion.

It is to be obſerved, that there is a great difference between the oratorial talent, and the art which aſſiſts in forming that talent The talent is called eloquence, the art, rhetoric; the one produces, the other judges, of the production: the

the former makes the orator, the latter what we call a rhetorician.

CHAP. II.

The matter of oratory.

ALL queſtions where perſuaſion may have place belong to eloquence. Theſe are generally reduced to three kinds; the firſt of which is called the demonſtrative, the ſecond the deliberative, the third the judiciary. The firſt has for its object the preſent, the ſecond the future, and the third the paſt. In the demonſtrative we praiſe or condemn, in the deliberative we incite to or diſſuade from action; and we accuſe or defend in the Judiciary.

The demonſtrative kind.

In the demonſtrative kind are included all panegyrics, funeral orations, academical diſcourſes, compliments made to kings, princes, &c. On ſuch occaſions we are to collect every circumſtance that is likely to do honour to, and pleaſe the perſon we intend to praiſe.

We praiſe his birth. It is the noble blood of his anceſtors that flows in his veins: the bold eagle does not bring forth the timid dove.

If the origin of the perſon we praiſe happens to be obſcure; in that caſe, the hero owes all the

advantages he poſſeſſes to himſelf; his glory is the work alone of his virtue.

In praiſing his education: he has naturally ſuch great parts; he was ſo carefully educated; that either of theſe advantages ſingly, without the aſſiſtance of the other, would have been ſufficient to have made an extraordinary man of him.

If education has been wanting, then, his natural ſtrength of genius, like ſomewhat divine, took of itſelf a noble flight, and ſurmounted all obſtacles.

But the orator ought to be aware, that in attempting to do his hero too much honor, he may ſometimes diſhonor himſelf. Though the audience may not be then either judges or parties, yet they have certain rights of which they are jealous, and which they generally take care to exert in their greateſt latitude. If your proofs are badly choſen, if they appear to ariſe from an overſtrained flattery, rather than from the boſom of truth, they excite our indignation againſt the flatterer, who endeavours to make us accomplices in his meanneſs.

It is eaſy, ſaid Socrates, to praiſe the Athenians at Athens; but to ſucceed before a Scythian, a Lacedemonian, or a philoſopher, would be the height of glory both to hero and panegyriſt. A Scythian and a philoſopher are to be won only by truth,

truth, and in this kind, truth is found in facts only. To praiſe well then, nothing more is required than to repreſent facts in a lively and ſtriking manner. A panegyric that is ſupported only by a number of high ſounding words and phraſes, reſembles thoſe bubbles of water which glitter a while in the air, and are puffed away by the leaſt breath of wind.

Let the facts be arrayed in all the dreſs of eloquence, let the moſt noble and magnificent terms may be employed, with bold turns, ſwelling periods, prepared cadences, and dazzling figures; let every thing appear ſelected, methodized, and ſet off with flowers and ornaments; to all this the hearer readily conſents. The panegyriſts from the time of Pericles to the preſent have always maintained themſelves in poſſeſſion of it. We all know, that every panegyric is a kind of triumph granted to virtue. So far then are we from being diſguſted with having it rendered as pompous and magnificent as poſſible, that on the contrary we ſeem in ſome meaſure to ſatisfy our own ſelf-love in the applauſe we give: but facts there muſt be.

The deliberative kind.

The demonſtrative kind praiſes virtue. This exhorts to the practice of it, and ſets forth the reaſons which ſhould induce us to embrace it. The

following maxim of Horace, which is true indeed in all caſes, is more particularly ſo in this:

——Cui lecta potenter erit res
Nec facundia deſeret hunc nec lucidus ordo——

Him who does judgment in his choice exert,
Not eloquence nor method ſhall deſert *.

We ought to be perfectly maſters of our ſubject, and to have conſidered it in all its points of view, not only real but poſſible.

An undertaking is propoſed. Is it uſeful? Is it not? War is to be declared to revenge an inſult received: here we ought carefully to weigh ſuch things as are likely to make for or againſt it, what is to be feared, what may be expected, what reſources can be furniſhed by the ſtate, and thoſe which the enemy can command. What conſequences may follow upon ill ſucceſs; and

* By the context which in the original precedes this quotation, monſieur Batteux ſeems to have given Horace another ſenſe than what is commonly and juſtly underſtood of him in this paſſage.

"La maxime d'Horace vraïe dans tous les cas l'eſt "ici plus que jamais: il faut connoitre à fond ſon ſujet, "et l'avoir conſidéré attentivement dans toutes ſes faces, "non ſeulement reelles mais poſſibles." By the tenor of which it ſhould ſeem that he interprets *res lecta potenter* into the reading or effectual ſtudy of the matter, whereas, in the origiual *lecta* evidently means choice, and *potenter* according to one's ſtrength or power.

how

how thoſe conſequences are to be repaired; laſtly, whether the loſſes we are about to hazard, do or do not exceed thoſe we have already ſuſtained.

All theſe circumſtances being maturely weighed by an evidently ſolid and diſintereſted mind, nothing remains but to ſet them forth with energy and ſimplicity. Here is no longer room for diſplaying beauties, tickling the ear, or ſoothing the imagination. This is an eloquence for ſervice that rejects with diſdain every thing that has more of glare than ſolidity. Mark Demoſthenes, giving his advice to the people of Athens, when met in council to deliberate whether or not they ſhall declare war againſt Philip, his oration is rich and pompous, but then it is ſo, purely from the force and power of good ſenſe.

The judiciary kind.

The firſt ſtep to be taken by an orator in the judiciary kind, is to ſettle the ſtate of the queſtion.

The object of the queſtion is, either the fact, the right or lawfulneſs of the fact, or the name to be given it.

It is aſked, who has committed the murder? The accuſer ſays it is you. The accuſed replies, It is not me. Here then the point is, to prove the fact. Is it or is it not you? We muſt put together ſuch circumſtances as tend to eſtabliſh

the

the truth or falſity of the fact. This perſon was your enemy, you have threatened him, you was in the ſame place with him, you might have perpetrated this fact without any danger to yourſelf, your intereſt was concerned in it, you diſappeared on a ſudden, and the like; theſe are circumſtances which all make againſt you. Theſe again or refuted by other circumſtances, which can no wiſe agree with the fact alledged: I was a hundred miles off, the very day the murder is ſaid to have been done, &c.

But I acknowledge I killed him, and I had a right ſo to do. Here ariſes another queſtion. Is it allowable to kill a man who makes an attempt upon my life, when I have no other means left of preſerving it? Clodius attacks me, he attempts to aſſaſſinate me; I defend myſelf: in the ſcuffle he is killed. The law pardons me, or rather declares me innocent.

The queſtion about the name has for object the deciding the quality of the fact, and this once done the controverſy ceaſes. Is the ſtep taken by ſuch a ſoldier, properly deſertion, or is it not? Here is only a name to be given to the action; that once agreed upon, the affair is decided, and no more is left to be ſaid.

The judiciary kind, always ſuppoſes ſome injury, real or pretended. The injury *(injuria)* may be defined, a free act by which one perſon de-

deprives another of the goods of which he was in lawful poſſeſſion.

If there was no free agent there would be no real crime. If there was no lawful right there could be no injury done. An injuſtice then implies a right violated by a free agent.

Now there are in general two kinds of right; the right of nature, which is imprinted in the breaſt of every man: and civil right, or that which binds and reſtricts the inhabitants of the ſame town, place or commonwealth, the ſubjects of the ſame kingdom, to the performance or non-performance of certain things, relative to the quiet and good of the whole. No one can infringe theſe laws without being a bad ſubject, nor can any one violate the law of nature without being an offender againſt humanity.

It is the buſineſs of an orator to enforce the authority of theſe laws. He will beſt engage the attention of his hearers by laboring to ſhew, that the public intereſt, nay, humanity itſelf, has ſuffered an outrage in the action for which he demands juſtice. This is the only way that can be taken to make private intereſt affect the community.

Nam mea res agitur paries cum proximus ardet.

My roof's in danger when the next's on fire.

As it is not in our plan here to aim at forming a pleader, and being beſides perſuaded that a multiplicity of rules only ſerve to confuſe weak minds, and give a needleſs trouble to thoſe of a happy genius, we hope to be diſpenſed from entering into any longer detail on this ſubject. And ſhall only obſerve, that it is not to be imagined that the three kinds abovementioned are ſo totally different from each other, as not all to join together upon occaſion. The contrary of ſuch a ſuppoſed incompatibility happens in almoſt every diſcourſe. What, for inſtance, are moſt elogies and panegyrics, but ſo many exhortations to virtue? The praiſes of good and great men ſerve to warm our hearts to ſentiments of piety and honour, and to ſupport and animate our natural weakneſs. All the kinds, not excepting the judiciary, do in ſome meaſure make a part of the deliberative; for the judges are between the negative and affirmative, and it is the pleaders and counſellors only that can remove their uncertainty, and determine them on the ſide of juſtice. In a word, as the decent, the uſeful, and the equitable, which are the three objects of theſe three kinds, meet all in one and the ſame point, ſince whatever is truly uſeful is likewiſe juſt and decent, and ſo reciprocally, it is not without reaſon that ſome modern rhetoricians have ventured to regard this diviſion, which was ſo famous in the rhetoric of the

the ancients, as without any real foundation in nature.

Whatever ſubject an orator handles, he has neceſſarily three functions to fulfil. Firſt, to fix upon the things he is to ſay; ſecondly, to diſpoſe theſe in due order; thirdly and laſtly, to expreſs them with propriety. Theſe three functions of an orator are called invention, diſpoſition, and expreſſion.

Quid dicat, et quo loco, & quomodo.

CICERO.

That we may at once give a clear idea of theſe three operations, which prevail alike in all the the arts, as may be gathered from the firſt part of this work, we ſhall preſent our readers with a ſhort and plain example, it matters not in what kind: let it be in that of the fable.

A young prince aſked La Fontaine for a fable, and gave him for ſubject *The cat and the mouſe*. Now how did the poet manage towards the treating it?

On conſidering his ſubject, he immediately perceived the different parts that the ſeveral characters of his piece were to perform. The cat is made to catch mice, and mice are made to be catched. But this firſt idea did not as yet lead to any thing.

On

He then ſuppoſes the mouſe to be young, and the cat old. Theſe two circumſtances are of the poet's own invention, and cannot be refuſed to him, as they in no wiſe change the ſubject. Nevertheleſs it is by theſe that the action will be produced.

The mouſe being young, is conſequently ſuppoſed to be unexperienced; and the cat, on account of her age, artful and cunning. Here we have what we were in ſearch of, actors and characters; but where is the action?

It follows,

A young mouſe who had been catched by an old cat, uſed all his endeavours to ſoften him, but puſs makes a jeſt of his intreaties, and devours her prey.

This is the groundwork of the fable, or what is commonly called the ſubject; it is the firſt and principal operation of the genius, and what is termed invention.——In the next place follows the unfolding of the principal parts. The mouſe endeavoured to ſoften the cat, conſequently muſt have made her ſome ſhort ſpeech; the cat makes a jeſt of his intreaties, conſequently muſt have made ſome reply. But where are we to find ſpeeches proper for each. Conſult the precept of Horace: *dicat debentia dici.* The mouſe muſt ſpeak in a manner ſuitable to his age, ſize, and the ſituation he is in; the cat the ſame. Thus has

has invention furniſhed all the ſeveral materials for the ſtructure. Let us now proceed to the diſpoſition of theſe parts.

This ſecond part depends a good deal upon the firſt, for the genius being guided by nature in all its productions, neceſſarily proceeds from one thing to the other which ought to follow it. The mouſe is firſt of all to be catched, then it is to uſe entreaties: the cat is to anſwer; and the mouſe is ultimately to become the victim.

In the laſt place follows the expreſſion, which cloaths with words thoſe thoughts of which the fable is compoſed. The words are of two kinds; thoſe employed ſolely to deliver the matter, and thoſe which give it certain graces. We will now examine our poet's art and taſte, in this part of his production.

Une jeune Souris de peu d'expérience,
Crut fléchir un vieux Chat implorant ſa clémence,
En payant de raiſons le Raminagrobis:
Laiſſez-moi vivre: une Souris
De ma taille & de ma dépenſe,
Eſt-elle à charge en ce logis?
Affamerois-je, à votre avis,
L'hôte, l'hôteſſe & tout leur monde?
D'un grain de bled je me nourris;
Une noix me rend toute ronde.

A préſent je ſuis maigre. Attendez quelque tems,
Reſervez ce repas à meſſieurs vos enfans.
Ainſi parloit au Chat la Souris attrapée.
L'autre lui dit: Tu t'es trompée.
Eſt-ce à moi que l'on tient de ſemblables diſcours?
Tu gagnerois autant de parler à des ſourds.
Chat, & vieux, pardonner, cela n'arrive gueres.
Selon ces loix deſcens là-bas;
Meurs, & vas-t'en tout de ce pas
Haranguer les ſœurs filandiéres.
Il tint parole.

In this fable we have a chain of ideas, reflections, and deciſions, in themſelves true, juſt, and clear, and conveyed in terms of a like quality, without which the work would have been faulty. But, if no other qualities than theſe were found in the work, it would want what we call the beauties, which make the ſpirit of a work. It was therefore neceſſary that the author ſhould furniſh theſe beauties; which he has accordingly done in various manners; ſometimes by a droll expreſſion: *Payer de raiſons, le Raminagrobis, reſervez ce repas à meſſieurs vos enfans.* Sometimes by ſtriking circumſtances: *Ainſi parloit la ſouris attrapée; chat, & vieux, pardonner.* Or, by a ſimple and familiar manner of ſpeaking: *Deſcens là bas, & vas-t'en tout de ce pas. Haranguer* is a term of deriſion, *ſœeurs filandieres* is a fabulous alluſion.

Such

Such are the three operations, of which we are to explain the art in the three following articles, which comprize the whole of rhetoric.

ARTICLE I.

Of invention.

IT is the buſineſs of an orator to perſuade. Now to perſuade men, it is neceſſary to prove, to pleaſe, and to move. Sometimes one of theſe means alone is ſufficient, ſometimes it is neceſſary to join all three. We prove by arguments, we pleaſe by morals, and we move by the paſſions.

Some over-rigid metaphyſicians have in vain attempted to oppoſe the uſe made of the paſſions in eloquence. We are to take men as they are, not as they ought to be.

When philoſophy ſhall be found capable of anſwering its intentions, ſo as to make them love truth purely for its own ſake, and abſtracted from all private intereſt, then eloquence will be no longer under a neceſſity of having recourſe to the paſſions; but, till then it will be neceſſary to follow the ſame plan, and to arm, in favour of virtue, every principle that humanity can furniſh.

CHAP. I.

Of arguments.

TO explain what is meant by an argument, it is neceſſary to know, that, among logicians, there are three kinds of thoughts.

The firſt of theſe conſiſts in a ſimple repreſentation of ſomething in the mind; as when I figure to myſelf the *ſun*, or the quality of *roundneſs*; this is commonly called an *idea*.

The ſecond is the repreſentation of the connection between two ideas; as when I ſay to myſelf, the *ſun* is *round*; this is a judgment.

The third is the repreſentation of the relation between any two or more ideas which are connected together; as when I ſay, the ſun appears to every body to be round, *therefore* it is round; this is called a *reaſoning*.

Here we have the three operations of the mind, conception, judgment, and reaſoning.

When theſe three kinds of thoughts are expreſſed by words, they change their names: the idea is called a *form*; the judgment, a *propoſition*; the reaſoning, an *argument*.

Reaſoning, as we have already ſeen, preſuppoſes judgment, and this latter an idea, or, which is the ſame thing, arguments are compoſed of propoſitions, and propoſitions of terms.

The

The argument has ſometimes three propoſitions:

We ſhould love that which will make us happy.
Now virtue will make us happy.
Therefore we ſhould love virtue.

This is what they call a ſyllogiſm in form. The firſt of theſe three propoſitions is called the *major*, the ſecond the *minor*, and the third the *concluſion*.

Sometimes the argument has bnt two propoſitions, one being left out, as eaſily to be ſuppoſed by the underſtanding.

Virtue makes us happy;
Therefore we ſhould love virtue.

This is called *enthimema*. The firſt propoſition is called the *antecedent*, and the ſecond the *conſequent*.

Laſtly, in ſome caſes the argument is carried on by example, and from ſeveral particular propoſitions we infer a general one:

We ought to love prudence.
We ought therefore to love juſtice.

This is called inference.

We ſeldom meet with the formal ſyllogiſm in oratory, its place being generally ſupplied by the enthimema; or, if we do, its parts are diſpoſed in a different manner from what they are in its philoſophical form.

In

In logic, we ſay; Virtue makes us happy, therefore we ſhould love virtue. In a work of taſte, the propoſition to be proved is put in the firſt place, and the reaſon, by which it is proved, does not come till the laſt: We ought to love virtue, becauſe it renders us happy.

We have an example of this manner of diſpoſing the argument in Cicero's Exordium to his oration for the poet Archias: "If, auguſt judges, "I have any abilities, and I am ſenſible they are "but ſmall; if, by ſpeaking frequently, I have "acquired any merit; if I have derived any "knowledge from the ſtudy of the liberal arts, "which have ever been my delight, A. Licinius "Archias may juſtly claim the fruit of all. For, "looking back upon paſt ſcenes, and calling to "remembrance the earlieſt part of my life, I find "it was he, who prompted me firſt to engage "in a courſe of ſtudy, and directed me in it. If "my tongue, then, formed and animated by "him, has ever been the means of ſaving any, I "am certainly bound, by all the ties of grati-"tude, to employ it in the defence of him who "has taught it to aſſiſt and defend others *."

This

* Si quid eſt in me ingenii, Judices, quod ſentio quàm ſit exiguum: aut ſi qua exercitatio dicendi, in qua me non inficior mediocriter eſſe verſatum: aut ſi hujuſce rei ratio aliqua

This period, turned into a ſyllogiſm, would ſtand thus: If I am indebted to the poet Archias for the talent I have (for rhetoric), he ought to reap the advantages of it: Now, I am indebted to him for this talent; therefore he ought to reap the advantages of it. Here, *Quod ſi hæc vox, &c.* is the major, *Nam quoad longiſſimé, &c.* the minor; and *Si quid eſt in me ingenii, &c.* the concluſion; and with this he begins the diſcourſe.

Another obſervation concerning the ſyllogiſm in oratory, is, that it is made more comprehenſive and full, by ſhewing two other propoſitions joined to it; one of which, in caſe of neceſſity, ſerves to prove the major, and the other the minor; *ex. gr.*

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aliqua, ab optimarum artium ſtudiis ac diſciplina profecta, à qua ego nullum confiteor ætatis meæ tempus abhorruiſſe: earum omnium rerum, vel in primis hic A. Licinius fructum à me repetere propè ſuo jure debet. Nam quoad longiſſimè poteſt mens mea reſpicere ſpatium præteriti temporis, & pueritiæ memoriam recordari ultimam, inde uſque repetens, hunc video mihi principem, & ad ſuſcipiendam, & ad ingrediendam rationem horum ſtudiorum extitiſſe. Quod ſi hæc vox, hujus hortatu, præceptiſque conformata, non nullis aliquando ſaluti fuit; à quo id accepimus, quo cæteris opitulari & alios ſervare poſſemus, huic profecto ipſi, quantum eſt ſitum in nobis, & opem & ſalutem ferre debemus. CIC. *pro Arch. poet.*

We ſhould take delight in whatever can improve us,
Polite literature can improve us;
Therefore we ſhould take delight in polite literature.

This is a philoſophical argument; we ſhall now render it an oratorial one:

We ſhould take delight in whatever can improve us.

This is one of thoſe intuitive truths imprinted in our very natures, and is ſo fully proved to us by our own reaſon and ſelf-love, that it will admit of no contradiction.

Now polite literature will improve us.

There cannot be the leaſt doubt of this, ſince it enriches the mind, ſoftens the manners, and gives an air of good breeding and politeneſs to our whole deportment.

Therefore we ought to take delight in polite literature.

But the taſte not being able to bear with ſuch a formality of method, in diſpoſing the parts, as gives an air of ſtiffneſs to the oration, it will be neceſſary to reverſe and diſguiſe it a little; as for example: "Can one do otherwiſe than delight "in polite literature, ſince it enriches the "mind, ſoftens the manners, poliſhes and com-"pleats the man? Self-love, and our own rea-"ſon, are ſufficient to make it dear to us, and "engage us to cultivate it to the utmoſt."

Zeno

Zeno compared the philoſophical argument to the hand when clutched, and the rhetorical argument to the hand when open.

Reaſoning is only made uſe of when we want to find out, or to demonſtrate to others, ſome truth which does not diſcover itſelf at all, or not ſufficiently; for example,

Let any two ideas, having no apparent connection between themſelves, be connected with a third, this latter ſhall ſerve to connect the other two, thus: if I do not know that we ſhould love juſtice, I aſk myſelf what juſtice is; it is a virtue. That is enough. I know that we ſhould love virtue, I know likewiſe that juſtice is a virtue; conſequently I know that we ſhould love juſtice. This is a continuation of the famous rule: Two things agreeing with a third, will agree likewiſe with each other.

In the other caſes, we meet with nothing more than the ſimple expoſition of the ideas; the buſineſs in poetry, in narration, in diſcourſes, being, for the moſt part, rather to preſent objects to the view, than to prove the reality of their exiſtence.

Common places.

The ancients, who were for reducing every thing to an art, had made one for invention likewiſe. Having ranged in order all the external

and internal aſpects of a cauſe, they pretended to lead the genius as it were by the hand, and make it find out on a ſudden all the arguments that were poſſible to be found, in the different *places* whether they conducted it. For thus they termed thoſe kind of reſervoirs or magazines wherein are treaſured up thoſe riches which are the object of invention.

Among all theſe, *definition* holds the firſt rank; by this the orator finds, in the very nature of the thing he is ſpeaking of, a reaſon to perſuade others of the truth of what he ſays. Thus, he proves that eloquence ought to be regarded and cheriſhed, becauſe the faculty of ſpeaking well is an ineſtimable thing. The greateſt art is required to conduct an army. "What is an army? ſays Mr. Flechier. "It is a prodigious body animated by an infinity "of different paſſions, and put in motion by one "man for the defence of his country: It is a "troop of armed men, who blindly follow the "orders of one chief, without knowing any thing "of his intentions: It is a multitude of ſlaves, "for the moſt part mean and mercenary, who, "without having the leaſt care for their own re-"putation, labor to raiſe that of kings and "conquerors: It is a confuſed aſſemblage, where "libertines are to be made obedient, and cow-"ards to be led to battle; where raſhneſs is to "be taught prudence, and impatience perſeve-

rance.

"rance *." Therefore the greateſt art is required to conduct an army.

By the example here given, we ſee that eloquence is indebted to this common place for many ſhining beauties, and, at the ſame time, that the oratorial definition is very different from the definition in philoſophy. What is man? Man, ſays the philoſopher, is an animal endowed with reaſon: Man, ſays the poet:

Man, like the generous vine, ſupported lives;
The ſtrength he gains is from the embrace he gives.
On their own axes, as the planets run,
Yet make at once their circle round the ſun;
So two conſiſtent motions act the ſoul,
And one regards itſelf, and one the whole.

Pope's Eſſay on Man.

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* "Qu'eſt-ce qu'une armée, dit? c'eſt un corps "animé d'une infinité de paſſions differentes, qu'un "homme ſa i mouvoir pour la défenſe de la patrie; "c'eſt une troupe d'hommes armés, qui ſuivent aveuglément les ordres d'un chef, dont ils ne ſavent pas les "intentions; c'eſt une multitude d'ames, pour la plupart viles & mercenaires, qui, ſans ſonger à leur propre réputation, travaillent à celles des rois & des conquérans; c'eſt un aſſemblage confus de libertins, qu'il "faut aſſujetter à l'obeiſſance; de lâches, qu'il faut mener au combat; de téméraires, qu'il faut retenir; d'impatiens, qu'il faut accoutumer à la conſtance." FLECH.

Or,

L'homme en ſa courſe paſſagére,
N'eſt qu'une vapeur légére
Que le ſoleil fait diſſiper.
Sa clarté n'eſt qu'une nuit ſombre,
Et ſes jours paſſent comme l'ombre
Que l'œil ſuit & voit échapper.

Enumeration of parts, or detail, is what we meet with in a diſcourſe; as when, for example, inſtead of proving directly, that we ought to love virtue, it is proved, that we ought to love juſtice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance. Some of our modern orators are indebted for almoſt the whole of their reputation to this common place. It has doubtleſs its merit. The thoughts, if they do not fall like a thunderbolt, for want of the ſame force and eclat, do at leaſt fall like a ſtorm of hail, which, though it may not ſtrike the traveller to the ground, will oblige him to ſeek for ſhelter.

Etymology ſometimes furniſhes the orator with a ſmall argument. If philoſophy * be indeed the love of wiſdom, be wiſe and moderate, you who make a profeſſion of being a philoſopher.

* The word philoſophy being derived from φίλεω, I love, and σοφία, wiſdom.

The *omonima*, or play upon words, is nearly in the ſame taſte. A cauſe is very deſperate indeed when driven to ſuch ſhifts for its defence. It is in ſome meaſure an injury offered to juſtice, to employ ſuch weapons in its ſupport *.

But it is different with the *genus* and *ſpecies*. It is eaſily proved, that we ought to love juſtice, becauſe we ought to love virtue, and, by a reciprocal way of arguing, that we love virtue becauſe we love juſtice, which is one ſpecies of virtue.

We paſs over *ſimilitude*, which is almoſt one and the ſame thing with *compariſon*; and *diſſimilitude*, which is confounded with *contraries*.

Contraries are greatly in uſe. They are frequently the beſt methods of ſetting forth a thought. If we begin by ſaying what a thing is not, the audience immediately ſet themſelves to find out what it really is. Moreover one deſcription in this way, ſerves as a kind of ſhade to ſet off another that is to follow. "Si je venois ici déplorer la "mort imprévue de quelque princeſſe mondaine "je n'aurois qu'à vous faire voir le monde avec

* Yet we find that Ariſtotle himſelf has given this figure a place in his rhetoric among the beauties of that art: It is nevertheleſs very poor and trifling, and is, I think, at preſent, univerſally exploded by all the maſters of polite writing or ſpeaking.

" ſes vanités & ſes inconſtances; cette foule de " figures que ſe préſentent à nos yeux, & qui " s'évanouiſſent; cette révolution de conditions " & de fortunes qui commencent & qui finiſſent, " qui ſe rélevent & qui retombent; cette viciſſi- " tude de corruptions, tantôt ſecrétes, tantôt vi- " ſibles, qui ſe renouvellent; cette ſuite de " changemens en nos corps, par la défaillance de " la nature, en nos ames par l'inſtabilité de nos " déſirs; enfin, ce dérangement univerſel & con- " tinuel des choſes humaines, qui tout naturel & " tout deſordonné qu'il ſemble à nos yeux, eſt " pourtant l'ouvrage de la main toute-puiſſante de " Dieu, & l'ordre de ſa providence. Mais, " graces au Seigneur, je viens louer une princeſſe " plus grande par ſa religion que par ſa naiſſance, " &c." *Flechier.*

Did I appear in this place to pay a mournful tribute to the memory of ſome worldly princeſs, I ſhould then have nothing more to more to do than ſet before you the vanity and and inconſtancy of this world and its poſſeſſions. The croud of objects that juſt preſent themſelves to the ſight, and diſappear again. The alternate exaltation and abatement of conditions and fortunes, the various ſcenes of corruption in private and public, which are continually renewed, the ſucceſſion of changes wrought in our bodies by the defects of

na-

nature, and in our ſouls by the mutability of our deſires; in fine, the univerſal and continual diſorder of all human things, that however natural or badly ordered it may appear to our eyes, is ſtill the handy work of an almighty being, and the diſpoſition of his providence. But, thanks be to God, I now preſent myſelf to ſpeak in praiſe of a princeſs yet greater by her piety than by her birth, &c.

Things that are *repugnant* ſerve to prove the impoſſibility of a fact. Peter is accuſed of having killed Paul. But Paul was his friend; he had no kind of intereſt in his death; he was at a conſiderable diſtance from him; it is therefore unlikely that he ſhould be the author of his death.

Circumſtances are of great weight in proofs. Milo is ſaid to have way-laid Clodius. But conſider the circumſtances he was in at that time; he was in a conveyance, wrapped up in cloaths that embarraſſed him, accompanied by his wife and her women, &c.

Sometimes thoughts, facts, and circumſtances are accumulated and thrown together to overwhelm as it were the audience with their force and number. "Turenne dies; all is in con-"fuſion: the fortune of the day ſtands irreſolute; "victory flags; peace grows more diſtant; the "late happy diſpoſition of the allies turns cool; "the ſoldiers are oppreſſed with grief; the whole

"camp remains ſilent and motionleſs," &c. *. The Latins gave the name of *conglobata* to this common place.

Antecedents and *conſequences* are ſuch things as precede or follow a fact, and help to diſcover its nature. You have had ſeveral diſputes with Clodius; you have even threatened him at times: theſe are the antecedents. He has been murdered; you have diſappeared on a ſudden; you ſeem to have apprehenſions of ſuch as were his friends: theſe are the conſequences.

In the laſt place, from a conſideration of cauſes and effects, we praiſe or blame an action; and adviſe to, or diſſuade from an enterpriſe. What can be more exalted and heroic than the action of the Horatii, if we conſider it in its motive? It was a ſolemn devoting themſelves to certain danger for the good of their country: the effect ariſing from thence was no doubt glorious; the honour of having ſaved their country.

Theſe ſeveral aſpects or faces are reckoned interior, as being part of the ſubject itſelf, either as cauſes, as parts, as relations, or as circumſtances.

* "Turenne meurt, tout ſe confond, la fortune chancéle, la victoire ſe laſſe, la paix s'éloigne, les bonnes intentions des alliés ſe ralentiſſent, le courage des troupes eſta abattu par la douleur, tout le camp demeure immobile," &c. *Fleth.*

They

They are drawn from the very nature or vitals of the cauſe *ex viſceribus rei*; on this account they have the denomination of interior places, to diſtinguiſh them from the exterior places, which are ſix in number, viz. Law, title, common-report, oath, queſtion, and witneſs. All pleas theſe excluſive of the cauſe; and without any of which taken ſeparately, the cauſe may ſubſiſt.

An oath, or confeſſion extorted by torments, and witneſſes, admits of no contradiction; or if there is any, it is nearly the ſame in almoſt every caſe. The oath may be repreſented as a perjury, the confeſſion drawn by torture, as the conſequence of preſent pain, rather than any impulſe of the conſcience. Witneſſes may be ſuborned, corrupted, &c.

As to law and titles, it is a diſcuſſion which belongs rather to the knowledge of the laws than to eloquence.

Common-report depends on the different intereſts concerned, and accordingly may be either the voice of truth or of falſhood; an idle tale or an oracle from heaven. We ſhall enlarge no farther on this matter of common places, as it may be found, with all its minute circumſtances, in moſt books of rhetoric, but ſhall content ourſelves with cautioning the young orator againſt being too ready to deſpiſe theſe helps with which art furniſhes genius on ſuch occaſions. They

often ſerve as a ſure clue to a bewildered mind. Why ſhould we not aſk ourſelves ſome ſuch queſtions as the following, when we have any ſubject in hand. What is it that I am about to undertake? Is it not to praiſe an extraordinary perſonnage? But what renders a man extraordinary? Being poſſeſſed of vices or virtues in a more eminent degree than is found among the generality of mankind: But have ſuch been found in the perſon I am about to ſpeak of? Let us trace the ſeveral circumſtances of his life. In one inſtance he has diſplayed the moſt heroic moderation: a ſoul of a common ſtamp would have acted quite in a different manner. In another inſtance he has given proofs of a ſurpriſing prudence and capacity: and the manner in which he has behaved has produced an effect that could hardly have been hoped for. And ſo on. Thoſe who have the moſt affected to deſpiſe common places, have been frequently obliged to have recourſe to them; and ſometimes without knowing it, have been indebted to them for the chief beauties of their performance.

Proofs are, of all the means of conviction, the moſt rigorous and effectual: they conſtitute the attack, and make the breach to enter victoriouſly at. But by his morals it is that the orator inſinuates himſelf inſenſibly into the minds of his hearers,

hearers, which he artfully diſpoſes by maens of theſe to a voluntary ſubſcription.

CHAP. II.

Morals.

MORALS are taken in two different ſenſes, in poetry and eloquence.

In poetry we have nothing to do with the poet, but only with the perſons he introduces. As to theſe, we do not regard whether they are virtuous or not, provided they are true, that is, that they bear a reſemblance to the hero who is deſcribed, or rather to the general idea had of him.

When we ſpeak of the morals, in eloquence, we conſider the virtue and probity of the orator. He muſt be a man of an upright character, and give us marks of his probity in every part of his diſcourſe. An orator was defined by the Heathens: *Vir bonus dicendi peritus*: a virtuous man ſkilful in ſpeech.

He ſhould be modeſt. Nothing ſo much offends the auditor as haughtineſs or preſumption in the perſon who is ſpeaking to him. In this caſe, he immediately puts on the ſtern judge and rigid cenſor, denying his aſſent to every thing that is in the leaſt diſputable. Nay, even where the caſe is the moſt clear he will neither be perſuaded nor convinced. This is not a place to enter upon the eu-

eulogium of modeſty, but thus much we may obſerve, that it is in general the diſtinguiſhing mark of true knowledge as well as true merit.

To the probity and modeſty of the orator we may join an attention or rather zeal in him for the good of thoſe who are his hearers. All men are naturally led to believe what is ſaid to them by thoſe they take to be their friends. When an orator appears to have our intereſt at heart, and ſeems to endeavour in good earneſt to do us ſervice, it is almoſt impoſſible we ſhould differ from him. He takes us by our weak ſide, the love we have for ourſelves.

A fourth quality is prudence, which neceſſarily implies an inlightened underſtanding. What would it benefit us to be under the guidance of a perſon, however worthy or much our friend, if he himſelf was ignorant of the right road?

It ſhould be the endeavour therefore of every orator, to eſtabliſh his authority on theſe four virtues, and to diſplay them through the whole of his diſcourſe. When he has the poſſeſſion of theſe in himſelf, and is moreover perfectly maſter of his ſubject, we immediately feel the whole weight of his authority. His very appearance begets our confidence. When a preacher, fired with a becoming ſenſe of the dignity of his office and a warm zeal for the welfare of ſouls, who to

a thorough reading and meditation on the divine writings joins the ſolid practice of the Chriſtian virtues, when ſuch an one I ſay mounts the pulpit of Chriſt, all his words, thoughts, and expreſſions will bear evident marks of his divine miſſion, and diſplay the integrity of his own morals. He will be heard with the utmoſt degree of attention and pleaſure, and whenever he ſpeaks it will be to edification. How delightful is it to have a man of probity and knowledge to rely on! we follow in full ſecurity wherever he leads the way, never troubling ourſelves after any other path than that which he points out to us. *Autoritati credere magnum compendium nullus labor.* St. Aug.

CHAP. III.

Of the Paſſions.

THERE is yet a third means of perſuaſion, and that is by employing the paſſions: theſe are dangerous inſtruments indeed, in any other hands than thoſe of reaſon, but more efficacious than even reaſon itſelf, when accompanied and aſſiſted by it. It is by the help of the paſſions that eloquence triumphs, and exerts its empire over our hearts. He who has the art of raiſing theſe properly, is at any time maſter of our minds; and can at pleaſure make us paſs from

ſorrow

ſorrow to joy, from pity to rage, vehement as a tempeſt, penetrating as lightening, and rapid as a torrent; he ſurmounts all obſtacles, and the flood of his nervous eloquence carries all before it. Thus ſpeaks one of the greateſt maſters in the art *. By this Demoſthenes reigned in the Areopagus; Cicero in the Roſtrum, and Bourdaloue in the pulpit.

Que dans tous vos diſcours la paſſion émue,
Aille chercher le cœur, l'échauffe & le remue, &c.
Boil. †.

In all you write, obſerve with care and art
To move the paſſions and incline the heart.
If, in a labor'd act, the pleaſing rage
Cannot our hopes and fears by turns engage,
Nor in our mind a feeling pity raiſe,
In vain with learned ſcenes you fill your plays:
Your cold diſcourſe can never move the mind
Of a ſtern critic, nat'rally unkind;
Who, juſtly tir'd with your pedantic flight,
Or falls aſleep, or cenſures all you write.
The ſecret is, attention firſt to gain;
To move our minds and then to entertain.

But to give a clear idea of what is meant in this place by the word paſſions, we muſt take the mat-

* Cic. de Oratore.
† Art. poet. Chant. 3.

ter

ter a little higher, and enter into a kind of detail of the faculties and operations of the ſoul.

Though the ſoul in itſelf be one, and indiviſible, there are nevertheleſs to be diſtinguiſhed two different parts as it were. We ſay, I *conceive* what you ſay to me, but I *will* not do it. This way of ſpeaking ſignifies that our ſoul both *conceives* and *wills*, and that to *conceive* is not the ſame thing as to *will*. The faculty by which the ſoul conceives, is called underſtanding; that by which it wills, is termed the will. We ſay, a perſon is a man of great underſtanding, or (which is the ſame thing) a very intelligent man, when he clearly, readily, and eaſily conceives what is propoſed to him. The office of the underſtanding then, is to perceive, know, and comprehend. That of the will, to love, hate, approve, or diſapprove.

From the intimate connection ſubſiſting between the will and the underſtanding, whatever is offered to the view of the one, neceſſarily makes an impreſſion on the other. And according as this impreſſion is agreable or diſagreable, the will approves or diſapproves of the object that occaſions it.

When theſe impreſſions are ſlight, they produce what we call ſentiments, or notions, and the gentle paſſions, ſuch as friendſhip, gaiety, taſte

taſte. The ſoul not being in this caſe diſturbed by any of thoſe violent ſhocks which confound her, but only excited juſt ſo much as is neceſſary to put her into exerciſe and procure her the pleaſure ariſing from being in action. Theſe when found in a diſcourſe only in ſuch a degree as here mentioned, are ſometimes termed morals, becauſe the emotion they throw into the diſcourſe does in ſome meaſure reſemble that of a moderate man who acts from ſome view or intereſt, but without being carried away by any over violent ſentiment.

When the impreſſions are lively and violent, then it is that they are properly called paſſions. They are impetuous motions carrying us away towards an object, or averting us from it.

As the different appellations of genius, judgment, imagination or memory, are given to the mind, according to the different methods it obſerves in operating on its objects, in like manner does the will take its different denominations from the particular manner in which it determines itſelf towards any thing. When it is inclinable to unite itſelf to any object which is preſented to it, it is called love.

To excite this paſſion in thoſe we are ſpeaking to, we muſt ſet forth the object with all the qualities that can poſſibly make it appear agreable and uſeful to thoſe we ſpeak to.

Deſ-

Deſpreaux thus endeavours to inſpire a love for Louis XIV.

Tel fut cet Empereur ſous qui Rome adorée
Vit renaître les jours de Saturne & de Rhée,
Qui rendit de ſon joug l'univers amoureux,
Qu'on n'alla jamais voir ſans revenir heureux,
Qui ſoupiroit le ſoir ſi ſa main fortunée
N'avoit par ſes bienfaits ſignalé la journée...
Mais où cherche-je ailleurs ce qu'on trouve chez nous?
Grand Roi, ſans recourir aux hiſtoires antiques,
Ne t'avons-nous pas vu dans les plaines Belgiques,
Quand l'ennemi vaincu déſertant ſes ramparts,
Au-devant de ton joug couroit de toutes parts,
Toi-même te borner, au fort de la victoire,
Et chercher dans la paix une plus juſte gloire? *Boil.**

Such was that emperor †, whoſe indulgent reign
Reſtor'd Saturnian times in Rome again;
The Romans then the days of Rhæa knew,
Happy, as ere to Heaven Aſtræa flew:
He only for the good of all was arm'd,
And all were with the pleaſant bondage charm'd.
Still to be doing good was his delight,
And when he loſt a day he figh'd at night:...

* Epit. i. au Roi.
† Titus.

But

But why ſhould I ſo far go back, when we,
Great KING, as great a bleſſing have in Thee?
Why ſhould I fondly to old ſtories fly?
Our own a bright example will ſupply.
Have not we ſeen Thee in the Belgic field
In peace amid a thouſand triumphs yield?
When hoſtile leagues before thy banner fled,
And vict'ry thy reſiſtleſs armies led:
Men whom thy foes did for thy yoke prepare,
Nobly forego the glories of the war,
Command the battle and its rage to ceaſe,
And ſeek a juſter Fame in gentle peace?

A love for a rural life, for liberty, eaſe, labor, or virtue, is to be raiſed by ſetting forth the advantages or pleaſures ariſing from them in the ſtrongeſt light they are capable of receiving.

If the will has a tendency to averſion for any object, it is called hatred. This paſſion is to be excited by means the very reverſe of thoſe which are uſed to produce love. Cicero has furniſhed us with ſome very fine examples of this kind in his orations againſt Verres, Philip, and Catiline.

Theſe two paſſions, love and hatred, are the baſis of all the others; as including the two relations which the ſoul has with good and evil. When evil is preſent, the affection of the ſoul occaſioned thereby is ſorrow or grief, and when abſent

abſent and attended with a likelihood of being able to avoid it, it is fear; when it is not to be avoided, it is diſpair: if we perceive it in others, but with a poſſibility of befalling ourſelves, it is compaſſion.

It is the ſame with good. When preſent it inſpires joy; when abſent, but with ſome views of obtaining it, it is hope. If we ſee it in others in a manner prejudicial to ourſelves, it is envy: if others attempt to diveſt us of it when in our poſſeſſion, it produces anger. It would be very eaſy to lengthen out this detail, and produce a multiplicity of examples in ſupport of it; every tragic poet abounding with them throughout. Beſides, we are ſufficiently ſenſible of them when we meet with them in authors. When it is neceſſary to expreſs them, we muſt firſt feel them ourſelves, for there is no attaining a proper ſenſe of them from any ſyſtem or body of Rules. We ſhall hereafter treat of the method of expreſſing them.

ARTICLE SECOND.

Of Disposition.

CHAP. I.

In what it consists.

DISPOSITION, in the oratorial art, consists in arranging the several parts furnished by invention, in such a manner as is most suitable to the nature and interest of the subject in hand. The fruitfulness of the imagination shines in invention, and prudence and judgment appear in disposition.

Every work, to be compleat, should have a beginning, middle, and end. An oratorial discourse then should in the first place have an exordium, then should follow the narrations or proofs, and last of all a conclusion of some kind or other, that should at least give to understand that every thing is said.

The exordium is that part of the discourse by which we engage the attention of the auditors for what is to follow. The narration is a short and clear exposition of a matter of fact. A proof is a reasoning serving to establish the truth of a proposition. Every one knows what is meant by a conclusion. Things already evident in themselves are only rendered obscure by attempting to explain them. We will now take a view of these

several

ſeveral parts, and examine the conduct which art preſcribes to the orator with relation to each of them.

CHAP. II.

Of the exordium.

THE exordium conſtitutes a very important part of the diſcourſe, as being that by which we are to diſpoſe the minds of the hearers to a favorable reception of what is going to be ſaid. On this account all maſters of rhetoric have laid it down as a rule, to have the exordium ingenious, modeſt, ſhort, and taken immediately from the ſubject itſelf.

The orators among the Greeks and Romans had always a number of theſe ready at hand in almoſt every kind; ſome drawn from the perſon himſelf who was ſpeaking, or from thoſe who were the hearers; from the judges, from circumſtances of place, time, &c. Theſe they adjuſted in the beſt manner they could to the ſubject, reſerving to themſelves the liberty of retouching them or ſubſtituting others in their places, as the oration was to be delivered in public or private. Now-a-days our orators do not approve of ſo much art. If they are preſſed upon to ſpeak upon the ſpot, they lay hold of the firſt exordium that preſents

ſents itſelf, or if none is at hand they enter directly upon the matter without any preparation.

It is required that the exordium be ingenious: but it is not meant by this that it ſhould be flaſhy, or ſparkling with points or antitheſes, but moderate, and heightened with ſuch a degree of wit only as may be neceſſary to beget a favorable opinion of the talents, genius, and good ſenſe of the orator, that it ſhould ſet forth in a proper manner what is to follow, and determine the auditors to a proper attention,

2d. It ſhould be modeſt. This is a quality which greatly enhances the value both of the talents and probity of the orator, and which accordingly he ſhould above all things be careful to preſerve at his firſt ſetting out in his diſcourſe. The ſelf-love of the auditor is ſo delicate, ſo eaſily offended, and the behaviour of one who ſets himſelf up to give leſſons to others, borders ſo near upon arrogance, that the greateſt art is required in taking the firſt ſteps ſo as not to diſpleaſe. Thoſe who are authoriſed by the divine miſſion may indeed be allowed to preſent themſelves with the utmoſt confidence, as being ambaſſadors of the truth. But even in this caſe we can eaſily diſtinguiſh that confidence which ariſes from the miniſtry, from that which belongs to the miniſter. The one adds a double weight and force to his elo-

eloquence, the other only deſtroys and renders it of none effect.

3°. The third and laſt quality of the exordium, is to be ſhort, conciſe; that is, in a degree ſuitable to the length of the diſcourſe. One is not to place a dwarf's head on a giant's ſhoulders, nor a giant's head on the neck of a dwarf. If we cannot preſerve a juſt proportion, it would be better to have the exordium too ſhort than too long. Nothing is ſo irkſome to an audience as the proſpect of a long and tedious diſcuſſion.

Exordiums are uſually diſtinguiſhed into two kinds: The one, which ſets out by way of inſinuation, as when it is neceſſary to diſpoſe the minds of the hearers by little and little, to adopt the opinion intended to be inſpired, or gently to bring them off their prejudices. All pleadings, ſermons, or diſcourſes, in which the orator addreſſes himſelf to his auditors in a cool and deliberate manner, ſhould begin in this way: For, as Cicero very juſtly remarks, one who in ſuch a caſe ſhould break out into tranſports at the firſt word, would be like a drunken man in the midſt of a company of ſober perſons: *ebrius inter ſobrios.* But when the audience have their minds impreſſed with a lively grief, an exceſs of joy, or a violent indignation, then indeed there is no hazard in breaking out at once with "How far, O Cati-

" line, wilt thou abuſe our patience? How long " ſhall thy frantic rage baffle the efforts of juſtice? " To what height meaneſt thou to carry thy da- " ring inſolence?" In this manner does Cicero begin his firſt oration againſt Catiline. The ſenate were aſſembled. The orator was about to addreſs himſelf to them in a ſet ſpeech, when, on a ſudden, Catiline appears. The ſenators are ſeized with a panic: Cicero himſelf, who was conſul, was under no leſs apprehenſion than the reſt; but indignation got the upper hand of his other paſſions: And he ſets out with precipitation, and darts like lightning upon his enemy. This kind of exordium is, in terms of art, called *exordium ex abrupto.*

The propoſition at the end of the exordium naturally follows. This is an expoſition of the end propoſed by the diſcourſe, and ſhould be clear, direct, and compriſed in few words. It would be needleſs to demonſtrate this by a chain of reaſonings, as it is ſufficiently obvious of itſelf.

Immediately after the propoſition comes the diviſion, if there is any. Thoſe of the rhetoricians who are the moſt ſtrict, have found fault with the glittering antitheſis, which orators of an ingenious and lively turn ſometimes introduce into their diviſions. But I think it appears probable, that if theſe were under proper reſtrictions, they might be an aſſiſtance to the auditor, in laying hold

hold of the principal branches of the ſubject. Tho' it is certain, on the other hand, that if theſe branches are preſented in a clear and diſtinct manner, they will not ſtand in need of any figures to impreſs them ſtronger on the mind. The following is the propoſition and diviſion made uſe of by Cicero, in his oration for the poet Archias: "It "is not juſt that Archias ſhould be deprived of "the privileges of a Roman citizen: 1°. Becauſe "he is a citizen. 2°. Becauſe, was he not, he "has deſerved to be made one *."

CHAP. III.

Narration or recital

IN the judiciary kind, the narrative generally follows the diviſion; becauſe here the proofs ought to ariſe from the facts. The chief art of this part then will be found to conſiſt in making, in the firſt expoſition, a kind of half diſplay of ſuch proofs as are propoſed to be made uſe of afterwards, by which means they will appear more natural, and have more the air of truth, when they come to be drawn out at length in the argumentation.

The order and detail of the narration ought to be both relative to the ſame end. Care is to be taken to place every favorable circumſtance in

* Cicer. Orat. IX. pro Archiâ poetâ.

the ſtrongeſt and faireſt light, without omitting one. But for thoſe which make againſt the cauſe, they are to be left in the dark, or only taken notice of in a curſory manner, and that on the weakeſt and leaſt advantageous ſide, for there would often be more danger in omitting them entirely, than in thus making a ſlight mention of them, for the adverſary would not fail to take advantage of your ſilence, and to make uſe of it as a tacit avowal, on your ſide, of the validity of thoſe facts, and by this means eaſily overturn the good effects that might otherwiſe ariſe from your proofs. The whole art of this kind of recital is to be met with in that which Cicero makes of the murder of Clodius by Milo.

CHAP. IV.

Proofs.

THE orator has two things to bring about by his proof, *viz.* To eſtabliſh his propoſition by employing every means that his cauſe can afford him—And, to refute thoſe made uſe of by his adverſary againſt him. He muſt be able both to build up and to pull down.

Sometimes he ſets out with refutation, if he perceives that his adverſary has already made a conſiderable impreſſion on the minds of the audience; ſo

ſo that his proofs are likely to be ill received, unleſs he can firſt remove their prepoſſeſſion.

A ſkilful orator knows his judges, and in what manner to deal with them. Oftentimes the beſt reaſons are not thoſe that have the moſt effect. The whole depends on the particular ſituation of the mind on which they fall. A demonſtration paſſes for a trifling ſubtility, or a mere ſubtility for a mathematical demonſtration, according to the difference of minds, taſtes, ages, and intereſts.

In the arrangement or drawing up of the proofs, rhetoricians have adviſed to have an eye upon that of an army. The moſt bold and vigorous are to be placed in the front rank, as it often happens that the whole ſucceſs depends upon the firſt onſet. Another body of choſen troops are to be ſet apart as a *corps de reſerve*, to give the finiſhing ſtroke, and make ſure of the victory. In the centre are to be diſtributed ſuch whoſe courage and abilities are ſomewhat doubtful; ſo that if they are not diſpoſed of themſelves to move forward to the fight, they may, by virtue of this poſition, be puſhed on by thoſe behind. And this appears very juſt in ſpeculation; but it is frequently found, that matters require a very different diſpoſition when we come to take the field. Every ſubject has its proper rules, and it depends on the prudence and good ſenſe of the orator, to diſcover

theſe, and follow them accordingly. The whole that has been ſaid, may be reduced to the recommending, above all things, perſpicuity and exactneſs.

If a proof is too fine ſpun, it becomes weak and feeble; if too contracted, it loſes for want of reach, and falls ſhort of its aim, as redundancy of words overload it; ſo a too great brevity renders it obſcure, and prevents it from exerting its full force.

For my own part, I think the orator, in his proof, may be very aptly compared to a man running a race. You ſee him continually bending towards the end of his courſe. Born forwards by his own weight, which acts in concert with the tenſion of his muſcles, and the motion of his feet, ſo that every part of him concurs in adding to his ſwiftneſs. Bourdaloue Boſſuet, among the moderns, Demoſthenes and Cicero among the ancients, are perfect models in this as well as the other parts of oratory. We join the career, and keep pace with them to the end. Our thoughts are carried away by the rapidity of theirs, and though at times we loſe ſight of their proofs and reaſonings, yet we judge of their ſolidity from the conviction we feel wrought in us by them.

Refutation requires a great deal of art; becauſe it is much more difficult to heal a wound than to make one. Sometimes contempt alone will be ſuffi-

ſufficient to refute an adverſary. Thus Scipio confounded an impudent tribune of the people, who was accuſing him of miſmanagement of the public revenues. "Friends, ſays he, (ſtarting up on a "ſudden) I remember it was on this very day "that I defeated Hannibal; come on, let us to "the temple to return thanks to the gods, and "leave this worthleſs fellow *(nebulo)* to himſelf." *A. Gell.*

Sometimes the argument may be retorted on the adverſary. The philoſopher Protagoras, who was a great ſophiſt and rhetorician, had agreed with his diſciple Euathlus, for a conſiderable ſum to be paid him by this latter, upon the firſt cauſe he ſhould gain. The time ſeeming long to the maſter, he ſued the other for the money, and this was the argument he made uſe of on the occaſion. Either you will loſe your cauſe, or you will gain it. If you loſe it, you will be obliged to pay me in virtue of the ſentence given againſt you by the judge; if you gain it, you muſt alſo pay me in virtue of agreement between us.

To this the diſciple made the following anſwer: I muſt either loſe my cauſe or gain it. If I loſe my cauſe, I owe you nothing, in virtue of the agreement between us: if I gain my cauſe, I ſhall owe you nothing, in virtue of the ſentence given in my favor by the judges.

When the objection admits of a refutation in form, it is to be made by contrary arguments, drawn either from circumſtances, the nature of the thing itſelf, or from other common places.

When it appears to carry too great a weight with it, it ſhould be paſſed over as if not attended to, or an anſwer may be promiſed to it ſome other time, and then proceed inſenſibly to another ſubject: Or take occaſion to amuſe with a ſtroke of wit or a *bon-mot*. In this manner did an Athenian orator, who undertook to refute Demoſthenes, who had juſt ſet every thing in a flame and uproar, begin by ſaying, That it was no matter of wonder, that Demoſthenes and he were of different opinions, ſince that orator was well known to be a great drinker of water, and himſelf drank only wine. This paltry piece of wit immediately extinguiſhed all the flame that prince of orators had been laboring to raiſe.

Laſtly, when there is no warding off the blow, nothing is left but to own the crime, and have recourſe to prayers and tears, to avert the impending ſtorm.

CHAP. V.

The per-oration.

THE per-oration is the concluſion of the diſcourſe. This uſually comprehends a recapitulation of the moſt ſtriking circumſtances that have been made uſe of in the courſe of it, for the conviction or perſuaſion of auditors; after which the propoſition is once more ſet to view as reſulting from the ſeveral reaſons already advanced.

ARTICLE THIRD.

Of the ORATORIAL ELOCUTION.

WE have paſſed pretty briefly over the two preceding articles of invention and diſpoſition, for two reaſons: The firſt is, that after what we have already ſaid in the two former volumes, concerning the functions of the genius and taſte, and the application of their reſpective rules, it cannot but be very eaſy to form an idea of what muſt naturally reſult therefrom, with regard to eloquence. The ſecond, which is furniſhed us by Cicero himſelf, is, that it is ſufficient to give ſome general notions concerning them, to ſhew their force, and to admoniſh the

Orator, that whatever is requiſite for him to ſay, ought always to be inſpired by the cauſe he has in hand, and manage in a manner the moſt conducive to his intereſt therein. His own good ſenſe will point him out the path he is to tread in, and furniſh him with means for arriving at the end of his journey *Hæc propria magis prudentiæ quam eloquentiæ.*

But it is not the ſame thing with reſpect to elocution. Thoſe poſſeſſed of the brighteſt underſtanding and genius, may want to be put in mind of a multitude of little particulars that eſcape the general obſervation, but on which however depends almoſt the whole effect of eloquence; ſo called not merely from invention and diſpoſition, though they are the moſt ſubſtantial parts of it, but from elocution, which ſeems to do more than all the reſt put together, on the minds of the auditors.

The Greek and Latin rhetoricians entered into very nice diſcuſſions on theſe matters. They went ſo far as to count the letters and ſyllables, meaſure the words, and even to calculate the time required to pronounce each. They muſt doubtleſs have had their own reaſons for doing thus, and have ſuppoſed that carrying their obſervations to ſuch a degree of nicety contributed to the greater perfection of their eloquence.

As to us moderns, we look upon ſuch things as trifles, below the attention of a happy genius.

From

From a general perſuaſion that the ſtyle, to be good ſhould flow natural and eaſy, we think that in cramping it by a number of rules we rob it of the greateſt part of its beauties; as if it were not thoſe very rules, when once we have gained a habitude of obſerving and applying them, that give the elocution all that eaſe and freedom we require in it.

It is by rules that we are taught to know the agreement of ſounds, and how to blend them with each other in the moſt intimate manner; rules furniſh us with the means of keeping up the attention of our auditors, and of ſoothing and drawing them to our own purpoſes. In a word, it is by them that the ſoul is laid open to perſuaſion, and they alone form all the difference between good and indifferent writers.

CHAP. I.

What is meant by elocution.

THOUGHT may be expreſſed three ways: by the tone of voice, as when we ſigh; by geſture, as when we make ſigns to any one to advance or retire; and by ſpeech, as in pronouncing certain words. The two firſt ways of expreſſion belong to pronunciation; the laſt is what we call elocution.

Elocution then is in general an expreſſion of thought by ſpeech.

As the expreſſion and thought have each the ſame object and acknowledge the ſame rules, we ſhall conſtantly conſider them together, and ſo make them ſerve as a ſupport and proof of one another. And here we muſt beg leave to enter into particulars.

Thought is in general a repreſentation of ſome one thing in the mind, as when we repreſent to ourſelves *the Sun*.

Expreſſion is in general a repreſentation of the thought. I think of *the ſun*, and I ſay *ſun*; here my thought is expreſſed.

We have obſerved a little above, that there are three kinds of thoughts; idea, judgment, and reaſoning; and that the expreſſion of theſe three was termed propoſition and argument *.

When an idea includes ſeveral other ideas, it is then called complex. *A tree adorned with bloſſoms, and full of fruit. A large houſe, and richly furniſhed.* But when it is ſingle and diſtinct from any other, then it is called a ſimple idea.

The judgment, or propoſition, contains three parts; one which has another joined to it, *the ſun*; a ſecond, which is the thing joined, *round*;

* See page 22.

the

the third, by which the other two are joined or connected, *is*. *The ſun is round.*

The firſt of theſe is called the *ſubject*;

The ſecond, the *attribute*;

The third, the *copula* or *connection*.

The propoſition is ſometimes contained in a ſingle word, as *love*; which is as much as to ſay, *be ye loving*: ſometimes it has two words, as, *I love*, that is, *I am loving*: frequently it has three, as, *I am loved*. Theſe three propoſitions are ſimple, as having only one ſubject and one attribute; thoſe which have ſeveral, are compounded, and are called *complicated* or complex.

In the complex propoſition, we diſtinguiſh the principal propoſition and incidental propoſition. Theſe belong either to the ſubject or the attribute. *The diffidence of thoſe who ſpeak in public is rational*: the diffidence is *rational*, is the principal propoſition; *of thoſe who are ſpeaking in public*, is the incidental one; becauſe it reſts upon or falls in with the ſubject of the principal propoſition. If we have a mind to add one to the attribute alſo, we may ſay, *The diffidence of thoſe who ſpeak in public is the effect of an enlightened reaſon*. Propoſitions of this kind are to be met with in every book.

The reader will find ſome particulars relating to the reaſonings at the beginning of the firſt article, to which we beg leave to refer him.

There

There are then three ſorts of thoughts, *viz.* idea, judgment, and reaſoning; and likewiſe three kinds of expreſſions for theſe, *viz.* term, propoſition, and argument. Let us now ſee what are their qualities.

CHAP. II.

The qualities of elocution.

THERE are two ſorts of qualities belonging to the thoughts and expreſſions, one which we may call logical, as being required by reaſon and good ſenſe. The others are the qualities of taſte, as it is the taſte that decides concerning them. The former make the ſubſtance of the diſcourſe, the other the ſeaſoning or embelliſhment of it.

The logical qualities.

The firſt eſſential quality of a thought is, that it be true, that it repreſents the thing ſuch as it really is. If I repreſent to myſelf the ſun as a round and luminous body appearing to paſs along the heavens, my thought is true: but if I repreſent it as a ſquare opaque body, appearing to the ſight as immoveable, my thought is falſe.

The expreſſion is true when it repreſents to others the thought ſuch as we ourſelves have it. It is falſe when it does not repreſent our thought

to

to others, or repreſents it in a different manner from what we have it ourſelves.

To this firſt quality belongs juſtneſs. A thought perfectly true is always juſt. Nevertheleſs, cuſtom hath placed a kind of difference between the truth and the juſtneſs of a thought: The truth of a thought in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, ſignifies that conformity a thought bears to its object: juſtneſs rather ſhews the extent of that thought.

The thought then is true when it repreſents the object, and it is juſt when it has neither a greater nor leſs extent than that object. The expreſſion alſo will be true when it repreſents the thought, and juſt when it has neither more nor leſs extent than it. If it has more it will be looſe, if it has leſs the thought will be cramped and in a manner ſtrangled.

The ſecond quality is clearneſs, nay indeed it may in ſome meaſure be ſaid to be the firſt, for a thought that is not clear, is not properly a thought. Clearneſs conſiſts in a plain and diſtinct view of the object that we repreſent to ourſelves; when this appears without cloud or obſcurity, the thought is plain; when it appears ſeparate and detached from all other objects, then it is diſtinct.

The expreſſion is clear, when it repreſents the thought ſuch as it is without equivocation or confuſion

fuſion, and by the particular word and turn that belongs to it, and no other.

The generality of people know but very little the language they ſpeak, and yet leſs how to give an exact account to themſelves of their own thoughts, or to ſeparate them from one another, and conſider each in its proper light. Hence it frequently happens that they make uſe of words without any clear idea annexed to them, or if their ideas are clear, they do not make uſe of words proper to expreſs them by. One knows but half of what they are ſaying: they diſpute without underſtanding one another, when nothing but a definition is wanting all the while to put an end to the quarrel.

The firſt ſtep then to expreſs a thought, is to underſtand it thoroughly, to ſeparate it from whatever does not make a part of it, and fully to inveſtigate its ſeveral appearances. This done, the expreſſion will follow of itſelf.

Ce que l'on conçoit bien s'anonce clairement
Les mots pour l'exprimer arrivent aiſement.

Things well conceiv'd, may clearly be explain'd,
And words t'expreſs them are with eaſe obtain'd.

And to this are reducible all the logical qualities, without which there can be nothing of elegance in works of literature. But in order to pleaſe, it is not enough that there are barely no

defects,

defects, there muſt alſo be beauties, and theſe are the peculiar gifts of taſte.

CHAP. III.

Qualities of taſte.

WHatever beauties or graces the thoughts and expreſſions in a diſcourſe are ſuſceptible of, ariſe from knowing how to ſelect them from the group that preſents itſelf, and to diſpoſe and order them in the moſt ſuitable manner. Hence all the rules of elocution may be reduced to theſe two, choice and diſpoſition.

The choice of the words and thought.

As ſoon as any ſubject is propoſed to the mind, the firſt appearance under which it ſhews itſelf produces certain ideas: on conſidering it in a different light, it produces another ſet of ideas: on a ſtill more ſtrict examination, we diſcover a new ſtore. Each ſucceſſive exertion of the mind brings forth freſh fruit; till at length the whole ſoil is covered with a plentiful harveſt. But amidſt this abundance of productions, all cannot be alike good.

There are certain thoughts which ſhine with a falſe ſplendor, and have nothing ſolid to ſupport them. There are others which anſwer no purpoſe, nor have the leaſt reſemblance with the ob-

ject

ject they pretend to repreſent. Others again are weak and trifling, and have all the clearneſs of water, with all its inſipidity. Some are low and creeping, and fall ſhort of the dignity of the ſubject; and laſtly, others are monſtrous, and tower out of all reach of conception: productions in either of theſe kinds are fit for nothing, and to be ſet aſide as paltry ſtuff.

Among theſe thoughts that have a title to our attention, and deſerve to be employed, are, firſt, the common and natural, which occur to every man of ſenſe and underſtanding, and ſeem to riſe of themſelves from the ſubject without pains or labor. Theſe give the die in grain, and form the true ground-work of the piece. In the next rank are thoſe which have ſome quality of their own to ſet them off, as vivacity, ſtrength, richneſs, boldneſs, gracefulneſs, nicety, dignity, &c. for we ſhall not here pretend to make a nice enumeration of the ſeveral kinds of pleaſing thoughts.

The lively thought is that which repreſents its object in a clear light, and in a few ſtrokes. It ſtrikes the mind by its clearneſs, and in a ſudden manner too by its brevity. It darts like a ray of light. When the ideas are long in coming, and through a tedious length of ſigns, there is no room room for the momentary impulſe. But when Medea is aſked, What reſource ſhe has left againſt ſo many enemies? *Myſelf*, replies ſhe. This is light-

lightening. The ſame may be ſaid of the HAVE DIED *of Horatius the father.*

The ſtrong or nervous thought has not that ſudden effect which the lively one has. But then it makes a deeper impreſſion on the mind; and traces its objects thereon in the moſt laſting colors; it engraves them in characters never to be effaced. Mr. Boſſuet, when he is admiring the pyramids of Ægypt, ſtructures intended by their royal architects to elude the united efforts of Time and Death, adds, by a happy turn of reflection, that they are tombs and burying places. The thought here is very ſtrong and forcible. *Pleaſures make to themſelves wings and fly away.* Here the idea ariſing from pleaſures on the wing ſtrongly images the rapidity of their flight.

The bold thought, abounds with ſtrokes and colors of an extraordinary nature, and ſeemingly out of rule. When Deſpreaux ventured to write this line. *Le chagrin monte en croupe et galope avec lui.* He ſtood in need of the ſanction of example and the approbation of friends. If we repreſent to ourſelves vexation mounted behind the knight on his courſer, it is certainly a very bold metaphor; but for the poet to keep up the thought and make this allegorical perſonage galop off with his knight, is doubtleſs going rather too far and expoſing himſelf to cenſure.

We

We ſufficiently underſtand what is meant by a lively thought. Its ſmartneſs is commonly occaſioned by an encountering of ideas.

Qu'a ſon grés deſormais la fortune me joue
On me verra dormir au branle de ſa roue. *Boil.*

Let fortune play me all the tricks ſhe will,
I'll ſleep ſecurely on her whirling wheel.

Here we ſee the wheel of fortune, which raiſes or overturns the greateſt empires, ſerving only to rock the philoſopher to reſt.

A rich thought is that which preſents at one and the ſame time not only the object but the manner of exiſting in that object as well as in other objects which ſurround it, in order to make the impreſſion the greater by this aſſemblage of ideas.

Prens ta foudre Louis.
Take thy thunderbolt oh Louis!

The ſingle word *foudre*, thunderbolt, paints to us in the moſt expreſſive manner, an encenſed deity, on the point of attacking his foes, and reducing them to duſt. And in the following,

Et la ſcene Francoiſe eſt ne proie a Pradon.
Beneath Pradon the murder'd ſtage expires.

What a furious man, or rather monſter, are we to ſuppoſe this Pradon to be! who thus inhumanly mangles the poor ſtage; that expires under his feet.

The

The nice or ſubtle thought repreſents the object only in part, and leaves us to gueſs at the reſt. We have an example of this in the following epigram of Mr. de Maucroix:

Ami, je vois beaucoup de bien
Dans le parti qu'on me propoſe:
Mais toutefois ne preſſons rien.
Prendre femme eſt étrange choſe;
On doit y penſer mûrement.
Gens ſages, en qui je me fie,
M'ont dit que c'eſt fait prudenment
Que d'y penſer toute ſa vie.

Or this, from Buchanan:

Says George to William, neighbour, have a care,
Touch not that tree—'tis ſacred to deſpair;
Two wives I had, but, ah! that joy is paſt!
Who breath'd upon thoſe fatal boughs their laſt.
The beſt in all the row, without diſpute,
Says Will—Wou'd mine but bear ſuch precious fruit!
When next you prune your orchard, ſave for me,
I have a ſpouſe, one cyon of that tree.

Sometimes it repreſents one object by the help of another. That which is intended to be repreſented, is as it were concealed behind the other, as when we have the idea of a book to be found only in a grocer's or chandler's ſhop.

The

The poetical thought is that whoſe uſe is wholly confined to poetry, as being too ſhining and ſtudied for proſe.

The ſimple thought ſprings naturally from the ſubject, and preſents itſelf, of its own accord, to the mind without being ſought after, as for example:

Un Boucher moribond voyant ſa femme en pleurs,
Lui dit: Ma femme, ſi je meurs,
Comme en notre métier un homme eſt néceſſaire,
Jacques, notre garçon, ſeroit bien ton affaire:
C'eſt un fort bon enfant, ſage, & que tu connois,
Epouſe-le, crois-moi, tu ne ſaurois mieux faire.
Helas! dit-elle, j'y ſongeois.

Thus Engliſhed.

A butcher on his death-bed laid,
Thus to his weeping conſort ſaid;
My dear—nay prithee dry thy tears—
A man you'll want in your affairs.
There's James, a ſober honeſt lad,
You know him well, I ſhould be glad
You would him for a ſecond take,
A better choice you'll hardly make.
Alas! reply'd the ſobbing dame,
I juſt was thinking of the ſame.

There are ſome thoughts which take their characters immediately from the nature of the object. Theſe are called, noble, grand, ſublime, graceful,

ful, mournful, &c. according as the object itſelf is noble, grand, &c.

There is yet another ſpecies of thoughts, ſo called by way of excellence, without being characteriſed by any peculiar quality of their own. Theſe are in general ſuch reflections as are made by the author himſelf, and as fully blended with his ſubject. Sometimes it is a maxim in morality and politics. *Nothing works more upon a people than goodneſs.* Sometimes it is a lively and pictureſque idea: *Theſe young warriors* (ſpeaking of the three Horatii) *carried in themſelves alone the courage and valor of the whole Roman people.*

Theſe ſeveral kinds of thoughts have as many different ſorts of expreſſions anſwering to them. In like manner as there are common thoughts, and thoughts with ſomething to ſet them off, ſo are there proper terms, undiſtinguiſhed by any particular ornament; and borrowed terms, which are for the moſt part diſtinguiſhed by a character of vivacity, richneſs, &c. to repreſent thoughts of the ſame nature and kind. For an expreſſion to be juſt, ſhould for the generality be in the ſame taſte with the thought.

I ſay for the generality: becauſe it may happen that the expreſſion ſhall have a character which is not found in the thought. For example, the expreſſion may be ſubtle without the thought being ſo. When Hypolitus ſays, in ſpeaking of Aricia;

Aricia; *If I hated her I would not fly her.* Here the thought is not ſubtle, but the expreſſion is; for it expreſſes the thought but by halves. Again, the expreſſion may be bold, and the thought not ſo, and *vice verſâ.* The ſame holds good with reſpect to almoſt all the other qualities of thoughts.

This difference between the quality of the thought and expreſſion, is occaſioned by the diverſity of the rules of nature and art in this point. It would be natural for the thought and expreſſion to have the ſame character, but art has its reaſons for doing otherwiſe. Sometimes by means of a ſtrength in the expreſſion, a body is given to a thought otherwiſe weak and poor; at others, the ſoftneſs of the one tempers the harſhneſs of the other: if a narration is tedious, it is made ſhort by a richneſs in the expreſſions. If an object is baſe or contemptible, it is wrapt up or dreſſed ſo as to appear more decent: and ſo in other caſes.

Proper terms are thoſe which are employed in their primitive and natural ſignification, as when I call *plant* a plant, *lyon* a lyon.

Borrowed terms are thoſe which are employed in a foreign ſignification, and which is lent them only on account of ſome reſemblance between the objects, as when I call a young perſon *young plant*, a bold and couragious man *lyon.*

The

The true diviſion of theſe, is into proper terms and improper terms; in the latter of theſe we diſtinguiſh thoſe which are made uſe of through ignorance or neceſſity, or for the ſake of ornament. I ſhall explain myſelf.

Whenever an idea is expreſſed by a word that is not proper to it, it is done through ignorance, from neceſſity, or from taſte; when it is done through ignorance, it is a fault in the perſon who does not underſtand the language he ſpeaks in. When it happens from neceſſity, it is a fault of the language, which cannot furniſh the mind with ſuch words as it ſtands in need of. Laſt of all, when it is done by taſte or choice, it is from meeting with ſomething more agreeable in the improper word, than was to be found in the proper one.

A propriety in the terms is the principal ſource of clearneſs. Now as clearneſs is one of the chief beauties in a diſcourſe, certainly propriety is to be regarded as one of the moſt valuable qualifications in the expreſſion. To procure this then, it will be neceſſary, whenever we come to a word of any importance, to ſtop a while and carefully to weigh its import, to examine how far it exceeds or falls ſhort of what it is intended to ſignify; whether it is intelligible of itſelf, or requires the help of others; to recollect what ſenſe we have already

uſed it in, in order to give it always the ſame import it had in the ſame ſubject.

Borrowed terms, when borrowed with taſte and choice, give an elegance and life to the diſcourſe. They are called *tropes*.

The word *trope* in general ſignifies to change, turn, or transfer; when applied to words, it ſignifies a change in their ſignification.

Tropes.

The principal tropes are, the metaphor, the metonymy, the ſynecdoche, the irony, and the hyperbole.

The word metaphor, means a term transferred from its proper and ordinary ſignification, to one that is improper to it, for the ſake of ornament; as when we ſay, *inflamed* with anger, a *harveſt* of glory, the *ſmiling* fields, a *green* old age; terms which, including a kind of concealed compariſon, add a new idea, and ſo give beauty to the thought. When the metaphor is carried on further, and conſiſts of a number of words, it is called *allegory*: "this young *Plant* thus watered "with the *dews* of heaven, was not long without "*bringing forth fruit*." Take away the figure, and the phraſe will ſtand thus; "This young *Princeſs* "thus *endowed* with heavenly *grace*, was not long "without *putting in practice acts of virtue*."

Poets, orators, and even hiſtorians themſelves, if

if they are poſſeſſed of fire and imagination, abound with metaphors.

In the metaphor we are to be equally careful to avoid exceſs on the one part, and lowneſs on the other. To ſay, in ſpeaking of the ruins of a building, that it is the carcaſs of a houſe, would be going beyond the bounds of a proper liberty: But if, in ſpeaking of the deluge, we were to ſay, that God had given his image a fine ſouſing *, it would be ſinking into the laſt degree of lowneſs.

Metonymy puts, 1°. The author of the thing for the thing itſelf, as when we ſay, *the labours of Mars* for the toils of war; the *muſes* for the polite arts. 2°. The cauſe for the effect, as in ſaying of a hero in battle, that *death is in his hands*. 3°. It figures the vicious perſon by the name of the vice itſelf; royalty by the crown and ſceptre. 4°. It takes the thing containing for that which is contained; *he drinks off the fatal cup*.

Synecdoche takes the part for the whole; as when Virgil ſays, *Summâ placidum caput extulit undâ*: He rear'd his placid front above the waves. It would not be underſtanding that poet to take this expreſſion in a literal ſenſe, and imagine a perſon ſwimming, with his head appearing above water. This would be as poor and paultry an idea in a poem, as it would in a pic-

* Much ſuch an expreſſion made uſe of by a French poet, in his tranſlation of Ovid: *Dieu lava bien la tête a ſon image.*

ture. But Virgil's deſign is to fix his readers attention on the very face of his God; the front being the ſeat of ſerenity, *Placidum caput*; is to be taken in the ſame ſenſe as in Terence, when he ſays, *Quot capita tot ſententiæ*; and Horace, *Quis deſiderio ſit pudor aut modus tam chari capitis?* 2°. It takes the whole for the part: *The people who drink the Seine.* 3°. The matter of which the thing is made, for the thing itſelf: *Arm'd with a victorious ſteel: O blood, worthy of Horatius!*

Irony, or counter-truth, is made uſe of, when we ſay exactly the contrary of what we think, in order to divert ourſelves at the expence of the perſon we thus deceive:

Toutefois, s'il le faut, je veux bien m'en dédire:
Et pour calmer enfin tous ces flots d'ennemis,
Réparer en mes vers les maux qu'ils ont commis:
Puiſque vous le voulez, je vais changer de ſtile.
Je le déclare donc, Quinaut eſt un Virgile,
Pradon comme un ſoleil, en nos ans a paru.
Pelletier, *&c. Boileau, Sat.* 9.

Thus Engliſhed:

But ſince it muſt be ſo, I'll make amends,
And late oblige my foes to be my friends,
Th' offences of paſt poems to repair,
I'll change my ſtile, and to the world declare,
Quinault's a Virgil, Pradon learning's ſun,
And Pelletier——— ———

As

As all the terms here made uſe of, taken in their proper ſenſe, are juſt and reaſonable, but falſe with reſpect to the intention of him who ſpeaks them, it is neceſſary to give a key to the true ſenſe couched under this figure; and this is done by means of a word artfully thrown in, as *I ſuppoſe, to be ſure, in all probability.*

Hyperbole, in ſome meaſure, reſembles the former figure, in that, like it, it makes the thing it is ſpeaking of ſomewhat more or leſs than it is in reality. A ſtab of a ſword, by the help of this figure, dwindles into the prick of a pin; and the prick of a pin is aggravated into a mortal wound.

This matter admits of being carried to a great length. The ancient grammarians and rhetoricians took much pleaſure in employing themſelves herein.

The expreſſions, both proper and borrowed, have their ſeveral differences which conſtitute ſeparate ranks of each. Man, ſays a certain writer, is the meaſure of all things: An obſervation nowhere more clearly verified than in what relates to language. For as among us there is the Noble and the Plebeian, the one of whom is formed for pomp and ſhew, and to attract reſpect and hommage whenever he makes his appearance, while the other is ſubſervient to the meaneſt offices, and always ready at command; ſo are there

words, terms, and phraſes, of which ſome are ſet apart for performances of the more exalted kind, as panegyrics, ſtudied harangues, and the higher ſpecies of poetry; and are called loſty terms; and others again which however ſtrong and forcible in themſelves, for want of having been ennobled, are condemned to remain in vulgar uſe; theſe are called low terms, common phraſes. But there is yet a middle kind, between theſe two degrees; which contains a certain number of words and phraſes that partake in ſome meaſure of the two extremes, without abſolutely belonging to either: theſe form the baſis and ground-work, and body of every diſcourſe, of whatever degree it be. By the addition of a few noble terms and phraſes, the middle kind may be ennobled; as, on the contrary, by the concurrence of one or two low words or ignoble phraſes, even mediocrity itſelf may be debaſed. A ſingle phraſe, if mean and trivial, is ſufficient to diſhonour a whole page; nay oftentimes it may be done by one word. But indeed rules or precepts, in this kind, are equally uſeleſs to thoſe who have a nice taſte, as to thoſe who have none at all. We ſhall therefore only make one obſervation in this place, in relation to the method ſometimes followed in forming the taſte of the young pupils in eloquence. They

They have ſome of the moſt ſtriking paſſages, in authors of this claſs, placed before them, their attention is directed to the ſhining thoughts; of which they are made to obſerve the principal ſtrokes. But this method is attended with ſome inconveniencies. Every thing ought to be remarked in a good author; and ſometimes thoſe places which appear the leaſt worthy of attention, are preciſely thoſe on which the maſter ought to dwell the moſt; theſe frequently make the tiſſue of the work; and from hence the principal beauties have their ſource and origin: here they are firſt prepared, and from hence they take their relievo. A mind conſtantly accuſtomed to metaphors and antitheſes, cannot but be at a loſs when you come to require ſound ſenſe. And yet we find that the merit of moſt writers of any diſtinction lies in theſe. But what is to be thought of a perſon who ſhall judge of a building by the ornaments and carve-work about it, without giving any attention to the diſtribution of the ſeveral parts, or the ſolidity and ſtrength of the whole?

In all good writers we find one continued chain of natural thoughts, bearing the common acceptation, and drawn from the very ſubſtance of the matter they treat on: this forms the baſe of the whole compoſition.

Scribendi rectè ſapere eſt & principium & fons.
Hor. A. P.

Good ſenſe the fountain of the muſes' art. *Francis.*

On this uniform ground they lightly ſtrew the flowers of elocution; I mean ſuch ſtrokes and expreſſions as have a diſtinguiſhing character. Their genius indeed furniſhes them with a multitude of beautiful thoughts of every kind: But if, at any time, from a ſecret complaiſance, they are induced to blend theſe ornaments with the texture of the work; they are reſtrained by judgment and good taſte in the diſpoſition of them, leaſt they ſhould have the air of miſplaced trappings: They adopt therefore ſuch only as take their colour from the ſubject, and make one body with the reſt.

CHAP. IV.

Of the ordering of the thoughts and expreſſions.

HAVING demonſtrated the ſeveral kinds of thoughts and expreſſions, with the particular qualities of each, and pointed out the proper choice of them according to different circumſtances, it remains to treat of the diſpoſition and connection to be obſerved between them.

In the diſpoſition of the thoughts and expreſſions, there are two ends only to be had in view, *viz.* to give them more beauty, or greater ſtrength. For that diſpoſition which produces ſim-

ple

ple clearneſs only, is rather logical and grammatical than oratorial.

There is by nature a grace attached to whatever is performed with eaſe: and it being the privilege of ſtrength to do every thing without trouble, it ſeldom happens, that gracefulneſs and ſtrength are found ſeparate. The vigorous athlet is maſter of all his motions; he regulates and meaſures the time neceſſary to each, and by that means aſſures their direction. Let us examine whatever has youth, and we ſhall find it full of gracefulneſs, becauſe it is in the flower of its ſtrength. The order obſerved in a well-formed ſquadron, at once augments its ſtrength, and gives it a pleaſing appearance.

This may eaſily be applied to a diſcourſe, in which the diſpoſition of the words, by contributing to the mutual connection and combination of the ideas, adds greatly to their force. Moreover this connection making an impreſſion on the ear and mind, by the agreement and affinity of the ſounds which compoſe the words; there ariſes that pleaſing ſenſation which we call harmony.

The diſpoſition of the words and thoughts, conſidered relative to thoſe two effects, comprehends all the different kinds of figures in rhetoric; and all the ſeveral combinations which can produce harmony and numbers.

CHAP. V.

The diſpoſition which produces figures.

BY *figure* in elocution, we underſtand the ordering or diſpoſing the parts of an oratorial phraſe, or even of ſeveral phraſes, ſo as to form a certain ſymmetry with each other: this is done by a kind of regular configuration, like that obſerved in figures in geometry, ariſing from the arrangement of ſeveral lines, by which we make a triangle a ſquare, *&c.*

When there is but a ſingle word or idea; as for example, when I either repreſent to myſelf, or ſay, the ſun, in this caſe there is no room for uſing any figure; becauſe the thought and expreſſion being one, will not admit of two combinations: it is the ſame as a geometrical point. And I muſt always ſay the ſun. But when there are two parts, then there is room for a twofold combination, *he is: is he?* And we may ſtill add other particles, which, without altering the ſenſe, give another form and attitude to both thought and expreſſion. A man may be upright, ſitting, lying in a poſture that ſhews activity, paſſion, indolence, *&c.* The ſame may be ſaid of the thoughts and expreſſions. It is from the kinds of attitude given to theſe, that they have taken the name of oratorial turns with us, and of figures with

with the Latins: *Sententia quasi habitus, figura dicendi*, says Cicero; the figure in speech is as it were the air and port of the sentence.

Figures as to words.

The figures of the words consist in a certain disposition given them, by which they are made to run off more smoothly, or proceed with a more firm and solemn pace.

Some of these are made by addition, as when we tack several words to a phrase which it has no absolute need of: Of this number is

1°. The Repetition; this word carries its own definition with it.

On egorge a la fois les enfans les viellards,
Et le frere et la sœur, et la fille et la mere.

The murthering sword slays youth and age alike;
And the brother *and* the sister, *and* the daughter *and* the mother.

Here the repetition of the conjunction *and* seems to multiply the murders, and paints in lively colours the headstrong fury of the soldiers. Sometimes the repetition of the word is made at the beginning of different phrases, which follow one another in order, as under one leader:

Ici je trouve le bonheur,
Ici je vis ſans ſpectateur,
Dans le ſilence litteraire,
Loin de tout importun jaſeur,
Loin des froids diſcours du vulgaire
Et des hauts tons de la grandeur.
Loin de ces troupes douceureuſes,
Où d'inſipides précieuſes
Et de petits fats ignorans,
Viennent conduits par la folie,
S'ennuyer en cérémonie
Et s'endormir en complimens.
Loin de ces plattes cotteries,
Où l'on voit ſouvent réunies
L'ignorance en petit manteau,
La bigoterie en lunettes,
La mmauderie en cornettes,
Et la Réforme en grand chapeau.
Loin, &c. *Greſſet*.

Here ſecure from prying eyes,
Here I taſte of real joys;
Here I live from folly free,
Bleſs'd in learned apathy:
Far from vulgar error's voice,
Far from grandeur's pompous noiſe;
Nor the flatt'ring *belle* appears,
With borrow'd face and borrow'd airs;
Nor the fop by faſhion led,
Dares within this circle tread:
Far from folly's giddy train,
Ceremonious, proud, or vain;

Where

Where ignorance in robes appears,
Where bigotry her glaſſes wears;
Where the prude ſteps forth ſo prim,
With ſuperſtition in broad brim.
Far from, &c.

Sometimes it is an exclamation repeated.

O rage! O deſeſpoir! O fureur ennemie!
Oh rage! oh deſpair! oh hoſtile fury!

Sometimes a proper name, as, ah Corydon! Corydon!

2°. The Gradation or *climax*, which ranges the words according to their degree of ſtrength or weakneſs; either by aſcending, as, *he ſtarts, he runs, he flies*; or by deſcending, when, after having made uſe of ſublime and elevated ideas, we employ their oppoſites; but this ſeldom happens but in ſubjects of the burleſque kind.

3°. Retrogradation, or the *anti-climax*, turns words back again upon themſelves, but in a different ſenſe: We do not live to eat, but eat to live, ſays Moliere in his Miſer; and Deſpreaux in one of his epigrams.

Oui, j'ai dit dans mes vers, qu'un célèbre aſſaſſin,
Laiſſant de Galien la ſcience infertile,
D'ignorant médecin, devint maçon habile.
Mais de parler de vous je n'eus jamais deſſein,
Perrault, ma Muſe eſt trop correcte:
Vous êtes, je l'avoue, ignorant médecin,
Mais non pas habile architecte.

Thus

Thus Engliſhed:

Yes, I have ſaid, an Æſculapian fop,
More by Vitruvius than by Galen got,
Has prov'd ſucceſsful in the building way,
Who, as a doctor, always went aſtray.
Yet think not, PERRAULT, I on you reflect,
Your pardon, Sir, my muſe is too correct;
A quack you are; but no good architect.

But the diſpoſition of the words in theſe two figures, ſeems to depend much more on the thoughts than the expreſſions. Yet here, as well as in many other parts, art cannot hope to effect a perfect ſeparation of what nature has once joined.

The figures of words made by retrenching, are, 1°. Diſjunction or ſeparation, which takes away the conjunctive participles, in order to make the diſcourſe more lively and rapid:

Une grenouille vit un bœuf
Qui lui ſembla de belle taille:
Elle qui n'étoit pas groſſe en tout comme un œuf,
Envieuſe, s'étend, & s'enfle, & ſe travaille
Pour égaler l'animal en groſſeur.
Diſant: Regardez bien, ma ſœur.
Eſt-ce aſſez? dites-moi, n'y ſuis-je point encore?
Nenni. M'y voici donc? Point du tout. M'y voila:
Vous n'en approchez pas.

La Fontaine Fab.

Thus

Thus Engliſhed:

A frog, the ſmalleſt of her race,
Beheld a ſtately ox at graſs;
And vex'd to ſee herſelf no bigger,
Longs for to rival him in figure.
She ſwells and puffs and ſwells again,
And thinks ſhe grows at every ſtrain.
At length ſhe to her ſiſter cries,
Here!—tell me—a'nt I near his ſize?
I think I am.—Not you indeed!
Well then, obſerve how I proceed:
What think you now!—Why much the ſame.
But now?—Indeed child you're to blame;
Juſt as unequal as at firſt,
You'll never match him, tho' you burſt.

What ſort of a figure would the concluſion of of this ſtory have made, had the poet been obliged to ſay, The ſiſter anſwered; thus the other replied as follows, &c.

2°. Adjunction is made, when of two verbs we ſuppreſs one: Complaiſance makes friends, truth ennemies.

There is a third kind of figure of words found in the Greek and Latin writers, which conſiſts in a likeneſs of ſound and terminations. But this is ſeldom made uſe of by us moderns, on account of its near reſemblance with rhyme, which is one of the diſtinguiſhing characters of our verſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Figures as to thoughts.

IN the figures as to thoughts we diſtinguiſh thoſe which excite the attention, and thoſe which chiefly affect the heart: I ſay chiefly, becauſe to come at the heart we muſt paſs through the mind; and the mind is only to be moved by what intereſts the heart. This we have obſerved elſewhere: Now theſe two operations are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, as inſeparable as the two faculties from which they ariſe.

Striking or poignant figures.

1°. Subjection is that figure by which the orator interrogates his opponent or the auditors, and takes upon himſelf to anſwer for them.

2°. Interrogation ſtirs up the mind; it ſeeks for the reply, and takes a pleaſure at leaſt in foreſeeing what it will be. Mr. Flechier employs this turn with a great deal of grace, in his funeral oration for marſhal Turenne: *

" Who

* " Qui fit jamais de ſi grandes choſes? qui les dit " avec plus de retenue? Remportoit-il quelque avan- " tage? à l'entendre ce n'étoit pas qu'il fût habile, mais " l'ennemi s'étoit trompé. Rendoit-il compte d'une ba- " taille,

" Who ever did ſo many great things? Who " ever related them with more modeſty? Did he " gain an advantage over the enemy? If you would " believe him, it was not the effect of his abilities, " but of their own overſight. Was he to " give an account of a battle? Not a circum- " ſtance relating to it eſcaped his memory, but " only that it was he who gained it. In what " manner did he return home from campaigns " that will render his name immortal? He fled " the public applauſe: and ſeemed even to bluſh " at the fame of his own victories; he went to " meet praiſe, as others would to make their " excuſes, &c."

3°. Anticipation obviates an objection and refutes it beforehand. This is a dexterous turn to elude, or at leaſt weaken the arguments that might be brought againſt us. They never gain any thing by being firſt ſtarted from the party againſt which they are intended; beſides, they by this means loſe great part of their weight and novelty, and by the confident manner in which they appear to be produced, the judges are

" taille? il n'oublioit rien, ſinon que c'étoit lui qui l'avoit " gagnée. . . . Revenoit-il de ces campagnes glorieuſes, " qui rendront ſon nom immortel? il fuyoit les acclama- " tions populaires, il rougiſſoit de ſes victoires; il venoit " recevoir des éloges, comme on fait des apologies, &c."

lead

led to think them of but little importance in themſelves. Deſpreaux was liable to be reproached for his ſatyrical turn, and the indecent manner in which he was thought to have treated Chapelain; the poet is ſenſible of this, and obviates the force of the accuſation by beginning it himſelf.

Il a tort, dira-t'on, pourquoi faut-il qu'il nomme?
Attaquer Chapelain! ah! c'eſt un ſi bon homme!
Balſac en faît l'éloge en cent endroits divers.
Il eſt vrai, s'il m'eut cru, qu'il n'eût point fait de vers.
Il ſe tue à rimer, que n'écrit-il en proſe.
Voilà ce que l'on dit. He que dis-je autre choſe?
En blâmant ſes écrits ai-je d'un ſtile affreux,
Diſtillé ſur ſa vie un venin dangereux?
Ma Muſe en l'attaquant, charitable & diſcrète,
Sait de l'homme d'honneur diſtinguer le poëte. *Sat.* 9.

Thus Engliſhed.

But wherefore, ſome perhaps will ſay, muſt he
With names forſooth be always making free?
Or why thus againſt Chapelain rail and ſtorm,
The honeſt man! that never did him harm?
And whom Balzac a thouſand times commends;
Pleas'd he can name him in the liſt of friends.
'Tis true, poor man, his verſes are but bad.
Had he ta'en my advice——I wiſh he had——
He then would have confin'd himſelf to proſe,
And not have given this ope'ning to his foes.
Thus they go on: and pray what more ſay I?...
The poet's character my ſatire takes,
Nor ever into private actions rakes;

Never

Never with baſe invectives ſeeks to ſcan
His life, and for the muſe attack the man;
But ſtill for virtue ſhews a due regard,
And from the worthy man diſtinguiſhes the bard.

4°. Compariſon ſets two things or perſons in the ſame point of light. The mind is here agreeably exerciſed in coming and going from one to the other, in comparing and eſtimating the ſeveral ſtrokes in the characters of each, and forming ſucceſſive judgments on their reſpective differences or reſemblance. Under this figure we rank the parallel, which is no other than a compariſon of two illuſtrious men with each other.

Mr. de la Mothe has, in the few following lines, given us an elegant parallel of Racine and Corneille.

Des deux ſouverains de la Scene
L'aſpect a frappé nos eſprits;
C'eſt ſur leurs pas que Melpoméne
Conduit ſes plus chers favoris.
L'un plus pur, l'autre plus ſublime,
Tous deux partagent notre eſtime
Par un mérite différent,
Tour à tour ils nous font entendre
Ce que le cœur a de plus tendre,
Ce que l'eſprit a de plus grand.

Thus Engliſhed:

The two great ſov'reigns of the ſtage,
Our wonder equally engage;

In whoſe bright ſteps the tragic dame
Conducts her fav'rite ſons to fame:
One with more purity delights;
The other with more lofty ſlights:
Thus each alternately controuls
The different paſſions of our ſouls.
This with his ſoftneſs wakens beſt
Each tender feeling in the breaſt:
While that bids nobler thoughts ariſe,
And wafts us with him to the ſkies.

Theſe figures are as ſo many noble Pictures in a work; they ſtrike every reader: hence it is natural to conclude, thaf they are to be uſed but ſparingly and with diſcretion.

5°. Suſpenſion is one of the moſt ſtriking figures in rhetoric, and is made when towards the end of a diſcourſe of ſome length, and which promiſes ſomething very intereſting in the ſequel, a quite different object to what was expected is of a ſudden preſented to the mind. "It is related, that "a certain empreſs having been impoſed upon by "a lapidary, was reſolved to be revenged on him "in an extraordinary manner. To this end ſhe "complained to her huſband, exaggerating the "baſeneſs and impudence of this perfidious mer-"chant, whom ſhe accuſed of no leſs than *læſæ* "*majeſtatis*. It is very reaſonable, replies the em-"peror, that you ſhould be revenged for ſuch an "inſult; the wretch ſhall be puniſhed as his crime

"in-

" deſerves: let him be thrown to the wild beaſts,
" The day for executing this ſentence being ar-
" rived, the princeſs prepares to enjoy her re-
" venge to its full height: the whole court and
" city take part with her in her ſentiments. The
" unhappy wretch appears in the theatre: all
" trembling, pale and breathleſs with his fears.
" What monſter is about to dart forth upon him?
" a furious tyger, a lyon, a bear, or what? A
" poor goat. The deceiver was deceived in his
" turn."

We can by no means omit in this place the famous ſonnet of Scarron.

Superbes monumens de l'orgueil des humains,
Piramides, tombeaux, dont la vaine ſtructure
A témoigné que l'art par l'adreſſe des mains,
Et l'aſſidu travail, peut vaincre la nature.

Vieux palais ruinés, chefs-dœuvres des Romains,
Et les derniers efforts de leur architecture,
Coliſée, où ſouvent les peuples inhumains,
De s'entr'aſſaſſiner ſe donnoient tablature.

Par l'injure des tems vous êtes abolis,
Ou du moins la plupart vous êtes démolis.
Il n'eſt point de ciment que le tems ne diſſoude.

Si vos marbres ſi durs ont ſenti ſon pouvoir,
Dois-je trouver mauvais qu'un méchant pourpoint noir,
Qui m'a duré deux ans, ſoit percé par le coude?

Thus

Thus imitated by Dr. Swift.

If neither braſs nor marble can withſtand
The mortal force of Time's deſtructive hand;
If mountains ſink to dales, old cities die,
And leſſ'ning rivers mourn their fountains dry;
When my old caſſock of an ancient line
Is out as elbows why ſhould I repine?

6°. Every one knows the *quos ego* of Virgil. This figure is called Interruption. Scarron has given us the following tranſlation of it after his manner.

Par la mort... Il n'a cheva pas
Car il avoit l'ame trop bonne:
Allez dit il, je vous pardonne
Une autre fois n'y venez pas.

This figure is ſometimes confounded with another called ſuppreſſion or concealment, but this latter is made by telling a thing at the ſame time that one declares one's intention not to ſpeak of it.

Je ne vous peindrai point le tumulte & les cris,
Le ſang de tous côtés ruiſſelant dans Paris,
Le fils aſſaſſiné ſur le corps de ſon pere,
Le frere avec la ſœur, la fille avec la mere,
Les époux expirans ſous leurs toits embraſés,
Les enfans au berceau ſous la pierre écraſés.

Voltaire, Henriade, Liv. 2.

Thus Engliſhed.

The tumult and diſturbance I paſs o'er,
Nor paint the ſtreets on float with human gore;

The

The ſon aſſaſſinated with the ſire;
Daughters that on their mother's corpſe expire;
Houſes by fire deſtroy'd; and dying groans
The helpleſs infant daſh'd againſt the ſtones, &c.

7°. It ſometimes happens that the orator on a ſudden takes himſelf up ſhort, to ſay ſomething better or different from what he has ſaid before. "But what am I ſaying? Is any thing capable "of touching you? Is it poſſible you ſhould "ever change your way of life? Can it be ex- "pected you ſhould once think of yielding to the "times, and of taking your flight or baniſhing "yourſelf from Rome?" In this manner Cicero addreſſes Catiline, and this figure is called correction.

The apoſtrophe is made by addreſſing one's diſcourſe to any perſon, and when we change our diſcourſe from the firſt perſon we were ſpeaking to, to addreſs it to others. "Ye powers the "foes of France, ye live as yet; and the ſpirit of "Chriſtian charity forbids me to form a wiſh for "your deaths. May you only acknowledge the "juſtice of our arms, and accept at length of that "peace, which, notwithſtanding the loſſes ye "have ſuſtained, you have hitherto refuſed at our "hands!" * &c.

* "Puiſſances ennemies de la France, vous vivez, & "l'eſprit de la charité chrétienne m'interdit de faire au-

Apo-

Apoſtrophes may be made to the living, the dead, the preſent, the abſent, and even to things inanimate.

O rives du Jourdain ! ô champs aimés des cieux !
Liban, dépouille-toi de tes cédres antiques. *Rac. Eſth.*

O banks of Jordain, fields belov'd by heav'n,
Diveſt thee Lebanon of thy ancient woods !

8°. The monologue or ſoliloquy is when a perſon is repreſented ſpeaking to himſelf; "Am I "then overcome," ſays Juno to herſelf, "muſt I "behold myſelf reduced to the neceſſity of aban- "doning my deſign. A Trojan prince oppoſes "me," &c.

9°. In the dialogue, two perſons are introduced talking together, as in the following epiſtle of Boileau to the king:

Pourquoi ces éléphans, ces armes, ce bagage,
Et ces vaiſſeaux tout prêts à quitter le rivage ?
Diſoit au Roi Pyrrhus un ſage confident,
Conſeiller très ſenſé d'un roi très-imprudent.
Je vais, lui dit ce Prince, à Rome où l'on m'appelle,
Quoi faire ? l'aſſiéger. L'entrepriſe eſt fort belle,
Et digne ſeulement d'Alexandre ou de vous.
Mais Rome priſe enfin, Seigneur, où courrons-nous ?

"cun ſouhait pour votre mort. Puiſſiez-vous ſeulement "reconnoître la juſtice de nos armes, recevoir la paix, "que malgré vos pertes vous nous avez tant de fois re- "fuſée," &c. *Flechier.*

Du

Du reſte des Latins la conquête eſt facile,
Sans doute on peut les vaincre. Eſt-ce tout? La Sicile
Delà nous tend les bras, & bientôt ſans effort,
Syracuſe reçoit nos vaiſſeaux dans ſon port,
Bornez-vous là vos pas? Dès que nous l'aurons priſe,
Il ne faut qu'un bon vent & Carthage eſt conquiſe,
Les chemins ſont ouverts, qui peut nous arrêter?
Je vous entens, Seigneur, nous allons tout dompter.
Nous allons traverſer les ſables de Lybie,
Aſſervir en paſſant, l'Egypte, l'Arabie,
Courir delà le Gange en de nouveaux pays.
Faire trembler le Scythe aux bords du Tanaïs,
Et ranger ſous nos loix tout ce vaſte hémiſphére.
Mais de retour enfin, que prétendez-vous faire?
Alors, cher Cineas, victorieux, contens,
Nous pourrons rire à l'aiſe, & prendre du bon tems.
Hé, Seigneur, dès ce jour, ſans ſortir de l'Epire
Du matin juſqu'au ſoir, qui vous défend de rire?

Boil. Epit. au Roi.

"Why all theſe elephants? This train and hoſt?
"Theſe ſhips prepar'd to quit the crouded coaſt?"
To Pyrrhus ſaid a ſage, whom oft he heard
And lov'd. Yet never did enough regard.
The king too mad, the counſellor too wiſe,
This ſhews the danger, and that ſhuts his eyes.
By empire and by fame I'm call'd to Rome,
And fly from an inglorious eaſe at home;
Thither I go——The boaſtful prince replies.
"For what?" A ſiege! "A glorious enterprize!

" Worthy alone of Philip's ſon and you;
" What ſhall we, ſir, when Rome is taken, do?"
We'll then with eaſe all Italy ſubdue.
" Yours I allow that Italy may be;
" But what will you do next?" Have Sicily;
She'll ſoon ſurrender, nor will Syracuſe
Free entrance to my dreadful fleet refuſe.
" Here do you ſtop, my Lord?" A tempting gale
Preſents, and thence we will to Carthage ſail.
Can Carthage deal with our victorious pow'rs?
Or long reſiſt our arms when Rome is ours?
Say what can ſtop us? When the way's ſo fair?
All Africk will be mine without a war.
" I underſtand you, ſir, When we have paſt
" The Lybian Deſert and Egyptian waſte.
" When we've enſlav'd the Arabs in our way,
" Ganges and Indus ſhall your laws obey,
" And Scythians yet untam'd confeſs your ſway.
" When this vaſt hemiſphere is ours, what then,
" Shall we not ſee Epirus once again?"
Yes, yes, victorious and content, we there
Will live the life of gods, and laugh at care.
No time for any thing but joy allow.
" What hinders, ſir, but you may do it now?
" Why ſhould you for the joy of laughing roam?
" What lets, but you may laugh your fill at home?
" Who, or what dares deny you that delight?
" Stay where you are, and laugh from morn to
" night.

Proſopopoiea ſets open tombs, raiſes the dead, and gives ſpeech to every being real or imaginary, in

in heaven or on earth. It is one of the moſt brilliant ornaments of eloquence.

La Molleſſe en pleurant, ſur un bras ſe reléve,
Ouvre un œil languiſſant, & d'une foible voix,
Laiſſe tomber ces mots, qu'elle interrompt vingt fois:
O Nuit! que m'as-tu dit! quel démon ſur la terre
Souffle dans tous les cœurs la fatigue & la guerre?
Helas! qu'eſt devenu ce tems, cet heureux tems
Où les rois s'honoroient du nom de fainéant,
S'endormoient ſur le trône, &c. *Deſpréaux.*

——— Sloth riſing from his ſilky bed
And leaning on one arm his lumpy head,
While from his languid eyes a deluge ran,
This broken ſpeech in feeble tone began.
O Night, thou ſtabb'ſt me with this killing news!
What new-born plagues doth active hell produce?
Still do the furies throw their fiery darts,
Still breath fatigue and war in human hearts?
Whither are fled thoſe happy times of peace,
When idle kings, diſſolv'd in thoughtleſs eaſe,
Reſign'd their ſceptres, and the toils of ſtate,
To Counts or ſome inferior magiſtrate;
And on their thrones ſupinely loll'd———

The hipotipoſis is a figure which paints the image of the things or perſons we are ſpeaking of in ſuch lively colours, that we think we ſee them inſtead of barely hearing them related. It anſwers to what we call image, picture, a lively relation, deſcription. It is known among the

learned by the name of proſopography when deſcribing the form of a perſon. Nothing of this kind can be more perfect than the following picture of ſloth in Boileau's Lutrin:

. . . . . La Molleſſe oppreſſée
Dans ſa bouche a l'inſtant ſent ſa langue glacée,
Et laſſe de parler ſuccombant ſous l'effort,
Soupire, j'etend ſes bras, ferme l'œil & s'endort.

She ſaid, her weary tongue refus'd the reſt;
Inſtant the goddeſs ſinks with ſleep oppreſt,
And dead to ſpeech,
She ſtretches, ſighs, and ſhuts her eyes, and ſleeps.

When this figure is employed in painting the manners, it is called ethopoiea:

— — — — When man yet new,
No rule but uncorrupted reaſon knew,
And with a native bent did good purſue;
Unfore'd by puniſhment, unaw'd by fear,
His words were ſimple, and his ſoul ſincere.
Dryden.

Sometimes it deſcribes facts:

— — — — Then Hector, with a bound,
Vaults from his chariot on the trembling ground
In clanging arms; he graſps in either hand,
A pointed lance, and ſpeeds from band to band;
Revives their ardor, turns their ſteps from flight,
And wakes anew the dying flames of fight.

As

As the bold hunter chears his hounds to tear
The brindled lion, or the tuſky bear;
With voice and hand provokes their doubting heart,
And ſprings the foremoſt with his lifted dart:
So godlike Hector prompts his troops to dare,
Nor prompts alone, but leads himſelf the war.

Pope's Iliad.

Topography deſcribes places. Mr. Flechier's deſcription of hoſpitals may ſerve as a model in this kind; 'tis in the queen's funeral oration: *

"Let us behold her in theſe hoſpitals, where "ſhe practiſed her public acts of piety; in theſe "places where all the infirmities and accidents "of human life are aſſembled; where the groans "and complaints of thoſe who ſuffer and are in "pain, fill the ſoul with inceſſant ſadneſs; where "the ſmell that exhales from the bodies of the "many diſeaſed wretches, makes thoſe who "attend them ready to faint away, &c."

Compariſon conſiſts in placing two things in front of each other, which have ſome reſemblance in one or many points:

* Voyons-la dans ces hôpitaux où elle pratiquoit ſes miſericordes publiques; dans ces lieux où ſe ramaſſent toutes les infirmités, & tous les accidens de la vie humaine; où les gemiſſemens & les plaintes de ceux qui ſouffrent, rempliſſent l'ame d'une triſteſſe importune; où l'odeur qui s'exhale de tant de corps languiſſans, &c, *Flechier.*

A wit's a feather, and a chief a rod,
An honeſt man's the nobleſt work of God.

Pope.

The antitheſis oppoſes words to words, and thoughts to thoughts.

Nature forms merit, ſays Rochefoucault, and fortune puts it into action.

Affecting figures.

The chief figures made uſe of to reach the heart are exclamation, which breaks out in ſudden ſtarts, as

O my ſon! my joy! O glory of my days!

Confeſſion, which is the owning of our fault, in order to obtain forgiveneſs; as, *I confeſs myſelf to have erred, but I am a man, and what is human, is what we are all ſubject to.*

Deprecation is made uſe of, when all other means failing, we have recourſe to prayers and tears:

By the tears you now ſee me ſhed, by the faith you have vowed to me, &c. *I conjure you to ſpare me,* &c.

Commination denounces vengeance:

On ſai ce que je puis, on verra ce que j'oſe.
Je deviendrai barbare, & toi ſeul en es la cauſe.
Voltaire.

Thou know'ſt my power, thou know'ſt too what I dare,
If I grow cruel, thou art the ſole cauſe.

Imprecation is the expreſſion of fury and deſperation. We cannot meet with a ſtronger example in this kind than what Corneille has given us in the following ſpeech of Cleopatra to her ſon Antiochus, who is going to marry Rodogune:

Regne de crime en crime enfin te voilà roi,
Je t'ai défait d'un pere, & d'un frere & de moi,
Puiſſe le ciel tous deux vous prendre pour victimes,
Et laiſſer choir ſur vous la peine de mes crimes!
Puiſſez-vous ne trouver dedans votre union
Qu'horreur, que jalouſie & que diſſenſion!
Et pour vous ſouhaiter tous les malheurs enſemble,
Puiſſe naitre de vous un fils qui me reſſemble! *

The

* Our Engliſh poets abound with many fine inſtances of this kind; but the imprecation denounced by Lear on his diſobedient daughter, is, I think, the moſt affecting that could be penned by man:

Hear, nature, hear; dear goddeſs, hear a father!
Suſpend thy purpoſe, if thou didſt intend
To make this creature fruitful:
Into her womb convey ſterility,

The interrogation is a figure frequently employed in the vehement and paſſionate ſtyle. It keeps the auditor in ſuſpence, obliges him to lend his attention, and receive the impreſſion it means to give:

Quoi Rome & l'Italie en cendre,
Me feront honorer Sylla?
J'adorerai dans Alexandre,
Ce que j'abhorre en Attila? Rouſſeau.

Shall Rome and Italy, in aſhes laid,
Make me admire the wretch who did the deed?
Or ſhall I worſhip Philip's conqu'ring ſon,
For what I hate in Attila the Hun?

But of all the figures in rhetoric, none give a greater addition to the ſentiment than amplification, in whatſoever ſenſe we take it. Sometimes it has the ſame character as the hyperbole, and then it conſiſts in giving an air of grandeur to what is low, and making what is great appear little; or, to uſe Montagne's allegorical expreſſion, in

---

Dry up in her the organs of increaſe,
And from her derogate body never ſpring
A babe to honour her! If ſhe muſt teem,
Create her child of ſpleen, that it may live,
And be a thwart diſnatur'd torment to her;
Turn all her mother's pains and benefits
To laughter and contempt; that ſhe may feel,
How ſharper than a ſerpent's tooth it is
To have a thankleſs child———

making

making ſmall ſhoes for large feet, and large ones for thoſe which are little:

"Pompey (ſays Cicero) waged more wars "than ſome others have read of, &c."

Sometimes amplification is confounded with gradation. It is a crime, ſays the laſt-mentioned orator, *to impriſon a Roman citizen; it is looked upon as a kind of parricide to put him to death; what then ſhall I ſay of thoſe who dare to nail him to a croſs?*

At other times this word ſignifies no more than a certain extent given to a thought, preſented under different appearances, in order to make the impreſſion ſtronger and deeper. The ſoul is ſtaggered by the firſt impulſe, the ſecond diſplaces it, and the third intirely overturns it. This is called raiſing a thought. In this manner does Rouſſeau amplify that thought; *Shall we always be the dupes of fortune?*

Fortune dont la main couronne,
Les forfaits les plus noirs,
Du faux eclat qui t'environne,
Serons-nous toujours eblouis?

Fortune who with erring hand,
Crown'ſt with gifts the vileſt band;
Shall we ever dazzled be,
With thy empty pageantry?

Here is the firſt ſtroke given, the ſecond follows, the thought remaining ſtill the ſame:

Juſques a quand trompeuſe idole,
D'une culte honteux & frivole,
Honorerons nous tes autels?

How long, flattering idol, ſay,
Muſt we ſhameful homage pay;
How long at thy altars bow?

The third is ſtill the ſame thought continued.

Verra-t'-on toujours tes caprices,
Conſacrés par les ſacrifices,
Et par l'hommage des mortels?

Muſt we ever ſacrifice
To thy whim and blind caprice,
And to raiſe thee fall thus low?

An important thought, when it paſſes like a flaſh of lightning, is ſcarcely perceived before 'tis gone; and if it is repeated in an inartificial manner, it loſes all the merit of novelty. What is to be done in this caſe? It muſt be preſented ſeveral times, and each time with different ornaments, ſo that the ſoul being amuſed with this piece of deceit, ſtops with pleaſure at the ſame object, and takes all the impreſſion that we propoſe to give her. Let us obſerve nature, when ſhe ſpeaks within us, and is governed only by ſome predo-

minant paſſion, and we ſhall find the ſame thought conſtantly returning, and oftimes in the very ſame terms: Art obſerves the ſame ſteps, but in varying a little the outward appearance:

He quoi! vous ne ferez nulle diſtinction
Entre l'hipocriſie & la dévotion?
Vous les voulez traiter d'un ſemblable langage?
Et rendre même honneur au maſque qu'au viſage?
Egaler l'artifice à la ſincérité,
Confondre l'apparence avec la vérité,
Eſtimer le fantôme autant que la perſonne,
Et la fauſſe monnoie à l'égal de la bonne? *Moliere.*

No degree of inattention can hold out againſt a thought ſo obſtinately bent upon returning, it muſt make its way into the mind, and fix itſelf there in ſpite of all reſiſtance. This is in all likelihood the *copia rerum & ſententiarum* of the Latins, a vigorous abundance which gives that life and ſpirit to diſcourſe, that cauſes it to roll in a full torrent, and bear down all before it.

Theſe are the principal kinds of figures as well of the words as thoughts: which are, according to the Roman orator, the eyes of the diſcourſe, and give it all its luſtre, fire, and beauty. But if theſe eyes were to be diſtributed all over the body, what would become of the functions of the reſt of the members, which are more neceſſary

and uſeful in their way. *Ego hæc lumina orationis, velut oculos quaſdam eloquentiæ credo, ſed neque oculos eſſe toto corpore velim, ne cætera membra ſuum officium perdant.*

CHAP. VII.

Of the diſpoſition of the words with regard to harmony.

A Notion and taſte for harmony ſeems to conſtitute the whole nature of our ſouls, as has been allegorically ſaid by ſome ancient philoſophers. Whatever is harmonious, eſtabliſhes itſelf therein as by right, and appears to make up a part of its eſſence.

Harmony in general is the agreement of ſeveral things of the ſame nature and kind: Thus there is an harmony of colours in a picture, of the lines in a parterre, of ſounds in muſic, thoughts in a diſcourſe, and laſtly, of words and figures in ſtyle.

To give a clear idea of the oratorial harmony, it will be neceſſary to diſtinguiſh three kinds of agreements in a diſcourſe, *viz.* that of the ſounds and words conſidered as a continued chain, or thread of things, belonging to, and mutually carrying on each other: that of theſe parts with each other, conſidered with reſpect to a certain extent proper to them, and as ſo many pieces of a com-

compartment made to fall in together. Laſtly, the agreement of theſe ſame ſounds and words, compared with the things they are intended to to ſignify. For want of this diviſion, the term harmony will be vague and undetermined; and all that the ancients have ſaid on this head, will appear myſterious and unintelligible.

The firſt kind of agreement may be called melody; and is the agreement of ſounds which follow each other, of which only one part can exiſt at a time, but yet ſo connected with the reſt, by means of the affinity it has with the ſounds which precede or follow it, as in the ſong, where the tones are placed at certain intervals, eaſily to be laid hold of. This may be compared to a running ſtream.

The ſecond is like the falling of drops of water, and is called number. It conſiſts in ſuch a diſtribution of the parts and pauſes, as the ſenſe or ear require. *Numerus in continuatione nullus eſt. Diſtinctio & equalium & ſæpe variorum intervallorum percuſſio numerum conficit; quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis diſtinguuntur, notare poſſumus, in amni præcipitante non poſſumus.* Cic. Orat.

The third ſpecies ſhall retain the name of its kind, and be called the agreement of ſounds, whether harſh or ſoft, grave or ſharp, ſhort or long,

long, of numbers rough or ſmooth, bold or weak, &c. with the tender or rough, ſerious, angry, dull or lively ideas, which they are intended to expreſs.

Each of theſe three points we ſhall treat of ſeparately.

CHAP. VIII.

Of oratorial Melody.

ORatorial melody is the manner of adapting or connecting ſimple or compound ſounds with each other, ſo as to form ſyllables; and of ſyllables to form a word, and of words to form a period, and ſo on.

The letters of the French alphabet are commonly reckoned twenty-four, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, *h*, *i*, *k*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *o*, *p*, *q*, *r*, *s*, *t*, *u*, *v*, *x*, *z*, which may however be reduced to twenty-three, becauſe their *k* becomes *c* or *qu* before *a*, *o*, *u*, and they at preſent ſeldom make uſe of the *k*.

The Engliſh uſually reckon the ſame number, becauſe anciently *i* and *j*, as well as *u* and *v*, were expreſſed by the ſame character; but as thoſe letters, which had always different powers, have now different forms, that alphabet may be properly ſaid to conſiſt of twenty-ſix letters. And

here

here we muſt beg leave to be ſomewhat particular.

Of theſe letters ſome expreſs a ſimple ſound, others a compound or figurative one.

The firſt of theſe are called *vowels*, becauſe they expreſs only a voice or ſound. Theſe are five in number.

The others are called *conſonants*, from having no ſound of their own, but what they receive from the aſſiſtance of ſome one of the vowels, whoſe ſound they at the ſame time repreſent. Thus *b* repreſents the ſound of the vowel *e*, and receives from that vowel what ſound it has: *b*, if pronounced without the aſſiſtance of a vowel, is no more than a motion of the lips, and not a ſound.

In the vowels we diſtinguiſh two things, the ſound, and the length of the ſound.

The ſound is either full or weak in a greater or leſs degree. Placing the vowels in the following order, *o*, *u*, *i*, *a*, *e*, we ſhall find that the firſt is the fulleſt, and the laſt the weakeſt.

Our *e* and *o*, in ſome words, is more open, in others more cloſe, and conſequently is at ſometimes more ſonorous, at others leſs ſo.

The length of the vowel is the time taken up in pronouncing it. This varies in almoſt every language, that is to ſay, that every language has ſounds, ſome of which require more, others leſs time

time to pronounce them. The firſt of theſe are called *long*, the others *ſhort*. This length and ſhortneſs of the vowel is only to be eſtimated by compariſon.

Conſonants are of ſeveral kinds, ſome are light and eaſily pronounced, and ſeem as it were to flow, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*. Theſe were called *ſemivowels* by the Greeks, with us they have the name of *liquids*.

Others again are more ſtrong and ſolid, as *p*, *t*, *g*, *f*, *k*, *&c.* and *g* before *a*, *o*, *u*.

There are a third kind which hold a middle place, and are only the latter ſoftened in a greater or leſs degree, *b*, *d*, *u*, *v*, *j*, *&c.* and *g* before *e*, *i*.

The *s*, which has a hiſſing ſound, has under it the *c* ſoft before *e* and *i*, and the *z ezzard* or *uzzard*, that is, *s*, hard

Theſe are the common elements of all languages, as being thoſe of nature herſelf. They have obtained the name of elements, becauſe it has been found, upon an analyſis, that all languages proceed immediately from them, and are reducible thereto, as unto a common principle.

Nature, as not contented with having given men the firſt elements of language, has furthermore furniſhed them with the principal combinations of all theſe, as it were to invite and put them in the way of forming words. She has given us dipthongs, which are the combinations of vowels only, as *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, *ou*, *ui*, *au*, *eau*, *eou*, *iou*, and *uai*.

uai. Theſe latter are generally termed tripthongs, from being compoſed of three ſeveral vowels. Theſe are the ſame in all nations, with a ſmall variation ariſing from the different modifications of the organs, according to the particular cuſtom or mode of ſpeech. She has, in the next place, provided ſyllables, which are combinations of theſe vowels with conſonants. Of theſe ſhe produced at firſt the more ſimple, as *ba*, *be*, *bi*, *&c.* afterwards ſhe brought forth others more compounded, as *bra*, *bre*, *bri*, *&c.*

Thus far reach the elementary ſounds and primordial combinations of all language. This is the common ſtock from whence every people firſt drew their words, which they afterwards diſpoſed according to certain laws, which uſe, cuſtom, example, neceſſity, art, imagination, circumſtances, or chance, introduced among them. In this manner have muſicians, from the ſeven principal notes in muſic, compoſed not only ſimple airs, but every different ſpecies and kind of muſic now to be met with.

Before we proceed to reaſon on theſe principles, it will be neceſſary to offer yet ſome few obſervations on ſounds, and their manner of combination.

With regard to ſounds, it is to be obſerved: 1°. That the nearer they approach to the ſimplicity of the firſt elements, the ſofter they will be, and

and more eaſy to pronounce. 2°. That the longer they are, the more melodious they are. 3°. That the more they are diffuſed, the more ſonorous they are. And contrarywiſe, the more complex, ſhort, or cloſe they are, the harſher, dryer, and deeper will they be.

As to the combination of ſounds, it is to be remarked, that the vowels which run into each other in joyning, are always ſoft, that thoſe which will not ſo blend, form certain gaps or vacuities called *hiatus*; that conſonants, which claſh with each other, are always more or leſs harſh, becauſe the configuration the vowel receives from them, becomes in that caſe laborious and ſeemingly overloaded.

Having thus diſpatched theſe obſervations on the number of the elements of ſpeech, and their particular characters, let us in the next place examine in what manner they are to be combined ſo as to form what is called melody.

And here there are two extremes to be avoided, *viz.* the *hiatus*, occaſioned by two vowels coming together, which ſeem to cut off each other, as in this phraſe, *Should thy Iambics*; and the encountering and claſhing together of conſonants, which, having no proper ſound of themſelves, fatigue the organs in pronunciation, and ſeems to deſtroy the vowel, as in the word *ſphinx*.

In

In this ſpecies, as in morality, the mean is the true point of perfection. The conſonants and vowels ought to be ſo blended and adapted, as to give a mutual ſtrength and ſweetneſs to one another. The former ſhould ſerve as it were for a ſupport and prop to the latter, while theſe again ſhould, in return, give a union and poliſh to the others.

Thoſe laws relating to the union of the letters in a ſyllable, and of ſyllables in a word, take place in ſuch words as are combined and adapted to each other in the ſame phraſe. The final conſonant readily unites itſelf to the initial vowel of the following word, and in the ſame manner the final vowel loves to reſt and ſupport itſelf on the initial conſonant, from whence there reſults an agreeable chain of ſounds, which nothing ſtops, nothing troubles or interrupts.

In the union of the members and periods, we are principally to regard eaſe and variety; this latter qualification is more eſpecially to be attended to. This we may gather from the diſguſt that a delicate ear feels from a ſameneſs of the final notes in a piece of muſic. Sometimes a phraſe ſhould be terminated by a ſhort word, at others by a long one; ſometimes by a chain of either of theſe; by ſounding ſyllables, or by falling ones; the firſt round off the cadence full, in the others

the voice almoſt dies away. The ſame holds good likewiſe as to the beginnings.

We are not however tyed down to a ſtrict obſervance of all theſe rules. Little more is required than to inform the taſte, that there are ſuch laws in being, to render it attentive, and put it upon its guard in its operations. We are ſenſible that hints of this kind often improve the underſtanding, and ſometimes even add to its ſtrength.

CHAP. IX.

Of number in oratory.

WE have already defined what is meant by number, and have repreſented it by a water falling drop by drop. But this requires to be farther explained.

Number is ſo called, becauſe it muſt conſiſt of more than one. Unity is no number in arithmetic, a ſingle note makes no meaſure in muſic, nor will one geometrical line form either ſymmetry or proportion. In like manner, in a diſcourſe, one word, or one ſingle member of a period, conſidered by itſelf, cannot produce what is called number. Number can only ſubſiſt in a multiplicity of parts, having an affinity of equality or inequality, conformity or difference with each other: *Diſtinctio, & æqualium & ſæpe inæqualium intervallorum percuſſio numerum conficit.*

To

To proceed regularly in this matter, which is of more importance than is generally imagined, we ſhall firſt inquire in how many ſenſes the word *number* may be taken; and then examine what effects it produces in a diſcourſe, when taken in every one of theſe different ſenſes.

The word *number*, in Latin *numerus*, has the ſame ſenſe as *rhymes*, ῥυθμος, had with the Greeks.

Sometimes it is taken for a ſpace of any kind, which has ſome ſenſible relation to another. In this ſenſe Cicero uſes it in the paſſage juſt cited.

It is likewiſe frequently underſtood of the manner in which a phraſe is terminated; or, in other words; by number is meant the laſt or concluding ſounds, which give an agreeable cadence or cloſe to a number or period. In this ſenſe we ſay a numerous cadence. Cicero in his Orator, and Quintillian in his Inſtitutes, frequently make uſe of it in this ſenſe.

Sometimes it ſignifies what the muſicians call the time or movement, that which renders the air quick or ſlow.

Laſtly, we ſometimes find this name given to what the Greeks called *metres*, and the Latins *feet*, and which we may term meaſure, though with leſs propriety. In this ſenſe we find it again in Cicero, Dionyſ. Halicarnaſſ. Quintilian.

Of number taken as the relation between ſeveral places.

All men have a natural propenſity to numbers. We do almoſt every thing by meaſure. When we walk, our ſteps are made at equal diſtances. We breathe at equal intervals. The hammer of the blackſmith falls in cadence on his anvil, and the weaver toſſes his ſhuttle in numbers. Not even to the ſcythe of the reaper, but has its ſtated times, its periods, its intervals of moving to and fro.

If this ſymmetry be found in things which appear merely mechanical, how much more reaſon is there to look for it in ſpeech, which is the image of mankind, that is, of that part of us which is itſelf, the principle, rule, and model of all ſymmetry and proportion?

From the neceſſity we lye under of fetching breath, we firſt begin to perceive the neceſſity of number in oratory. Our organs require an interval of art to reſume their functions; and nature, who never ſevers the agreeable from the truly uſeful, has attached a pleaſure to reſpiration, which is felt as ſenſibly by the hearer as by the orator himſelf.

Over and above this kind of pauſe, there are yet three others to be remarked, *viz.* The pauſe of the

the object, the pauſe of the mind, and that of the ear.

The objects ſhould be all repreſented diſtinct and without confuſion; and conſequently require to be ſeparated by ſome kind of interval. Let us conſider them as they are found in nature, or in a picture; not one but has its line of circumſcription, which bounds it and ſeparates it from every other object. And is it to be imagined, that in a diſcourſe, which is a moving picture coloured in the moſt exact and regular manner, they ought not to be drawn ſeparately, and diſtinguiſhed from each other in the ſame manner as in a piece of painting?

Though the pauſe of the objects repreſented is very eaſily confounded with that of the mind which repreſents them, and this without danger of prejudicing the number of the diſcourſe, nevertheleſs the mind has its pauſe peculiar to itſelf, and quite diſtinct from that of object.

Like a painter, it draws its ſtrokes one after another, whence they muſt neceſſarily be ſeparated from one another by ſome kind of ſpace or interval. There are three operations of the mind; idea, judgment, and reaſoning. Each of theſe is terminated by a pauſe. When the mind confines itſelf to an idea, there is a pauſe after this idea. When it would form a judgment, there is likewiſe a pauſe after this judgment. Laſtly, there

there is another pauſe after the reaſoning. Beſides this, the judgment when complex, and every reaſoning in general, has its half pauſes and quarter pauſes, which are diſtinguiſhed by the punctuation: for example: *youth, beauty, and riches, are periſhable goods.*

The ear has alſo its pauſes, which occur after a certain ſpace of time, and are as ſo many points, terminating a certain ſucceſſion of times, and marking the inſtant of commencement of another ſucceſſion. Theſe pauſes are very evident in muſic, which is always diſtributed by phraſes, demi phraſes, and meaſures. A ſucceſſion of ſounds without their proper diviſions and compartments would quickly tire the ear, or at leaſt ceaſe to afford it any exerciſe. *Numerus in continuatione nullus eſt.*

A few examples will preſently explain all that has been ſaid. *This young plant thus watered with the dews of heaven, was not long without bringing forth fruit.* In this phraſe there is but one pauſe marked, which is that where the full ſtop is. Nevertheleſs there is a pauſe after *plant*, another after *heaven*, and another after *long*. And to pronounce it properly, there ſhould be ſome ſpace or diviſion obſerved. We may breathe after *heaven*, but then this is but an half pauſe, the mind not being at the end or boundary of its operation till after *fruit*. There is a pauſe for the object after

after *plant*, and another after *long*; there is one for the reſpiration after *heaven*, and, laſtly, another for the mind after *fruit*. The pauſe of the object and that of the reſpiration are blended together in that of the mind, which ſtill continues its progreſs, though the objects are divided, and the pronunciation ſtops for to give breathing time: this occaſions a variety. At length theſe three pauſes all fall into one another at the full ſtop, where the ſucceſſion of objects finiſhes, the reſpiration remains free, and the mind is at the end of its career.

It now remains to give ſome examples of the pauſe for the ear. Theſe depend either on the ſymmetry of ſounds, which in the modern verſe is called rhyme, and ſupplies the place of the uniformity of metre that cloſed the verſes of the antients; or on the obſervance of certain ſet and uniform intervals, as in the following lines;

Je chante les combats & ce prelat ter*rible*,
Qui par ſes longs travaux & ſa force invin*cible*.

Or in theſe;

Arms and the man I ſing who urg'd by *fate*,
And haughty Juno's unrelenting *hate*.

Here the pauſes are uniform both from the rhymes and the equality of intervals, ſince each

verſe conſiſts of a like number of feet, and have each the ſame final. But beſides this pauſe of the finals, there is yet another of the hemiſtichs, which anſwer to each other and to the finals, and are uniform only from the equality of their intervals. This will be better perceived in theſe two lines:

Fortune who with erring *hand*
Crown'ſt blackeſt actions with ſucceſs.

Here the ear has its uniform pauſes, though there is no ſymmetry of ſound. But add the two following verſes, and there will be a ſymmetry of ſounds interwoven with a ſymmetry of intervals:

Muſt we ever dazzled *ſtand*
At thy falſe deceitful *dreſs*?

Here I think we have the pauſes of the ear diſtinctly marked, and their two-fold kind exhibited in a very plain and clear manner.

The pauſes of the mind, and thoſe of reſpiration, may be diſtinguiſhed by the punctuation. Thoſe of the objects, when they do not fall in with thoſe of the mind, cannot be diſtinguiſhed by any ſenſible mark in writing; nor yet in pronunciation, but by a particular tone or inflexion of the voice, or certain hardly perceptible breaks, *quaſdam impreſſiones*, which are directed only by taſte

taſte, or by a clear and diſtinct manner natural to the perſon who is ſpeaking. And hence is it that we meet with ſo few people capable of reading ſo as to give their hearers pleaſure and ſatisfaction.

The pauſes of the ear are diſtinguiſhed in the ſame manner as thoſe of the objects, when they depend only on the fixing of the intervals. Thus when we ſay,

Fortune who with erring hand
Crown'ſt blackeſt actions with ſucceſs.

We dwell a little on the two laſt words of each line by way of diſtinguiſhing the points of difference. But when there is a ſymmetry of ſounds or rhyme, the conſonance alone is ſufficient to diſtinguiſh them.

Theſe are the different kinds of pauſes; it now remains to conſider at what diſtance they are to be placed.

In poetry the pauſes are determined according to the neceſſity of reſpiration and the laws of taſte. This is inconteſtable. Therefore if we would pleaſe in proſe, we ought neceſſarily to follow, as near as poſſible, the ſame rules, ſince it is to paſs through the ſame organs, and to be judged by the ſame taſte; and, by a like conſequence, every piece of proſe, to be harmonious, ought to adopt ſuch intervals as are made uſe of

in poetry, be they of ten, twelve, ſix, eight, &c. feet, more or leſs.

But how comes it that this propoſition carries all the air of a paradox?

Dionyſius of Halycarnaſſus. in his treatiſe on the diſpoſition of words, goes ſtill farther. He will have it, that proſe which is perfectly harmonious, has not only its pauſes and rhymes nearly the ſame as what we find in verſe, but even its metres too *, and by cutting off ſome few ſyllables, which he ſuppoſes to have been in-

* Rhime is no other than a ſpace bounded by certain laws. Metre is a like bounded ſpace, but has its ſeveral parts filled according to certain laws.

To render the diſtinction more clear, let us ſuppoſe a rhyme of two meaſures, turn this any way you will, there muſt ſtill reſult two meaſures. Rhyme regards only a ſingle ſpace: but if this ſpace is filled with ſounds, as theſe ſounds are either ſhorter or longer, there will be more or leſs of them required to fill the ſpace; which will produce different metres in the ſame rhyme; or, if you will, different diviſions of the ſame ſpace. If the two meaſures of the rhyme are filled by two long ſounds (or ſyllables) the rhyme becomes that metre called a ſpondee; if by one long and two ſhort ones, the rhyme, though ſtill remaining the ſame, takes the name of dactyl: if there are two ſhort and one long, it is an anapeſte; if one long between two ſhort ones, it is an amphibrachys; laſtly, four ſhort ones make a double pyrrhic. Here are five ſorts of metres or feet for the ſame rhyme.

troduced

troduced merely for the ſake of better diſtinguiſhing the verſification, he has turned the exordiums of all Demoſthenes' orations into different kinds of verſe.

But we have no occaſion to go thus far, ſince we have no knowledge of the different metres. However, we have this to ſay, that French proſe, when it has its proper number or harmony, has its pauſes diſtributed in near the ſame regular manner as they are in verſe.

Let us open Flechier, one of the moſt famous orators they have for a fine and delicate ear. If we pronounce the words in the ſame manner as in proſe, that is without expreſſing all the ſyllables, we ſhall every where find the very ſame intervals which we ſo admire in verſe.

1. *Je me trouble, meſſieurs,*
2. *Turenne meurt :*
3. *tout ſe confond :*
4. *la fortune chancelle :*
5. *la victoire ſe laſſe :*
6. *la paix s'éloigne :*
7. *les bonnes intentions des alliés ſe ralentiſſent :*
8. *le courage des troupes*
9. *eſt abattu par la douleur*
10. *& ranimé par la vengeance :*
11. *tout le camp demeure immobile :*
12. *les bleſſés penſent à la perte qu'ils ont faite ;*
13. *& non aux bleſſures qu'ils ont reçues.*

14. *Les peres mourans*
15. *envoient leurs fils pleurer*
16. *ſur leur général mort.*
17. *L'armée en deuil eſt occupée*
18. *à lui rendre les devoirs funébres,*
19. *& la renommée qui ſe plait*
20. *à répandre dans l'univers*
21. *les accidens extraordinaires,*
22. *va remplir toute l'Europe*
23. *du récit glorieux de la vie de ce prince*
24. *& du triſte regret de ſa mort.*

Thus Engliſhed.

1. *I am afflicted, Sirs,*
2. *Turenne expires:*
3. *all is confus'd:*
4. *fortune gives way:*
5. *victory droops:*
6. *peace diſappears:*
7. *the good intentions of th' allies grew cool:*
8. *the troops feel their courage*
9. *oppreſt with grief,*
10. *yet fir'd with revenge:*
11. *the camp remains motionleſs:*
12. *the wounded think alone on what they've loſt;*
13. *nor once reflect upon the wounds they've ſuffer'd,*
14. *Expiring fathers*
15. *ſend their ſons to weep*
16. *over their lifeleſs chief.*
17. *His mourning army is employ'd*

18. *in rend'ring him the laſt funeral rites;*
19. *and fame, who loves*
20. *to ſpread around*
21. *whatever's great or wonderful,*
22. *proceeds to fill all Europe*
23. *with ſplendid accounts of this prince's life,*
24. *and ev'ry heart with ſorrow for his death.*

In this example we have twenty-four pauſes, all of them in the exact interval proper for verſe. None of them exceeding twelve feet in the French, nor ten in the Engliſh. The ſix firſt are rather ſhorter indeed than the common ſhort verſe; but the rule which confines that kind of verſe to nothing under ſix ſyllables, is purely arbitrary, and is to be obſerved as a law only in the ſtricter and more elevated poeſy. In the lyric and familiar we ſometimes ſee it allow of three or four ſyllables only. For the ſeventh, let us count the feet as they are pronounced (in the French:)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Les bonnes | inten | tions des | alliés ſe ra | ſentiſſent

And as written in Engliſh:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The good | inten | tions of | th' allies | grow cool.

And we ſhall find that in either there is only the pauſe at the hemiſtich wanting, to make all the

pauſes required in what is called the grand verſe or hexameter. The ſame of the following:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Les ble | ſſés pen | ſent á | la per | te qui'ls | ont faits.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The woun | ded think | alone | on what | they've loſt.

All the others are really verſes, if meaſured in this manner: for verſe with us is no other than a regular interval filled with ſyllables.

But of the intervals here preſented, there are ſome for reſpiration, and others for the pauſes of the mind. Theſe are too ſenſible to admit of a diſpute. But thoſe of the ear are not quite ſo plain; as for example in the following line:

Les peres mourans
envoient leurs fils pleurer
ſur leur général.

Expiring fathers
ſend their ſons to weep
over their lifeleſs chief.

And yet they are as much ſo as in theſe verſes of Mad. Deſhoulieres:

Aſſiſe au bord de la Seine
Sur le panchant d'un coteau,
La bergére Céliméne
Laiſſe paitre ſon troupeau.

By

By the borders of the Seine
Reſting on the graſſy mead,
The lovely nymph fair Celimene
Leaves her fleecy flock to feed.

Here you will ſay the pauſes are diſtinguiſhed by the rhyme. It is certain this renders them more ſenſible then they would be without it, but take away the rhyme and they ſtill remain ſufficiently ſenſible:

Aſſiſe au bord de la Seine
Sur le panchant d'un coteau,
La bergére Timarete
Laiſſe paitre ſes brebis.

By the borders of the Seine
Reſting on the graſſy mead,
The lovely nymph fair Arabel
Leaves her fleecy flock to graze.

Here we have no rhyme, and yet we have the pauſes for the ear diſtinguiſhed by a certain ſeparation of the objects.

But that we may not be imagined to have choſen the above extract from Mr. Flechier as an example ſingular in its kind, and ſeldom to be met with, we ſhall preſent the reader with the exordium of a ſermon of father Bourdalou's, on the reſurrection. The text is taken from the words of the angel to the woman at the ſepulchre;

He is not here, he is riſen; ſee the place where he lay. Matt. Chap. ult.

Ces paroles ſont bien differentes.
de celles que nous voyans communément gravées
ſur les tombeaux des hommes.
Quelque puiſſans qu'ils aient été,
à quoi ſe reduiſent
ces magnifiques eloges
qu'on leur donne,
& que nous liſons
ſur ces ſuperbes mauſolées
que leur érige la vanité humaine?
A cette inſcription:
Hîc jacet:
Ce grand,
ce Conquérant,
cet homme tant vanté dans le monde,
eſt ici couché ſous la pierre
& enſeveli dans la pouſſiére,
ſans que tout ſon pouvoir
& toute ſa grandeur
l'en puiſſe tirer.
Il en eſt bien autrement
à l'égard de Jeſus Chriſt.
A peine eſt il enfermé
dans le ſein de la terre,
qu'il en ſort,
dès le troiſiéme jour,

victorieux & triomphant.
Au lieu donc que la gloire des Grands du ſiécle
ſe termine au tombeau ;
c'eſt dans le tombeau que commence
la gloire de ce Dieu-homme.
C'eſt, pour ainſi parler,
dans le centre de la foibleſſe
qu'il fait éclater toute ſa force,
& juſqu'entre les bras de la mort
qu'il reprend par ſa propre vertu
une vie bienheureuſe & immortelle.

Thus Engliſhed.

How different are theſe words,
From thoſe we commonly behold
Engraven on the tombs of men,
Let them have been ever ſo powerful when living ;
In what at length
End the pompous panegyrics
Which we find inſcribed
On the proud monuments
That human vanity has raiſed to them ?
To this inſcription,
HERE LIES.
This hero,
This conqueror,
This mighty man ſo famous in the world

Lies here,
Stretch'd out beneath a little ſtone,
He and his glories buried in the duſt:
From which not all his power
Nor boaſted greatneſs
Can avail to raiſe him.
How different is it
With the lord Jeſus!
Scarce had the earth
Receiv'd him to its boſom,
When the third day
Beheld him riſe again,
A conqueror and triumphant.
Thus the glory of this God-Man,
Begins where every worldly glory ends;
In the grave.
He manifeſts his power,
In the very midſt of weakneſs,
And by the ſole effort
Of his own divine virtues,
He acquires a bleſſed and immortal life,
In the embraces of death itſelf.

It is to be remembered, that we are endeavouring to prove this maxim; that proſe ought to have nearly the ſame intervals and pauſes as thoſe which we find in poetry ariſing from the verſification. Now there are not one of the intervals in this example but what are exactly of the ſame kind

kind with thoſe made uſe of in poetry; ſo that the difference between proſe and poetry with us, does not at all conſiſt in the difference of the intervals, but in the liberty we have in proſe of changing them at will; whereas in verſe, the firſt interval always ſerves as a rule for the ſubſequent ones, or if different intervals meet together and anſwer each other, as ſometimes happens in pieces of the lyric kind, the firſt ſet always ſerve as a model for the reſt: or, laſtly, if this is not obſerved, then ſuch verſe differs from proſe only in the rhyme, or ſome certain arbitrary rules followed by the poet.

Let us now examine in what manner theſe in-intervals or numbers are to be combined in oratory.

In poetry, the firſt interval generally ſerves as a ſtandard for the reſt. In proſe, the intervals are independent one of another; provided they keep within certain bounds, it is all that is required. Or, to uſe the words of Quintillian, proſe is only confined, but poetry is kept in chains.

We find in general that thoſe intervals which have a ſymmetry of combination are the moſt agreeable; ſometimes from their equality.

Cet homme tant vanté dans le monde,
eſt ici couché ſous la pierre
& enſeveli dans la pouſſiére

This

This mighty man ſo famous in the world
Lies here ſtretch'd out beneath a little ſtone,
He and his glories bury'd in the duſt.

Sometimes when an irregular interval is followed by two regular ones:

Les peres mourans
envoient leurs fils pleurer
ſur leur Général mort.

Expiring fathers
Send their ſons to weep
Over their lifeleſs chief.

Sometimes from the climax, or continual aſcent.

Ce grand,
ce conquerant,
cet homme tant vanté dans le monde.

This hero,
This conqueror,
This mighty man ſo famous in the world.

Sometimes when this is reverſed.

1. *à quoi ſe reduiſent ces magnifiques éloges qu'on leur donne,*
2. *& que nous liſons ſur ces ſuperbes mauſolées que leur érige la vanité humaine?*
3. *A cette triſte inſcription:*
4. hîc jacet.

1. In what end at length the pompous panegyrics,
2. Which we find inſcribed on the proud monuments that human vanity has raiſed to them?
3. In this inſcription,
4. HERE LIES, *&c.*

Sometimes this reverſed progreſſion diſcovers a certain warmth or vivacity.

Direz vous que je me ſentois coupable?
Mais ce que j'avois fait bien loin d'être un crime, étoit une très-belle action.
Que je craignois d'être condamné par le peuple?
Il ne s'eſt point agi de ſon jugement; & s'il m'eût jugé, je m'en ſerois tiré avec un double honneur.
Que les gens de bien m'ont refuſé leur appui?
Cela eſt faux.
Que j'ai craint la mort?
C'eſt une injure.

Will you ſay that I knew myſelf culpable?
What I did was ſo far from being a crime, that it was rather a noble action.
That I fear'd being condemn'd by the people?
It did not depend on their judgment; and even had I been tried before them, I ſhould have come off with redoubled honour.

That

That I was deny'd the countenance of men of worth and merit?

This is a falſhood.

That I dreaded death?

This is a calumny.

The following affords a much ſhorter example:

I have conſidered every thing, weighed every thing, and ſeen every thing.

But of all theſe different combinations, none has ſo much dignity as that which preſents a climax; this elevates the ſtyle, and gives it a copiouſneſs mixed with warmth and energy.

But however beautiful and pleaſing this may appear, variety in the number is ſtill more ſo. Theſe two qualities ſhould be united as much as poſſible. The climax ſhould be reſerved for more forcible and ſtriking thoughts, which require to be ſet in a clearer light than the others; equal intervals, and ſuch as run down in a gradual deſcent, ſhould be employed at times, and the ſymmetry now and then broke through, for the ſake of rendering the numbers more brilliant. In a word all ſhould be ſo diſpoſed, as to avoid on one ſide the appearance of affectation and pedantry, and on the other, to have the pauſes to mutually anſwer to or diverſify each other, that there may be a ſucceſſion of objects without confuſion; and

and that the mind may alternately exert and reſt itſelf at proper intervals, that the ear may be ſtruck and led by a variety and uniformity of cadence; in fine, that the reſpirations be maintained free, but not too looſe, that the auditor be always kept breathing, and in that inſenſible kind of exerciſe which may be termed a mechanical attention.

But here we are liable to fall into two extremes, viz. obſcurity and confuſion when the pauſes are too few, and affectation when they are too many or too uniform.

For example; for want of the proper pauſes, we are in a manner bewildered in the ſecond of the two following. *It is an almoſt general received opinion that a man may with a very little underſtanding gain a conſiderable reputation in arms.* This is the firſt; here follows the ſecond. *But I am not the more diſpoſed to believe that a machine to which the uſe of reflection is unknown can poſſibly exerciſe with any kind of ſucceſs an art in which of all others reflection is of the greateſt importance.* There are ſome few pauſes in this phraſe indeed, but they are not in ſufficient number, nor ſo ſenſible as they ought to be; and the objects are as it were entangled in one another. This makes a confuſed medley, from which the mind cannot extricate itſelf without trouble; and if the reader

reader does not allow himſelf the liberty of breathing when he wants it, he is in great danger of being out of breath before he gets to the end.

When the pauſes are too frequent, too uniform, or too brilliant for the kind in which they are employed, in that caſe the diſcourſe becomes a kind of picture in moſaic work, where from a too great regularity, every thing appears forced, crammed in, and ſtiff; or elſe it will form a kind of *traveſty* or burleſque, in which, things, though quite ſimple in themſelves, are dreſſed up in the moſt pompous numbers, and thoſe of the greateſt conſequence, in the moſt looſe and diffuſed.

As a ſtriking example of this, take the following extract, where in laying down the principles of the art to a young ſtudent in eloquence, he is told, ſpeaking of orators, that,

Il faut que leur voix
propre en même-tems
à maîtriſer l'attention,
à exciter de grans mouvemens,
puiſſe donner,
à la véhémence du diſcours,
la mâle vigueur,
à l'élévation des ſentimens,
la noble fierté,
à la vivacité de la douleur,
l'éloquente énergie,

qui

qui leur ſont néceſſaires,
pour nous frapper,
pour nous ſaiſir,
& pour nous pénétrer
Ce n'eſt pas aſſez qu'elle ébranle;
il faut qu'elle tranſporte.
Ce n'eſt pas aſſez qu'elle impoſe;
il faut qu'elle ſubjugue.
Ce n'eſt pas aſſez qu'elle touche;
il faut qu'elle déchire.

Thus Engliſhed.

They ſhould have a voice
At once proper to command attention
And excite the ſtrongeſt emotions,
Such as may give their moſt vehement diſcourſes
That manly energy,
To their exalted ſentiments
That noble loftineſs,
And to their mournful eloquence
That melting ſoftneſs
That they naturally require
To ſtrike
ſeize
And penetrate our hearts:
It is not enough that they ſtagger;
They ſhould tranſport us:
It is not enough that they ſeduce;
They ſhould ſubject us:

It is not enough that they move;
They ſhould rend the ſoul.

This is what the Latins would have called *numerus luxurians*, a luxury of numbers; and Cicero, on ſuch an occaſion, would not have failed to have applied theſe verſes of Lucully:

Quam lepidé lexeis compoſtæ, ut teſſerulæ omnes
Arte, pavimento, atque emblemate vermiculato?

One may think to have done wonders in thus heaping ſymmetry upon ſymmetry, and diſtributing all the thoughts into ſo many different ranks, but after all it will be found, that inſtead of producing a noble, free, and vigorous elocution, nothing but an affected ſtyle and a childiſh brilliancy is the reſult.

We find a letter of Mad. de Sévigné's as full of numbers as the orations of Mr. *Flechier*; but thoſe of the orator are more regular, equal, and piercing, *vibrantes numeros*. Mad. de Sévigné never repeats a thing twice: ſhe ſays it at once, and then only for the ſake of ſaying it. Flechier amplifies his thoughts, is laviſh in his ornaments, and trys to deceive his hearers. Mad. de Sévigné never gives herſelf the trouble of chuſing her words, or endeavouring after imitative cadences. Flechier forgets nothing that can add to the energy, ſublimity, or luſtre of his diſcourſe. He not only endeavours to join cloſe the ſounds of his periods, but to make them terminate in ſuch

a manner as to render the cadence agreeable both to the ear and mind: in a word, he ſtrives to adorn his diſcourſe with all the brilliancy of of *numbers*, taking this word in the ſecond ſenſe we have given it above, and which we ſhall proceed to unfold.

Of number conſidered as cadence.

The ancients, who had metres ready made for their verſes, extended the uſe of them even to their proſe. They examined what were brilliant, ſimple, and of the middle kind. The firſt of theſe they reſerved for the cadence of the higher kind of poetry; the others they gave to the middle kind and to their proſe. With them it was uſual to ſay that ſuch a period, to terminate gracefully, ſhould end with an anapeſt, a dichoreus, a peon, *&c.*

As for us, after having reſerved the privilege of a uniformity of cadence, commonly called rhyme, as the characteriſtic of our poetry, in the ſame manner as the ancients reſerved the brilliant metre for theirs, we have for the reſt contented ourſelves with general rules, and judge it ſufficient that the cadence be natural, that is, not too lofty nor too creeping.

And indeed in this we appear to have as much advantage as the antients. For after all, their metric art did not teach them every thing. There

was

was a neceſſity for a taſte and ear to point out to them the uſe they were to make of their artificial rules, and direct them as to the time, place, and manner of applying them. For without this, their exact calculation of the ſyllables would have been of no more ſervice to them, than the rules of rhetoric to an illiterate or ignorant perſon in compoſing an oration.

Not but that the numbers of our proſe may be directed by certain rules, as to the ſyllables which ſhould immediately precede the pauſe. The finals of our words have their greater and leſs degrees of the ſonorous, the long, the heavy and the ſprightly, as may be more particularly obſerved in looking over the rhymes of any of our poets.

It is the buſineſs of the orator to make ſuch a choice of theſe as is moſt agreeable to the nature of his ſubject, and that of the thoughts he would repreſent; or the beſt adapted for keeping up variety, which is never more neceſſary than in this part. But then this variety is generally produced by the objects themſelves, and the words by which they expreſs them. The ſkilful orator will find the whole of his art reduced to the keeping his numbers free from whatever is likely to obſcure them or prevent their appearing in their true light.

Of

Of number conſidered as motion.

Number conſidered as *motion* conſiſts in the degree of ſlowneſs or ſwiftneſs. A ſtream flows ſwiftly in murmurs. A river ſwelled with rains diſplays a broad front, and proceeds with a firm but ſilent courſe, till it meets with ſome obſtacle that oppoſes it. A fountain plays in the air, but advances no farther.

Oratory is compared to a flood, and has indeed nearly the ſame volubility, poſſeſſes almoſt all its other attributes, and flows almoſt in as many different manners.

The movement of a diſcourſe exiſts in the manner of its compoſition, as well as in the action of the perſon who ſpeaks it. But it is in this latter only that it is clearly felt; as a piece of noted muſic has its movements expreſſed, but is not ſenſible till it comes to be played or ſung.

In a diſcourſe, it conſiſts firſt in a certain arrangement of the things, producing and propelling each other, as wave puſhes on wave.

2°. In a natural and unconſtrained connection of the ideas with each other, whence all the parts ſeem to be mutually attracted, and altogether tend to the ſame end.

3°. In enumerations and circumſtances, the ideas croud thick together, and ruſh upon us in a ſtrong and lively manner

40. In the uſe of certain figures, which ſeem to raiſe the diſcourſe as it were on wings, ſuch as *disjunction*, which takes away the copulations; *repetition*, which by a contrary effect multiplies words, and by giving ſpur to the thought quickens its pace. Laſtly, and above all, *interrogation*, which carries away the mind of the auditor with it, on which it impoſes the neceſſity of anſwering, and by that means often exerciſing it againſt its will.

56. In a mixture of ſhort and long ſyllables, which rendered the ancient Iambic ſo remarkable for its rapidity, *celeres iambos*, the ſhort ſtriking upon the long, the reſiſtance made by this latter ſeems to double the effect of the other.

Beatus ille qui procul negotiis,
Paterna rura bobus exercet ſuis,

Laſtly, in a proper diſtribution of theſe numbers which gives each member, ſentence, and word a kind of impulſe preciſely of the ſame nature with the muſical meaſure. The ear being accuſtomed to run over a certain length, gives mechanically into it, and from the very beginning of the period haſtens on to arrive at the end, and then begins again with the ſame activity. Beſides this, there are ſome pauſes and fourths of pauſes, which having all a kind of tendency to one point of union as to a centre, draw every thing

thing with which they have any connection the ſame way. It is to the union of all theſe qualities that the animated pace of Homer is owing, every thing is in motion with him, *ſemper ad inventum feſtinat*; and the reader in following him is ſo far from being weary or inclinable to nod, that he preſſes forward with double ardour to arrive at the concluſion.

Of number conſidered as metre.

With regard to number conſidered as *metre*, it is to be obſerved, that although we have no metres properly ſo called in our language, yet as we are poſſeſſed of the matter of which they are compoſed, I mean long and ſhort ſyllables, conſequently they are to be met with in our proſe, and we may, if we pleaſe, make uſe of every thing that the ancients have ſaid on that ſubject. There is more dignity in the long ſyllables, more fire and vivacity in the ſhort ones. Hence a diſcourſe which abounds with the former, will be more majeſtick, and where the latter prevail, more gay and ſprightly. We have already delivered our ſentiments on the particular rules to be given on this article, and ſhewn that they can in no wiſe ſupply the place of taſte.

And now to retrace in a few words all that has been ſaid concerning number, we ſhall demonſtrate the uſe it is of in a diſcourſe.

If we conſider numbers as certain ſpaces termi-

nated at proper diſtances, we ſhall find that they greatly eaſe the mind, ear, and reſpiration of both ſpeaker and hearer. They exhibit the objects in a diſtinct and ſeparate manner; join the phraſes together by a ſymmetrical connexion; cauſe them to fall and ſwell as circumſtances require, and vary them in a manner the moſt agreeable and pleaſing to the taſte. They prepare the orator's action; for no geſtures can be grateful that have not their proper times, degrees, variations, inflections and pauſes. And if a rhetorical compoſition is wanting in any one of theſe requiſites, it will have the ſame diſagreeable effects, as a dance in which the ſteps do not keep time to the inſtrument.

If we conſider numbers as a ſet of regular cadences prepared with art, they are like the ſharp points at the end of a dart; they at once give a greater weight to the thought, make it carry further, and render the duration more certain. So that when the ſounds are united by a juſt melody, and have a ſtrong and lively final joined to them, they form what Seneca calls *pugnatorius mucro*. In this caſe the phraſes are ſo many arrows which carry to a great diſtance, and enter wherever they ſtrike.

Laſtly, if we conſider number as a kind of general movement of the whole diſcourſe, it quickens the compoſition more or leſs. An hiſtory is read cooly and without emotion; the mind proceeds

ceeds unconſtrained and at its eaſe; it travels as in a carriage. But in a piece of pleading, or in a nervous ſermon, we are forcibly drawn away. In theſe, the argument and amplification have ſuch an impetuoſity, they ruſh on us with ſo violent and irreſiſtible a force, as adds a double ſtrength to their efforts, and bears down all oppoſition.

Hence I think we may conclude, that no one thing is of greater importance to an orator than to know how to make a proper uſe of numbers; ſince they comprehend the greateſt part of that degree of elocution, and that kind of poetic ſpirit which alone deſerves the name of eloquence.

CHAP. X.

Of oratorial harmony.

THE harmony of ſounds conſidered as ſigns, is the agreement of thoſe ſounds with the things they repreſent. This conſiſts of two points: 1°. The agreement and relation of ſounds, ſyllables, and words, with the objects they expreſs. 2°. In the agreement of the ſtyle with the ſubject, the firſt is the agreement of the parts of the expreſſion with the parts of the things expreſſed; the ſecond, the agreement of the whole with the whole.

The harmony in the ſounds.

Sounds are, from their nature and duration, and without the aſſiſtance of words to expreſs them by, capable of furniſhing mankind with a ſort of inarticulate language by which they might expreſs to a certain point a certain number of things. This is proved as follows.

If men had no other means than that of geſtures to communicate their ideas to each other, they would imitate as near as poſſible the figure and motion of the object they meant to repreſent. They would raiſe their hands to denote heaven; they would point downwards to ſignify any place beneath them; they would deſcribe by imitation the running of an horſe, or the falling of a tree. But ſuppoſing that in the room of geſture they were only poſſeſſed of voice, and knew no more of language than juſt the firſt combinations of theſe elements which have been elſewhere deſcribed as common to all men in general; is it to be thought that they would not find the means of ſpeaking to each other by theſe ſounds? Upon any urgent neceſſity the organ of the voice would be exerted in its utmoſt force, and give forth lively, piercing, dull, rapid, ſlow, rowling or furious ſounds, each of them expreſſed by the different impreſſions they received as they paſſed through the throat or larynx, over the tongue,

be-

between the teeth, or from the lips, and all in conformity to the qualities of the object they intended to denote.

And this kind of language is not merely imaginary, ſince it is found in a great part in infants, who frequently employ imitative ſounds to expreſs thoſe objects whoſe names they have not yet learned; and in theatrical declamation, there is ſcarce a ſcene in which we do not find many things expreſſed wholly by the particular tone of voice and imitative ſounds.

Theſe ſounds of imitation are found in all languages, they are indeed the very baſis and foundation of them, and the firſt principle from which words have their origin. Every language furniſhes us with a number of theſe terms. Muſical imitation firſt lays hold on ſuch objects as make a noiſe, becauſe nothing is more eaſy than to imitate ſound by ſound; then it proceeds to thoſe which have a motion, becauſe ſounds moving after their manner, have in that manner a power of expreſſing the motion of its object. Nor are forms or colours exempt from this muſical imitation, though they appear to yield little or no ſubject for it, yet has the imagination found a ſort of analogy or relation between theſe and the grave, the ſharp, the long, the ſlow, the ſwift, the ſoft, the harſh, the light, the heavy, the great, the ſmall, motion and reſt, &c. Joy ex-

pands, fear contracts, hope elevates, grief depreſſes: blue is ſoft; red, lively; green, gay. So that by this means, and by the help of imagination, which is very ready to lend its aſſiſtance in ſuch caſes, almoſt all nature has been more or leſs ſubjected to imitation, and repreſented by ſounds. From all which I conclude, that the firſt principle in harmony is to make uſe of ſuch words or phraſes, as from their ſoftneſs or harſhneſs, ſlowneſs or ſwiftneſs, carry with them that imitative expreſſion that is found in ſounds.

The greateſt poets in all ages, have made this a rule; Homer and Virgil have obſerved it thro' the whole of their writings. If a wreſtler is deſcribed, the verſes raiſe, bow, twiſt, preſent, claſh, precipitate, ſtand firm or fly off, in imitation of the perſons whoſe ſeveral motions they are to repreſent.

Is a monſter to be painted with a thouſand throats wide gaping to devour?

Quinquaginta atris immanis hiatibus hydra,
Intùs habet ſedem.

Or cries loſt in air, and the rattling of chains to be deſcribed?

Hinc exaudiri gemitus, & ſæva ſonare
Verbera: tum ſtridor ferri, tractæque catenæ.

Let

Let me aſk any one who has an ear, if he does not find in theſe lines, that inarticulate and natural language, of which we have been ſpeaking.

The writings of Racine and Deſpreaux among the French, and of Mr. Pope with the Engliſh, every where abound with inſtances of this kind; and make the ſound an eccho to the ſenſe.

The length of the ſounds may likewiſe contribute to the expreſſion. The Greeks and Latins had greatly the advantage of us in this reſpect, by having ſome of their vowels much longer than any of the others. This difference in length, was ſo conſiderable, that they had letters invented purpoſely to expreſs it by, though the ſound was ſtill the ſame: there is an example of this in the omega, which has the ſame ſound as the omicron. This length of ſound contributed greatly to the characteriſing certain muſical expreſſions; for it is evident that the ſhorter a ſound is, the drier and more harſh it will be; and the longer it is, the more eaſy will it be to render it full, copious, and ſonorous. We have our long ſounds in our manner, and conſequently our ſhort ones. Indeed we have ſome almoſt as long as the longeſt of the Latins, as *fantôme*, *blême*, in French: *fall*, *ball*, *call*, in Engliſh. Some alſo that are very ſhort, and are of admirable uſe for imitating ſwiftneſs: Others again which are ſcarcely pronounced at all,

as entêtement, cachetè; temperance, preference, &c. So that if we fall ſhort of the Greeks and Latins in ſounds to expreſs a ſlow movement, we exceed them in thoſe that repreſent ſwiftneſs and rapidity.

The length of the words has nearly the ſame effect in a diſcourſe, as length of ſounds. But our language is not defective in this article; for excluſive of our words being neither too long nor too ſhort in themſelves, our articles, prepoſitions and auxiliaries, though ſeparated in grammar, are not ſo in diſcourſe. They make but one word with the principal one, and are rendered abſolutely one and the ſame, by the unity of the idea they repreſent. Thus we pronounce as one word, *I ſing*, *I have ſung*; *the glory*, *the victors*: articles and pronouns are additional pieces, of which all languages have an equal ſhare.

So much for the harmony belonging to words taken ſeparately, *ſingulis*; there is yet another ſpecies which belongs to them, when conſidered as connected or joined to each other, *collocatis*.

As all objects which are connected with each other in the mind, are ſo from a certain character of agreement or diſagreement in one or other of their appearances, the phraſes which repreſent this connection of ideas, ſhould bear the ſame character. There are ſome phraſes more ſmooth, light, and harmonious, than others, from the choice

choice of the words and manner of placing and adapting them to each other. However nice this harmony may appear, it is productive of real beauties in compoſition, and a writer that has a good ear, will never neglect or paſs it by. No one can be more exact than Cicero, in this point. *Etſi homini nihil eſt magis optandum, quàm proſpera, æquabilis, perpetuaque fortuna, ſecundo vitæ, ſine ullâ offenſione, curſu: tamen ſi mihi tranquilla & placata omnia fuiſſent, incredibili quâdam & penè divinâ, quâ nunc veſtro beneficio fruor, lætitiæ voluptate caruiſſem.* The whole of this period has an admirable ſoftneſs; there is no diſagreeable claſhing of conſonants; the vowels are in great number, and an eaſy and continued movement which nothing interrupts, prevails through the whole, and ſeems to be ſupported and kept up by the ſounds of which it is compoſed.

The following is the very reverſe of this; being an inſtance of harſh conſtruction; it repreſents the preparations made for war.

Ut belli ſignum Laurenti Turnus ab arce,
Extulit, & rauco ſtrepuerunt cornua cantu,
Utque acres concuſſit equos, utque impulit arma;
Extemplo turbati animi: ſimul omne tumultu
Conjurat trepido Latium, ſævitque juventus
Effera. Ductores primi Meſſapus & Uſens,

Contemtorque deum Mezentius undique cogunt
Auxilia & latos vaſtant cultoribus agros.
Virg. Æn. 8.

The chain of ſounds here are perfectly well adapted to the ſubject; being as harſh and diſſonant as can poſſibly be. *Laurenti Turnus; ab arce extulit: rauco ſtrepuêre: utque acres:* and in the ſame line, *utque impulit, &c.* This warlike apparatus does not indeed produce many determinate objects for the imagination, but the general idea furniſhes a ſentiment of horror, on which the imagination beſtows a kind of body, that is in part repreſented by imitative art.

The harmony of the ſtyle.

The ſecond ſpecies of harmony is that of the general ſtrain or manner of the writer in his compoſitions, or the actor in his declamation, with that of the ſubject in general and in the whole. For as we are not to read tragedy in a comic tone, nor comedy in a tragic one, unleſs by way of parody; by the ſame reaſon ought we to treat every ſubject in the ſtyle that properly belongs to it.

Deſcriptas ſervare vices, operumque colores
Cur ego, ſi nequeo ignoroque, poëta ſalutor?

When I ſay the ſubject, I mean the ſubject with all its circumſtances; for an alteration in any ſingle

gle one of theſe, however inſignificant it may ſeem, is ſufficient to change the whole, for this plain reaſon; that a thouſand and one are not a thouſand.

The chief point here then, to avoid parody, is to underſtand perfectly the ſubject we treat, to know its full weight, extent, and degree of dignity; that done, it remains to give it the words, turns, and phraſes which are moſt ſuitable to it.

There is a wide difference between the elevated and the ſimple ſtyle: the ancients have diſtinguiſhed this difference, in what related to their languages; but I do not find that any of our modern rhetoricians have attempted to point this out from the writers of the preſent times; I ſhall therefore take upon me to preſent the reader with a few ſtriking examples of the kind.

In the following manner does madame de Sévigné relate the death of marſhal Turenne, in a letter to her ſon in law.

"It is to you, my dear count, that I now addreſs myſelf, to acquaint you with one of the "greateſt and moſt unhappy loſſes that could have "happen'd to France. If I am the firſt that ſends "you this news, I am perſuaded you will be in "as much grief and concern about it, as we all "are here. The king has been afflicted in a "manner proportioned to the loſs of the greateſt "general and the beſt man in the world. The

"whole

"whole court was in tears; Mr. de Condom "was near fainting. Every thing was ready for "ſetting out on a party of pleaſure to Fontain-"bleau, but upon the arrival of this diſaſtrous "news, all was broke off. All degrees of peo-"ple were in the greateſt confuſion and trouble. "Every one was making enquiries, and gather-"ing in crowds to lament the loſs of their hero. "I have ſent you a very exact relation of what "he did during the laſt days of his life. After "three months of a conduct almoſt ſupernatural, "and that thoſe of his profeſſion could never ſuf-"ficiently admire, arrived the fatal day, that "was at once to terminate his glory and his "life."

Here now is a paſſage thoroughly well wrote, but in the moſt ſimple ſtyle. The ſubject in itſelf is grand, but the kind in which it is treated is the leaſt ſo of any. The ſubject then in this caſe muſt be lowered, and reduced to the ſtandard of the kind. This is the rule: but in what manner has this been done?

The chief privilege of the epiſtolary ſtyle is freedom. In conſequence of this, ſuch things might be blended with the ſubject as concerned only the perſon who was writing, or to whom it was addreſſed. *It is to you, my dear count. If I am the firſt that ſends you this news, I am perſuaded,* &c.

In

In the ſecond place, there are ſeveral common phraſes introduced; *One of the moſt unfortunate loſſes that could have happen'd to France: afflicted at the loſs of the beſt man in the world: every thing was ready*, &c. *I ſend you an exact account: thoſe of his profeſſion.*

Lofty expreſſions are avoided. There is, *the greateſt general* indeed, but the reſt of the phraſe, which is entirely low, takes off from the dignity of the other, as well as the expreſſion *the beſt man in the world.* The term *hero* has nothing emphatic or affected, it was requiſite to be uſed in ſpeaking of M. Turenne.

The cadences are all looſe and flowing; *as much concerned as we all are here; all was broke off.*

In the laſt place, and what is, in my opinion, the moſt diſtinguiſhed characteriſtic of the ſimple ſtyle; there is neither diſtinct melody, ſupported harmony, or ſenſible numbers; all is looſe and negligent; one number does not introduce another; there is no progreſſion obſerved in the ideas nor phraſes, which rather reſemble a confuſed crowd, than an army artfully drawn up.

We ſhall now ſee a contraſt to this, in a paſſage which I ſhall cite from from M. Flechier. The Orator is in his pulpit; he is ſpeaking of the moſt ſublime and affecting ſubject (the death of an hero, to whom his country owed her preſervation) in the preſence of the moſt auguſt aſ-

ſembly

ſembly of a great kingdom. Will he introduce himſelf in his narration? Will he ſuffer a word, a thought, or a phraſe to eſcape him, without having firſt conſidered it with the greateſt attention.

"Already did the enemy, all pale and confuſed "tremble in their camp. That eagle had already "winged his way to the mountains to ſave himſelf, whoſe bold and rapid flight had at firſt terrified our provinces. Thoſe brazen thunderbolts "which hell has invented for the deſtruction of "men, roared on every ſide, to favour their "precipitate retreat; and France, in ſuſpence, "awaited the ſucceſs of an enterpriſe, which, "according to all the rules of war, appeared "infallible. Alas, we knew what we had to "hope, but never once thought of what we had "to fear. *——"

* "Déja frémiſſoit dans ſon camp l'ennemi confus & "déconcerté. Déja prenoit l'eſſor pour ſe ſauver dans "les montagnes cet aigle dont le vol hardi avoit "d'abord effrayé nos provinces. Ces foudres de bronze "que l'enfer a inventés pour la deſtruction des hommes, "tonnoient de tous côtés pour précipiter & favoriſer cette "retraite; & la France en ſuſpens attendoit les ſuccès "d'une enterpriſe, qui, ſelon toutes les régles de la "guerre, étoit infallible. Helas! nous ſavions ce que "nous devions eſpérer; & nous ne penſions pas à ce que "nous devions craindre."

"O terrible God, but juſt in thy councils "over the children of men, thou diſpoſeſt "both of the victors and their victories! —— "Thou ſacrificeſt the nobleſt victims to thy "ſovereign greatneſs, and ſtrikeſt when thou "ſeeſt fit, thoſe illuſtrious heads thou haſt ſo of- "ten crowned.

"Do not expect, gentlemen, to ſee me open, "in this place, a tragical ſcene; repreſenting "this great man ſtretched out and extended on "his own trophies; that I ſhould uncover the "pale and bloody coarſe, with the thunder that "ſtruck him dead yet ſmoking by his ſide; that "I ſhall make his blood cry out like Abel's, and "that I am ſetting before your eyes the ſad ima- "ges of your weeping religion and country. *

"I am afflicted, gentlemen, &c."

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* "O Dieu terrible, mais juſte en vos conſeils ſur les "enfans des hommes! vous diſpoſez & des vainqueurs "& des victoires... vous immolez à votre ſouveraine "grandeur de grandes victimes; & vous frappez, quand "il vous plaît, ces têtes illuſtres que vous avez tant de "fois couronnées.

"N'attendez pas, Meſſieurs, que j'ouvre ici une ſcéne "tragique; que je repréſente ce grand homme étendu ſur "ſes propres trophées; que je découvre ce corps pâle & "ſanglant, auprés duquel fume encore la foudre qui la "frappé; que je faſſe crier ſon ſang comme celui d'Abel, "& que j'expoſe à vos yeux les triſtes images de la reli- "gion & de la patrie éplorée....

"Je me trouble, Meſſieurs, Turenne meurt," &c.

This

This example is alone ſufficient to ſhew the difference between the elevated and the ſimple ſtyle. Who would think that Mad. de Sévigné had ſaid the ſame thing, and has made uſe nearly of the ſame turns? But if we examine both theſe examples cloſely, we ſhall find a great conformity between them. But what a difference in the thoughts, words, and phraſes of the two? Let us examine it more particularly.

1°. At firſt ſetting out, M. Flechier employs the moſt powerful terms, ſuch as paint the thing to the imagination, at the ſame time that they make it underſtood by the mind; *trembled, wing'd his way*——The eagle *whoſe bold rapid flight*——Thoſe brazen thunder-*bolts roared on every ſide: France in ſuſpence awaited*, &c.

2°. The turns are bold and ſtriking. *Already did the enemy tremble. Already had the eagle wing'd*, &c. Such conſtructions are rarely or never uſed inthe ſimple ſtyle.

3°. The figures are noble and ſublime: Exclamation, *alas!* Apoſtrophe, *O God terrible:* Pointed antitheſis, *Thou diſpoſeſt of victors and of victories.* The ſimple ſtyle has not ſuch an animated ſpirit, none of theſe ſallies that hurry the orator and his action away with them.

We

We are ſenſible he is in the pulpit, we hear his voice, we behold his action.

4°. Amplification prevails through the whole; that is, the orator preſents each idea ſeveral times, and each time with a new degree of enhancement and force: *Already trembled—Already wing'd his way.* The ſimple ſtyle contents itſelf with ſaying the thing once: *Mr. de Condom had nearly fainted.* Every *thing was ready for ſetting out for Fontainbleau—All was put off.*

5°. Diſtribution and progreſſion of numbers; that is, the orator has made choice of the moſt majeſtic intervals for his phraſes, which makes continually riſe in a certain progreſſion.

1. *Do not expect*, &c.
2. *That I ſhould repreſent*, &c.
3. *That I ſhould uncover*, &c.
4. *That I ſhould make his blood*, &c.

Here now are four members which continually riſe one above another. This is called the aſcending progreſſion of numbers, or the intervals which include the phraſe. This diſpoſition, which is almoſt every where to be found in the elevated ſtyle, preſents the mind with a kind of pyramid, with its point and baſe, and forms a figure, in which are at once blended variety and unity.

6°. The

6°. The cadence of the phraſes, which are more diſtinct, more ſtudied, and more varied than in the ſimple ſtyle.

7°. And which indeed I ſhould have put in the firſt place, the ſounds are maſculine, ſtrong, and ſufficiently furniſhed with conſonants; the words are long and harmonious, and the whole noble and majeſtic.

M. Flechier could not ſay that M. Turenne *was one of the beſt men in the world.* —That his death was *an unfortunate loſs to France*, that *thoſe of his profeſſion*, admired what he did. For the ſame reaſon that Madam de Sevigné, had ſhe made uſe of lofty and figurative words, inverſions, ſuſtained harmony, amplification, triple numbers, ſhe would not have wrote a letter.

Theſe extremes are eaſily avoided, inaſmuch as they are ſo ſufficiently ſeparated from each other, at ſuch proper diſtances as to prevent the falling out of one into the other: but there are degrees not quite ſo ſenſible, and kinds more ſimilar, though entirely ſeparated, which may ſometimes be taken one for another. Thus a tragic writer may make epic verſes, and ſometimes even lyric ones; and a comic writer may forget himſelf, and run into tragedy. Every one has his taſte peculiar to himſelf, and is apt to imagine that will pleaſe others which pleaſes himſelf. The compoſer ought to be in a manner engrafted into his ſubject, and

and ſhould think, and explain himſelf by that alone; and moſt frequently it is the ſubject that ſpeaks in the author; it takes the colour of the man, and loſes ſome part, at leaſt, of its own. If the ſubject alone was the rule in compoſition, then ſhould we find every idea, and every object, take the tone of the ſubject, in coming forth, and make the ground of the piece, ſo as to occaſion a variety without breaking the unity. Great things would be lowered without being degraded, and ſmall ones would be raiſed without loſing their ſimplicity. By this means would Homer, Virgil, Deſpreaux, Milton, Racine, Shakeſpeare, La Fontaine, and Gay, become the models of beauty in their ſeveral ways; and by the oppoſite to this, are Lucan and Seneca, and ſome others I could mention, examples of the contrary.

Of theſe two kinds of harmony, the firſt, which conſiſts in the agreement of ſounds with the objects they repreſent, is now found no where but in poetry, and in the more exalted kind in particular; for the poets, in their deliriums, perſonifying all that is in nature, giving life, ſpirit, and action, to every thing, the imitation becomes more eaſy, and the reſemblance more ſtriking. In the other kinds, where argumentation is as much concerned as deſcription, this harmony is more rare, and not near ſo remarkable, the whole being

being in a manner reduced to melody and the ſecond ſpecies of harmony.

It may perhaps be alledged that this nicety is ſeldom practiſed, and that theſe obſervations are too ſubtle to be of any aſſiſtance to the author in writing, or to the reader in forming a judgment. But thoſe of Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionyſius of Halycarnaſſus, are ſtill more ſo, and yet they have never been looked upon as uſeleſs. Such examples admit of no contradiction: beſides, they may help a maſter in the art to clear up every thing relating to elocution. It was by the help of theſe principles, the laſt-mentioned author was enabled to inveſtigate the nicer beauties of Homer, Herodotus, and Demoſthenes.

Were the beauties of oratorial or poetical elocution obvious and palpable, were they to be ſeen or felt, nothing would be more common than eloquence; and a middling genius might attain it with all imaginable eaſe. And ſometimes it even happens that for want of being ſufficiently verſed in them, a writer, though born with a talent for eloquence, ſtops in the midway, or wanders wide of the path.

Though the influence of theſe rules, in compoſition, may ſeem hardly perceptible, yet are they not the leſs real. Can it be believed that Cicero practiſed them only by inſtinct! Or even ſuppoſing that the author is not directly under

their

their guidance and influence, at the time he is compoſing, as having his attention taken up with other things; yet when his mind is free, and he comes to reviſe his work in a cool and deliberate manner, he is either made confident by theſe rules, or makes uſe of them to correct ſuch places wherein he may have wandered from, or tranſgreſſed them. *In præceptis his hanc vim & hanc utilitatem eſſe arbitror, non ut ad reperiendum quod dicamus arte ducamur; ſed ut ea quæ naturâ quæ ſtudio, quæ exercitatione conſequimur, aut recta eſſe confidamus, aut prava intelligamus, cum quo referenda dedicerimus.* Cic. de Inv. lib. 2. numb. 56.

CHAP. XI.

Of Style.

WHEN the words are choſen and diſpoſed according to the laws of harmony and number, in a manner agreeable to the dignity or ſimplicity of the ſubject treated of, there reſults what is called *ſtyle*.

The word *ſtyle* (*ſtylus*) was uſed by the ancients to ſignify an inſtrument like a bodkin, with which they wrote upon their waxen tablets. The one end of which was pointed, and the other flat; with this part they uſed to ſcratch out ſuch lines as did not pleaſe; hence the expreſſion of Horace, *Sæpe ſtylum vertas*, Scratch out, correct frequently. At preſent

preſent it ſignifies the manner, ſtrain, and colouring that prevail in a work, either in whole or in part.

There are three ſorts of ſtyle, the ſimple, the middle, and the ſublime.

The ſimple ſtyle is uſed in familiar dialogue, letters, and fable-writing. It ſhould be pure, clear, and without any viſible ornament. We ſhall explain its characteriſtics hereafter.

The ſublime ſtyle is that which gives an air of dignity and majeſty to a work. Here the thoughts are all noble and elevated, the expreſſions weighty, ſonorous, harmonious, *&c.*

There is a difference between a ſublime ſtyle, and what is called *the ſublime.* By the latter we underſtand whatever ſuddenly raiſes, tranſports, agitates or impreſſes the ſoul. This is a ſudden flaſh. The ſublime ſtyle, on the contrary, may be maintained for a length of time. It conſiſts in an elevated tone, a noble and majeſtic pace:

I've ſeen the wicked man on earth ador'd,
Up-tow'ring like the cedar to the ſkies,
With front audacious, and inſulting pride,
Seem the Almighty's vengeful bolt to wield;
While at his feet in proſtrate terror lay
His vanquiſh'd foes: thus flouriſh'd he awhile
I did but paſs, and lo! he was no more.

The

The firſt five of theſe verſes are in the ſublime ſtyle, the laſt is *the ſublime*, without being in a ſublime ſtyle. We have already conſidered *the ſublime* at the beginning of the third volume.

The middle ſtyle holds the mean between theſe two; it has all the artleſſneſs of the ſimple ſtyle, and at the ſame time is ſuſceptible of all the ornaments and colouring of elocution.

We often meet with theſe three different ſorts of ſtyle in one and the ſame work, becauſe, as the ſubject may either riſe or ſink, the ſtyle, as being dependant on it, muſt likewiſe be raiſed or lowered with it. And as all the parts of a ſubject hang together, and are connected by a ſecret chain, the ſame connection ſhould be obſerved in the ſtyle: conſequently care muſt be taken, that the ſeveral paſſages and connections be properly prepared, ſo as to riſe or fall inſenſibly, as occaſion requires, unleſs where the ſubject taking of itſelf a ſudden ſtart, and becoming wild and irregular, obliges the ſtyle to change as ſuddenly with it. For example, when Craſſus was pleading againſt one Brutus, who had by ſome bad action diſgraced his name and family, the orator happening to ſee the funeral proceſſion of one of this man's relations at that inſtant paſſing by, ſtopped thoſe that carried the corpſe, and turning himſelf about to Brutus, with the moſt ſevere reproaches, addreſſed him in the following manner: *What ſhall*

Julia

Julia ſay of you to your father, and thoſe of your anceſtors, whoſe images you now ſee carrying by? What ſhall ſhe ſay to that Brutus who delivered us from the tyranny of our kings? &c. Here were no colourings or nice connections required; the ſubject carried away the ſtyle with it, whoſe buſineſs it is always to wait on it.

The ſtyle may be either connected or disjointed.

The connected ſtyle is that wherein the propoſitions or phraſes are joined together, either by the ſenſe, or by the means of conjunctions.

The disjointed ſtyle is that whoſe parts are independant of, and unconnected with each other. Examples will ſuffice to illuſtrate both theſe kinds of ſtyle.

If Mr. de Turenne had known only how to fight and to conquer: If he had not raiſed himſelf to a more than common pitch of virtue: If his courage and prudence had not been animated with the ſpirit of faith and charity; I ſhould rank him only with the Fabii and the Scipio's: Here now is a period that has four members, and in each of them the ſenſe is kept ſuſpended. *If Mr. de Turenne had known only how to fight and to conquer,* &c. Here the ſenſe is left unfiniſhed, becauſe the conjunction *if* promiſes another period at leaſt, to follow: therefore the ſtyle is connected. To make it disjointed, we have only to take away the conjunction. *If Mr. de Turenne knew more than merely how to*

fight

ſight and conquer. He raiſed himſelf to a pitch of virtue more than human: His courage and prudence were animated with the ſpirit of faith and charity. In this he is far ſuperior to the Fabii and Scipio's of old. Or here is another example: *He paſſes the river; he watches the motions of the enemy; he raiſes the courage of the allies*, &c.

A period then may be defined: a thought compoſed of ſeveral other thoughts, in each of which the ſenſe remains unfiniſhed, till the final cloſe common to them all.

Each of theſe thoughts, taken ſeparately, is called a *member* of a period.

When they are but two, three, or four, it is called a period of two, three, or four members; but when they are more than four, it is no longer a period, but a continued or periodical diſcourſe. Likewiſe when there is but one; this, however harmonious it may be, is not properly a period, whatever ſome authors may ſay.

It ſometimes happens that the members of a period are compoſed of other parts, that are called *inciſi*, or parentheſis. Theſe *inciſi* ſerve to ſtrengthen and dilate the thought: *God can produce*, whenſoever he pleaſes, *from the treaſures of his wiſdom, the ſouls of great men*, &c. It is enough to have an idea of this part, for it would be only time and labour thrown away to collect a multitude of rules concerning it.

The ſame holds good in the rules that relates to the members of the period. It is enough to know, that if they are too ſhort, they will be light and ſuperficial, and that if they are too long, they will be heavy and tireſome; that the cloſe of each member ſhould have ſomething agreeable in it, and that of the laſt member more ſo than the reſt; in a word, that the thoughts ſhould be blended without reſtraint, and follow each other in ſuch a manner, that the laſt ſhould always add ſomething to thoſe which went before.

The connected ſtyle has two advantages over the diffuſed ſtyle. Firſt, it is more harmonious; ſecondly, it keeps the mind in ſuſpence. When the orator begins a period, the mind of the hearer is engaged, and finds itſelf in a manner conſtrained to follow him to the end of it, otherwiſe it muſt loſe the fruits of the attention it has given to the firſt words. This ſuperſtition has an agreeable effect for the hearer, it keeps him always awake and in breath.

The diffuſed ſtyle has more life and ſpirit than the former. They are both made uſe of in their turns, according as the ſubject requires. If we believe Cicero, the diffuſed ſtyle is that which ſhould be moſt generally uſed: *Neque ſemper utendum eſt perpetuitate, & quaſi converſione verborum; ſed ſæpe corpenda membris minutiaribus oratio eſt.* Variety, ſo requiſite in every thing, is more particularly

ticularly ſo in a diſcourſe; a monotony of ſtyle is above all things to be avoided——and we ſhould make it our ſtudy to learn how to paſs with eaſe,

Du grave au doux, du plaiſant au ſévére.

From harſh to ſoft, from merry to ſevere.

CHAP. XII.

Qualities of ſtyle.

OF all the qualities of a good ſtyle, which are partly the ſame with thoſe ſpecified at the beginning of this article, there is one much ſuperior to all the others, and which ſeems to comprehend them all; I mean ſimplicity of ſtyle.

To convey an exact idea of it, we muſt neceſſarily enter into a few minute particulars. Undoubtedly the art of expreſſing our thoughts, deſerves as much attention as any other, both for the beauty and great utility which attend it. A painter employs his whole life to attain a natural repreſentation of drops of water, of the down of fruit, or the moiſture of the dew: a muſician ſtudies carefully the leaſt variations in ſound, and is continually exerciſing his talent, in order to catch the delicacy of an air which laſts a moment; and ſhall not eloquence, which governs the hearts of mankind, immortalizes virtue, and is the ſweeteſt bond of ſociety, deſerve our whole application? The ancients, as we have already ob-

ſerved, were of the ſame opinion with us on this ſubject, and, that they thought right, is ſufficiently evinced by the ſame which their authors obtain and enjoy to this day, notwithſtanding the difference of age, climate, or manners, and the ſurprizing revolutions, that have happened in the hiſtory of the human mind. They neglected nothing which regarded elocution; and this is viſible in the minute obſervations they made concerning that point, which, though perhaps uſeleſs in themſelves at the preſent period, ſhould engage us to follow their example, in the ſtudy of our mother-tongue.

What ſimplicity of ſtyle is.

The Greek and Roman writers ſufficiently ſhew, that they were as well acquainted with ſimplicity of ſtyle as modern authors, but I queſtion that their language afforded a proper word to expreſs it. The Romans uſed the following: *Dicendi genus ſimplex, ſincerum, nativum, ingenuum, candidum, dicendi ſimplicitas*; but theſe words do not give an adequate idea to the French word *naïveté*, though they are equivalent to the Engliſh term, ſimplicity of ſtyle. We muſt not however confound ſimplicity of ſtyle with a ſimple thought, or a natural ſaying. A ſimple thought often ſteals from us unpremeditated, and often implies too much

much vivacity, ignorance, imprudence, or even a weak underſtanding. We have an example of this kind, in an anſwer made to a dying huſband by his wife. Marry ſuch an one, my dear, ſays the poor man; take my word, he is the man. Alas! replied ſhe, I was juſt thinking of it.

Simplicity of ſtyle, on the contrary, is the pure unconſtrained language of liberty.

In a ſimple ſaying there is neither reflection nor ſtudy; but both are requiſite in ſimple ſtyle, though void of affectation. In the former, the thought and words are artleſs; in the latter, examination and choice have preceded, but every thing is adapted to the ſubject and the preſent circumſtances.

Fools may ſay ſimple things, and fools only, becauſe they are not certain of what they ſay; but true ſimplicity belongs to men of great genius and ſuperior talents.

A ſimplicity of ſtyle is a mere ſhade, and conſequently not eaſily caught, we ſhall exhibit it in company with other ſhades, in order to fix our wavering ideas by ſtriking examples, ſet in contraſt with each other.

We may diſtinguiſh in an ingenious work, four ſpecies of thoughts; the firſt are *ſimple*, the ſecond *natural*, the third *far-fetched*, and the laſt *forced*.

The firſt ſpring naturally out of the ſubject, the ſecond are alſo in the ſubject, but require ſome aid to come forth; the third ſort demand a ſtrong effort, and belong as much to the author as to the ſubject itſelf; laſtly, the *forced* thoughts are extorted with violence.

The following diſcourſe is put in the mouth of Mucius by Livy. Mucius ſpeaks to Porſenna, whom he had attempted to ſtab, in order to deliver Rome from the danger ſhe apprehended from him.

"I am a Roman: my name is Mucius; as "an enemy I would have killed my enemy, nor "have I leſs courage to receive death, than I "had to inflict it. It is the part of a Roman to "do and ſuffer great things."

Romanus ſum, inquit, civis: C. Mucium vocant. Hoſtis hoſtem occidere volui. Nec ad mortem minùs animi eſt, quàm fuit ad necem. Et facere & pati fortia Romanum eſt.

The firſt thought, *I am a Roman: my name is Mucius*; may properly be called ſimple. Nothing, in effect, can be more ſimple, nor, at the ſame time, more ſublime. "I am not aſhamed "to own who I am. You hate the Romans "and are come to deſtroy them. I am one of "them; if you doubt of it, inform yourſelf; my "name is Mucius."

I would have killed an enemy. This might alſo be reekoned a ſimple thought, had it ſtood in Latin as in Engliſh, but Livy has ſpoiled it by an antitheſis: *hoſtis hoſtem occidere volui:* As an enemy I would have killed an other enemy. Mucius might have expreſſed himſelf in this manner, and conſequently it is natural; ſtill it is eaſy to perceive more art in that line, than in the foregoing.

Nor have I leſs courage to receive death, than I had to inflict it. This thought is not foreign to the ſubject; but if we recollect that the brave Mucius lived in an age, when the moſt eloquent, ſuch as Menenius Agrippa, ſpoke in an uncouth ſtyle, *priſco illo et horrido modo*, and throw an eye on the circumſtances, in which he was ſituated, ſhall we believe that he could frame an antitheſis of ſuch force? The hiſtorian muſt be allowed, at leaſt, to ſhare it with the hero; and this may be called *far-fetched.*

But what ſhall we ſay of the laſt thought: *Et facere & pati fortia Romanum eſt:* It is the part of a Roman, to do and ſuffer great things? This undoubtedly is noble and ſublime; but in the mouth of Mucius it ſounds too much like a falſe bravado. So general a ſentence might have found a more proper place in Pliny's panegyric, than in the diſcourſe of a ſoldier of that age; when, according to Salluſt, the ſtudy of virtue was pre-

ferred to that of elocution. The author ſhould have given it to us as his own ſentiment, or at leaſt found a more proper place for it; for certainly he was unwilling to loſe it. We profeſs a great admiration for Livy, and praiſe that energy, that bold preciſion, which reigns throughout the whole work; but we ſtill admire more the maſculine ſimplicity of Virgil, who, though entitled to poetic licence, is more ſimple in the diſcourſes, which the heroes of his poem hold on ſeveral occaſions. We may form a judgment, by thoſe of Dido, Æneas, Evander, and Turnus, but we ſhall content ourſelves with citing the words of Niſus, on ſeeing his friend Euryclus amidſt the Rutulians, ready to deſtroy him.

Me me, (adſum qui feci) in me convertite ferrum,
O Rutuli: mea fraus omnis, nihil iſte, nec auſus,
Nec potuit; cœlum hoc & conſcia ſidera teſtor.
Tantum infelicem nimium dilexit amicum.

"I am the Perſon, here I am: hither direct "your blows, Rutulians; I have done all the "miſchief. That youth had neither the cou- "rage nor the power to do any; I call to wit- "neſs the heavens, and the conſcious ſtars,— "alas! *his* only crime was, that he loved his "unfortunate friend too well."

This is the whole of the diſcourſe, and is ſimple from the beginning to the end, nothing but pure ſentiment. Seeing his friend on the point

of

of being maſſacred, he endeavours to draw the fatal ſtroke on his own head; for this reaſon he ſo often repeats, *I am the man, here I am.* He apoſtrophiſes the Rutulians in order to draw their attention in ſo critical a caſe. He takes upon himſelf the whole guilt: *I am the man*; and proves the innocence of his friend by declaring him incapable of annoying. Then he ſwears by the heavens, to which he points: *cœlum hoc*; and, finally, pities his exceſs of love: *Tantum infelicem nimium dilexit amicum.* Our attention is not fixed on Virgil's wit or ſpirited diction; it is engroſſed by Niſus, whoſe motion we obſerve, whoſe voice we hear, and whoſe geſtures we behold. There is nothing in this paſſage farfetched, much leſs forced. Every ſentiment is not only natural, but accompanied with that ſprightly eaſe, which characteriſes truth, and may properly be called ſimplicity.

Let us, for a moment, throw an eye on a picture of Le Sueur; we ſhall immediately diſcover in it the amiable ſimplicity, I am ſpeaking of. Art is ſcarce perceptible; every ſtroke exhibits life; this beauty cannot be defined nor taught by maſters, nor pirated by a rival pencil; yet thoſe who have a ſoul, and judicious eyes, are enchanted therewith.

The ſame ſimplicity may equally be found in a diſcourſe: words and phraſes, when properly

handled, are as pliant as the painter's colours. Homer is an inſtance of this kind; to whom may be added Virgil, Cicero, Catullus, and thoſe moderns who have followed their traces.

The obſervation is not new, though I imagine no writer ever attempted to explain the character of true ſimplicity. We ſhall undertake the taſk, however difficult, in order to enable authors to imitate a good model, and readers to diſtinguiſh the beauties of a book.

What produces ſimplicity of ſtyle.

The elocution of the ancients is viſible in their works. Their method is reducible to three points, viz. brevity, order, and combination. The firſt requires not much diſcuſſion; for, if one word ſuffices to expreſs our thought, it will neceſſarily be moſt natural to avoid more. The human mind is greedy of information, and is ſatisfied with the moſt compendious road that leads thereto. The uſe of circumlocution and far-fetched thoughts, only ſerve to fatigue the imagination, without inſtructing the mind. A thought ſhould be produced in its natural growth, as Minerva ſprung from Jupiter's head. Rochefoucault's maxim, *The mind is often the bubble of the heart*, could not be expreſſed in fewer words, nor in a more clear manner. Had he ſaid, *The love*

love and taſte which we have for certain things, repreſent them in a different light from what they really are; the thought would have been the ſame, but then, what difference in the expreſſion! The one creeps, and the other ſoars on wings.

Our ideas, in general, are complex, and conſequently ſuſceptible of various dreſſes. Therefore when we can convey an idea with leſs pain and time, where is the uſe of multiplicity of words to expreſs the ſame thought?

We do not mean, however, to reduce a language to monoſyllables, imperfect expreſſions, and enigmatical words, like thoſe with which Perſius abounds. A thought ſhould have its full dreſs, yet be viſible, in the ſame manner as our body appears through wet linen.

Neither do we blame thoſe orators, who launch out into amplification, though we are aware, that multiplicity rather belongs to our ideas than to arbitrary phraſes. For example, we never find too great a number in Tully's orations. His expreſſion is ſimple, and never dazzles or overcharges the mind with a load of ſuperfluous words. We might cite on this occaſion, Homer, Virgil, Terence, *&c.* but we are contented to refer the author to the abovementioned diſcourſe of Niſus. It is impoſſible to expreſs it in fewer words; had it been poſſible, the author would have done it.

The ſecond means of attaining ſimplicity, is order.

There always is a certain arrangement in our ideas. In our actions, we have one object in view, which occupies our whole attention, to the excluſion of all others, which have not ſome connexion with the principal object. This object is repreſented by a principal idea, as a ſubordinate idea exhibits an acceſſary object. Now I reaſon thus:

As language is a faithful picture of the ſenſations of our ſoul, common ſenſe directs us to repreſent them in the ſame order they are contained. A painter would be ridiculous in eclipſing the perſon, he intended to draw, with a group of heterogeneous figures. Their chief aim conſiſts in exhibiting the hero of the piece in the moſt conſpicuous point of view; this done, acceſſary ornaments may be employed, on which the ſpectator may caſt a glancing eye. The ſame law holds with reſpect to the painter and orator. A man, who ſees his houſe on fire and his life in danger, will never be heard to make this ſpeech to the ſtanders-by: *Gentlemen, be pleaſed to deliver me from the danger of either loſing my life or my habitation.* Nature then cries out, and expreſſes herſelf in one word.

In academical diſcouries, the ſame ſimplicity ſhould be obſerved, and the ſame order. Flechier,

chier, biſhop of Niſmes, in France, has excelled in this point. We ſhall ſelect the proſopopeia of a dying princeſs: "My eyes are ſinking in dark-"neſs; an eternal cloud is riſing between the "world and me. I am dying, and ſtealing inſen-"ſily from myſelf. Melancholy moment, and "fatal period of my lingering youth!" This diſcourſe proceeds from the ſame principle, which impels a man to cry out, fire. They are the words of a dying perſon, and have been placed in their proper and natural order by that learned prelate.

The moſt ſtriking object ſhould be foremoſt, as in the preceding example: *my eyes are ſinking in darkneſs—an eternal cloud is riſing between the world and me.* The exclamations whlch conclude the whole, are alſo conceived in a ſimple, artleſs ſtyle.

We may perhaps ſee this beautiful diſcourſe in a more advantagious light, by oppoſing to it another repreſentation of the ſame thought. Some orators would not bluſh to expreſs it in the following manner: *Death is ſcaling upon my eyes, and raiſing between the world and me an everlaſting cloud. I have finiſhed my career. A ſecret violence ſeparates the union of ſoul and body. How dreadful is this moment? Is this then the term of a few years paſſed in indolence?* Though this latter is far from being incorrect or ſtarch, yet, on reading the

the former, the difference will manifeſtly appear. In the one the words are diſpoſed according to the laws of nature, in the other according to the imperfect regulations of a language.

Simplicity of ſtyle requires alſo an exact combination of the words which compoſe it, and muſt be uniform throughout the whole work: *Servetur ad imum qualis ab incepto proceſſerit.* The ſame object muſt be kept in view; elſe, on the ſubſtituting of others, the reader's mind is entangled and diverted from the principal point. Thus an author would be liable to cenſure, for drawing the following conſequence: Taſte is not confined to a bare knowledge of books; therefore we ſhould not employ ſo many years in the ſtudy of ſciences. The firſt line dwells on taſte, and the ſecond on ſciences, which are two ſeparate objects, and of courſe diſtract the mind.

All the parts of a diſcourſe, both great and ſmall, ſhould be cloſely united, and compoſe one whole. This order is viſible in nature. A tree conſiſts of branches, leaves, root, *&c.* they are but one. Therefore, in order to conduct a work with propriety, we ſhould be acquainted with every part of it, and juſtly adapt them to each other. By this rule we ſhall avoid artificial tranſactions, awkward turns, and other frivolous expedients, too often employed to fill a gap, or dazzle vulgar eyes, who judge of the ſolidity of a

building by the plaiſter. In authors of note, we always diſcover a noble ſimplicity. When they have finiſhed one ſubject, they paſs to another, and treat it in the ſame manner; yet they do not loſe the energy which is diſtinguiſhable in brevity of ſpeech, when properly arranged. Their expreſſion may be compared to the impetuoſity of a javelin, which is darted in a direct line. A good author feels the impulſe of nature, and obeys it: language, however refractory, muſt at laſt ſubmit. It is true, that order may be perverted in ſome places, but, in general, the combination is exact. Hence we may conclude, that every author ſhould endeavour not only to be natural, but even ſimple. In order to attain this end, he ſhould be perfect maſter of the ſubject, and follow his inclination; language will always be ready to obey his dictate.

Nec facundia deſeret hunc nec lucidus ordo.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

The manner of forming a ſtyle.

WE ſhall conclude this article with a word or two concerning the manner of forming a ſtyle.

Firſt, we muſt read the beſt authors: Secondly, apply to writing. Cicero tells us, that the pen is the beſt guide in this kind: *Stylus optimus dicendi magiſter*. Thirdly, it would be proper to imitate. I ſhall chiefly dwell on this laſt article.

In general, imitation has little effect on our ſtyle. Tully is the common author, whom we propoſe for a model. The young ſtudent never fails to diſfigure a thought, which he is required to interpret. It is no longer Tully.

An imitator is liable to one of theſe extremes; he enriches or impoveriſhes the ſubject. The bee ſips from the roſe and other flowers, a juice which compoſes honey; in the hands of an inſipid imitator, all flowers wither indiſcriminately.

It would however be proper to preſent them with a model in the ſtudy of grammar. Thus let them tranſlate and compare the following paſſages: *Ad rivum eundem lupus & agnus venerant ſame compulſi*; a wolf and lamb, moved by thirſt, met at the

the ſame rivulet. *Ad patrem ſuum frater & ſoror venerant amore compulſi*; a brother and ſiſter, moved by love, went to their father.

In a performance of ſome length and conſequence, it will be neceſſary to proceed in a different manner, in order to attain an anſwerable ſtyle and dignity.

As muſicians before they begin a concert, tune their inſtruments to a certain key, ſo an author, before he takes pen in hand, ought to chuſe a proper model for his deſign. For a Latin harangue, he muſt not conſult Livy or Salluſt, much leſs Terence or Plautus; let him read thoſe orations of Cicero, which approach the moſt to his purpoſe. If it is a panegyric, the oration for Marcellus, for Ligarius, or the Manilian law, will ſuit him the beſt; if an invective, the orations againſt Verres, againſt Cataline. or the Philippics. Were I to undertake an heroic poem, I would peruſe Virgil; not his Georgics or Paſtorals, but thoſe parts of the Æneid, which appeared to bear the greateſt reſemblance to my ſcheme. Virgil alone ſhould be my Apollo, and Ariſtarchus my genius and my judge.

Having finiſhed my poem, I would inceſſantly compare it with the original model. What an exquiſite pleaſure would it be to find a ſimilitude in dignity of ſentiment, or energy of expreſſion?

The

The care is not impoſſible: we often catch inſenſibly the manners of thoſe we often converſe with: how natural muſt that communication be, if we endeavour to imitate.

When we read with an intention to imitate, we ſhould, for a few days, lend our whole attention to the original. It would be proper to obſerve every thought, every expreſſion, and often peruſe the ſame: nor is it ſufficient to read, we muſt pronounce each word aloud, and enter into the author's enthuſiaſm. Then we ſhall catch his ſpirit, and, ſhould ſome new ideas occur, they will mix with and aſſume the form of their companions. Horace, Juvenal, and Tully, will form an agreeable medley, and render the work exactly complete.

ARTICLE III.

On Pronunciation.

AS we propoſe, in this work, to inſtruct you, it will not be thought improper to ſuggeſt ſome obſervations, which may prove uſeful in their public exerciſes. What they repeat, is generally borrowed from others; however, they may deſerve applauſe by the manner of decla-

declamation, which is the ſure teſt of their underſtanding the ſubject.

CHAP. I.

IN the firſt place, they ſhould endeavour to pronounce clearly. This may be effected by ſpeaking ſlow, diſtinguiſhing the ſounds without mouthing or mincing the ſyllables, and obſerving the comma's and points. A clear pronunciation pleaſes the ear, as much as a fine letter in a well-printed book delights the eye.

2dly, Our pronunciation muſt be eaſy and fluent. We ſuffer ourſelves in hearing a perſon who ſpeaks with difficulty. I had rather hear a few bold faults in a gentleman's mouth, than liſten to the ſcrupulous exactneſs of a pedant.

3dly, It is neceſſary to accompany a diſcourſe with the tone of voice which the ſubject ſeems to require. I ſhall not determine.

As theſe tones may be infinitely varied, it is very difficult to give rules for them: nevertheleſs they are in ſome meaſure reducible to three kinds, *viz.* the familiar tone, the raiſed tone, and a tone that holds the mean between the two former, and on that account may not improperly be termed the *middle* tone.

The familiar term is that uſed in common converſation. This is neither ſinging nor monotonous,

nous, but conſiſts in a gentle and ſimple inflection of the voice. This is better learnt from imitation, and the choice of a model, than by any rules. I ſay the *choice of a model*, becauſe there is a certain choice to be made: there is a genteel familiar tone, and it would be but an uncertain method, to teach young people to ſpeak in the ſame manner as they do to thoſe of their own age.

The raiſed tone is that which is uſed for declamation, and the graver ſort of diſcourſes, or in the reading of a very ſerious work. Here the voice is to be always full, the ſyllables are to be pronounced with a kind of melody like chanting, and a dignity of variation in the inflections.

The middle tone is a little more ſtudied than the familiar, and ſomewhat leſs ſo than the raiſed. Theſe three kinds of tones have each their different modifications more or leſs, according to the ſubject, the actors, the audience, and the place.

In public exerciſe, all the definitions, remarks, reflections, and narratives, ſhould be pronounced in a familiar tone. It is a literary converſation.

In all quotations, whether in verſe or proſe, except of the higher kind, the tone ſhould be ſomewhat raiſed; as for example, a paſſage from a diſſertation, a play, or a fable. For we muſt treat a fable in the ſame manner as we do the remarks upon that fable. Theſe latter ſhould be read in a more uniform and eaſy manner. The

fable

fable itſelf with a little more art, and in a lively and graceful manner.

Laſtly, the ſtrong tone is to be uſed for all paſſages from orations, or the higher kind of poetry, which I rank with oratory here, though it is a degree above it, verſes ſhould be chanted and not read. We ſhould make uſe of a noble and elevated tone in reading or ſaying, *Turenne is dead, Every thing falls into confuſion, Peace flies off, Victory grows weary.* But this tone will become much more grand and elevated, in repeating the following verſes.

Maues des grands Bourbons, brillans foudres de guerre,
Qui futes & l'exemple & l'effroi de la terre.

This ſtrong tone conſiſts chiefly with reſpect to young perſons:

1°. In beginning each period in a low tone of voice. We know by experience, that we inſenſibly riſe again to the pitch we left off at. This forms an agreeable variety that ends the phraſe, and ſeldom fails of pleaſing the ear; indeed it would be ridiculous to require any thing more in an exerciſe. Can it be deſired, that a child ſhould take the tone, or adapt himſelf to ſo many different characters, one after another, as are truſted to his memory? that he ſhould declaim like Bourdaloue now, and in the next line ſpeak like Criſpin?

2°. In

2°. In pronouncing with an emphaſis, that is to ſay, by dwelling upon certain ſyllables, to expreſs the ſpirit and life of the performance.

3°. In conveying the rhyme fully, eſpecially in the higher kind of poetry, but without neglecting the points and ſtops. For it is a fault to ſtop at the rhyme, unleſs the ſenſe requires it.

As to action, it is commonly thought to mean the motion of the hands. But action is no other than ſuch a carriage or motion of the body as beſpeaks ſenſation and thought. It is a language addreſſed wholly to the eyes; whereas words and tones are addreſſed to the ears only.

It would be as ridiculous to require great action from children, as it would to expect the ſpirited oratory of the pulpit or the theatre. If they preſerve an eaſy and graceful air, and ſuch as is agreeable to what they are ſpeaking or rehearſing, if any they appear to think that is enough. If they have motion in their hands, let it ſeem rather the firſt ſtep towards action, than compleat action itſelf. This will be no loſs to them, but rather the contrary, for it will appear as if they were under a modeſt reſtraint, which, in thoſe of a tender age, is a greater recommendation than all the graces they can make uſe of.

To employ their eyes, they muſt be taught to look upon the perſons as preſent to whom they are ſuppoſed to be ſpeaking, in their natural ſituation,

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and as giving attention to them. Thus for example, if they are repeating the fable of the oak and the reed, and it is the oak that ſpeaks, they muſt be made to figure to themſelves a reed liſtening in a particular peace, whether they muſt direct their eyes and what little action they make uſe of.

The hands are commonly a great embarraſſment to young people, eſpecially the left; therefore they ſhould at firſt have a book given them to hold, or a role of paper, or elſe the back of a chair, which conceals moſt part of them, and ſo rids them of a great deal of their perplexity. This is much better than to ſee an arm ſtretched out like a ſtatue accompanied by a diſguſting monotony of voice. In every thing that is to be done with taſte and elegance, the firſt thing to be conſidered, is that the actor be quite at his eaſe. Some characters are much more pliable than others: and we have ſeen children as it were born with peculiar graces, while others again are clumſy in all their motions. The former ſcarcely ſtand in need of any tuition; it is enough to point them out the way, and learn them to purſue that engaging care and freedom which a ſour authority almoſt always nips in the bud. As to the latter, we ſhould give them ſuch leſſons only as are gay and lively. The defect of theſe is hardly to be cured effectually but by the care and vigi-

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vigilance of a tender and ſenſible mother; or if any other makes the attempt, it muſt be by adopting the ſame ſoftneſs and goodneſs.

I had forgotten to obſerve, that young folks ſhould never be left to make their firſt tryals by themſelves; they may by this means contract ſuch habits as it will be impoſſible to break them of afterwards. They muſt have an example given them, by ſpeaking before them what we would have them ſay, and repeating ſeveral times the different tones, motions of the head, arms, &c. that we would have them uſe, and then putting them upon making the trial themſelves. But if through diffidence or fear they cannot be prevailed upon to do this in their maſter's preſence, then they ſhould be deſired to practiſe by themſelves before a looking-glaſs. By this means they will hear themſelves ſpeak, behold their own action, and approve or condemn it at their own liberty; and if they have the leaſt ſpark of underſtanding or taſte in them, they will ſoon catch the action from the model ſet before them, or at leaſt ſupply its place by ſomething equivalent of their own. After this they will appear again with more courage, and conſequently with greater ſucceſs. Men are men at all times of life; and their ſelf-love is to be conſulted before every other conſideration. *Hæc omnia magis monitoris non fatui, quàm magiſtri eruditi.* CIC.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the connection of the voice and action with the elocution.

HERE I muſt beg leave to addreſs a few words to orators, to make them ſenſible of the connection there is between the elocution of the action and voice, and that of the words; and of how great importance it is, that the words, the tone of voice, and the action, ſhould be in perfect mutual agreement in the perſon who ſpeaks.

It is by no means our intention to lay down any rules in this place; we ſhall confine ourſelves to one ſingle point: and that is, to give ſome inſight into the extent and number of the things comprehended in the art of declamation, that if any one ſhould take upon him the ſtudy of it for his own ſervice, he may be clear in what he is about. We ſhall even allow, if it is requeſted of us, that every one ought to be almoſt his own maſter in this kind, and that the beſt leſſons on this head, eſpecially thoſe delivered in writing, are but thrown away.

The antients had a collection of precepts on geſtures and tones of voice, that formed an art, and ſerved as a rule for thoſe who were to ſpeak in public, They ever thought this to be one of

the moſt eſſential parts of the art of meaning and perſuading.

Every one knows how Cicero and Roſcius challenged each other to a trial of ſkill in their reſpective arts. The orator expreſſed a thought by words: the comedian inſtantly expreſſed the ſame by geſtures. The orator changed the words while he preſerved the thought: the comedian changed his geſtures, and ſtill expreſſed the ſame thought.

Here then we have two methods of expreſſion, each ſufficient of itſelf to repreſent the thoughts, ſpeech, and action.

Pantomimes were entire pieces, repreſented wholly by action. They formed a regular and connected diſcourſe, to which the audience could attend for ſeveral hours: what would they have been had they taken in the other part of declamation likewiſe, the tone of voice?

Muſic, which has only this latter means of expreſſion, makes uſe of it to convey an infinite number of things. It gives to feel grief, joy, and languor; it expreſſes fury, gentleneſs, tenderneſs, and many other paſſions and ſubjects in the variety of its modulations. It warms and tranſports us, though it ſpeaks to us only by ſounds. What would it be was it joined to action, which rouſes the ſoul in paſſing through the eyes; and to ſpeech, which at once makes its way

way to the heart and mind? Was a mathematician by chance to calculate the powers of a diſcourſe read in a plain and uniform manner, and thoſe of the ſame diſcourſe read with the ſpirit and tone of declamation, I am perſuaded that the latter would turn out double, triple, nay four-fold the ſum of the former, or even of itſelf make a whole, while the other ſtood for nothing.

Demoſthenes being aſked what was the chief and moſt eſſential qualification of an orator, anſwered, action: being aſked what was the ſecond, he replied as before, action: being aſked what was the third, he anſwered again, action: ſtill continuing to make the ſame reply, till they had done queſtioning him; giving them to underſtand by this, that without action, the other qualifications of an orator are to be conſidered as of little or no account; a truth which he himſelf had been taught too ſenſibly not to abide by it for ever.

This orator, the moſt eloquent that any age produced, notwithſtanding his great ſtrength of genius and manly elocution, never appeared in public without diſ-approbation, till he had learned how to manage his weapons. The leſſon he received from a comedian was like a ray of light which broke in upon his mind, and firſt clearly diſcovered to him, that without action the moſt beautiful things are but as a lifeleſs car-

caſe, and more likely to benumb the hearer, than to warm or tranſport him. He therefore applied himſelf to it with all his powers, and the prodigious efforts he made, joined to the immortal glory he acquired in conſequence of them, will be a ſufficient ſanction to thoſe who are deſirous of following his example, and to give themſelves up entirely to learn the art of declamation.

The ſtudy of this art is not only uſeful to thoſe whoſe profeſſion leads them to the pulpit or the theatres, but to every one who is obliged to appear at times in public. Without the aſſiſtance of this art, how can thoſe who read good authors be capable of taſting their beauties? To reſume the compariſon of the dead carcaſe, though no very pleaſing one, the books we read are but ſo many empty ſhadows, mere lifeleſs phantoms, that the reader muſt animate himſelf; if he would find any traces of their real form, he muſt lend them his voice and his action. He muſt himſelf behold Oedipus ſtriking his forehead and roaring in the agonies of deſpair; he muſt himſelf hear the burſts of Demoſthenes' eloquence; he muſt be, like Cicero, inflamed with rage againſt a Clodius and a Cataline; and have the audience before his eyes ſhuddering with horror; otherwiſe, the fineſt writings will be but like the faint ſketch of a drawing, or the weak ſtrokes of a maſterly pencil.

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How can the author, in his compoſitions, give any life to his ſtyle, unleſs he can, in his cloſet, imagine himſelf addreſſing heaven, or laying open the infernal regions. Where is he to come at grace, energy or ſtrength, unleſs he tries, at leaſt in ſome meaſure, the tones of nature?

Seeing then that the art of declamation is alike uſeful to him who compoſes, who writes, or who ſpeaks in public, it is no more than reaſonable that we ſhould ſtop a while, and take a view of what it contains.

Declamation, or to ſpeak in the phraſe of the rhetoricians, action, is a kind of bodily elocution, an expreſſion conſiſting in geſture and the tone of the voice. *Eſt actio quaſi corporis quædam eloquentia, cùm conſtet motu atque voce.* CIC.

This kind of eloquence has its elements as well as the language of words; it may, like that, be either ſimple or luxuriant; it may have its particular harmony with each object, and its general one with the whole ſubject; it has its melody, its numbers, its variations, and its propriety; laſtly, it has its faults and its exceſſes.

There are ſimple geſtures and tones of which the others are compoſed. There are ſome more compounded and others leſs, and the combinations of theſe are more or leſs eaſy. It may even

he ſaid that there are in the *geſtual* language not only whole periods and phraſes, but anſwers to words, ſyllables, and letters. But what is very ſingular in this language is, that it is underſtood by all men, of whatſoever age or condition; and alſo, that every individual has it as particular and perſonal to himſelf, as his exiſtence. Yes, we have, every one of us, our geſtures and our tones, in the ſame manner as we have our outward form, our features, our ſize and our voice; and we have them as different from thoſe of other men, as we ourſelves are different from them by the character of propriety, which makes it that Peter is not Paul, nor Paul Peter. Thus the *geſtual* language of Peter is in no wiſe that of Paul, nor Paul's that of Peter; and, though founded on the ſame common elements, yet the language of theſe two differ at leaſt as much as the French language from the Italian, or the Spaniſh from the Latin, from whence they have taken moſt part of the words which conſtitute them.

Every orator then has his action, which belongs to him, and him alone. This property of expreſſion makes him ſpeak in a proper manner the common language of all the world, and gives him likewiſe a method of expreſſing himſelf with a kind of novelty, though uſing words that have no novelty in themſelves. It is this charm

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of novelty which attaches us ſometimes to one preacher in preference to another, or to this actor rather than that. Let two different men have the ſame things to ſay, or that ſame part to act; we ſhall be charmed with the one, and tired with the other. The reaſon of this is, that the one joins to his language of words, a *geſtual* language, which is clear, definitive, and plain; and the other has only a vague, indeterminate, and falſe action, void of all force or energy.

There are ſeveral kinds of action; of which, ſome repreſent by imitating, as when any one mimicks another's gait or his manner of ſpeaking: theſe may be called *imitative* geſtures. There are others again, that only ſerve to point out an particular place, thing, or perſon, theſe are *indicative* geſtures. Laſtly, there are others that may be called *affecting*, becauſe they paint the affections of the ſoul, and convey theſe impreſſions of them to the ſpectators.

Imitative geſtures are more frequent in comedy than tragedy. It is unbecoming a man of dignity and gravity, to mimic the geſtures or ſpeech of any one, becauſe in ſuch an imitation, there muſt always ſomething eſcape to diſcover the want of gravity, and to put one in mind of its being but mimicry.

Indicative geſtures expreſs only a thought; they

ſerve but to point out the object that we would have the ſpectator take notice of.

Laſtly, the affecting geſture, is the true picture of the ſoul. It aſſiſts nature where ſhe means to diſcover herſelf ſuch as ſhe really is, and to give herſelf up without reſerve to the impreſſions ſhe receives. This is the life of every diſcourſe, and here eloquence particularly triumphs.

This geſture comprehends every attitude and motion of the body, without exception. An orator ſhould be attentive to the minuteſt circumſtance of his carriage, even to the placing of his feet though they are out of ſight; on their diſpoſition frequently depends the firmneſs, dignity, and grace of the whole deportment.

The ſame thing holds good with reſpect to the tones of voice, which diverſify and ſet off each other by ſuch diviſions as are frequently out of the reach of the niceſt muſical calculation. The pitch of an orator's voice is generally confined to the fifth, which it ſeldom exceeds, except in an impetuous ſally, or when ſome very unexpected ſtroke is to be given: this is what the Latins called *vocis contentio*. What art and pains is not required to lay hold of ſuch nice differences! Nay more, every orator has a voice of his own, which requires an art particular to it, either to ſoften when too harſh, to raiſe it when too weak,

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to correct it when falſe, or to moderate it when too impetuous.

In fine, there is not a ſingle paſſion nor emotion of any one in particular, nor even the ſmalleſt part of ſuch emotion, but has its peculiar geſture and tone, its modulations, and its degrees of geſtures and tones; and every man has likewiſe geſtures and tones peculiar to himſelf, for expreſſing theſe emotions: theſe I call perſonal; and, what ſhould be an alarming caution to thoſe who would ſpeak in public, there is not a ſingle perſon of the audience, if he is a man, but is able to lay his finger on this expreſſion, and to judge of its juſtneſs or falſity.

And on this very faculty of impreſſion upon the audience, is founded the energy of geſtual expreſſion. There is a natural ſympathy between the orator and his hearers, which makes the one to comprehend readily and exactly whatever is expreſſed by the outward action and tones of voice of the other. When our eyes and ears accompany the orator in his declamation, their functions are then exerciſed on their natural object. Nothing eſcapes us. It is nature herſelf who ſpeaks to our organs, that is to the faculties which ſhe has created purpoſely for herſelf, and in ſuch a manner, that theſe faculties may feel and comprehend whatever ſhe ſays to them.

However rich or copious a language may be either in words or turns, there are numberleſs occaſions in which it muſt neceſſarily fall ſhort of what it means to expreſs. Some things it can render but in part, or in an obſcure manner, or by circumlocutions; frequently it can only ſhadow out what ſhould be painted, or even deeply engraved. A ſingle cry will ſtir our very hearts within us; we feel our ſoul and all its powers intereſted in the object; it operates upon us ſo as to break through all other ties and connections, and carries us away altogether with itſelf. It is the ſame with geſtures. A look often expreſſes more than the moſt elaborate diſcourſe. And a particular attitude or poſition of the body, will explain to us a thouſand things at once, which we afterwards clear up to ourſelves with pleaſure. How many charming ſcenes are there which owe every thing to the art and genius of the actor, which had they had no other aſſiſtance than that of words, would have ſeemed at beſt but rude ſketches.

The language of declamation is as rich and copious, as it is ſtrong and forcible. It has expreſſions to anſwer to all kinds of words and turns whatever. In ſome figures, the tone of voice and the geſture are ſtronger and deeper laid. In a word, there is not a ſingle figure of the thoughts which has not its correſpondent geſture

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and tone, with this only difference, that the figures of the geſture and tones cannot be traced upon paper, whereas we may clearly repreſent in writing, thoſe of the words and thoughts.

The pliability of the geſtures and tones to the figures of the words and thoughts, are as evident likewiſe in the periods.

There are ſimple periods, conſiſting of one ſingle member only. There are compound periods, that have two, three, four, five, and ſix members, and more. Now every one of theſe requires a certain tone of voice and manner of geſture, which accompanies them from the beginning to the end, terminates the members by means of ſome inflection, marks the diviſions, prepares the way for the next member, and at laſt marks the full ſtop or place of reſting.

There is one tone that ſhews the firſt member, another tone for the ſecond, another for the third, and ſo on, and another again which ſhews the concluſion of the whole, and informs the mind and the ear, that the pauſe or full ſtop is at hand: and, as in every well turned period there is melody and numbers, variation of melody and number, and a juſt conformation of the whole, ſo likewiſe in geſtures and tones, there is to the melody; this adapts them to, and unites them with, each other: for in every geſture actually makeing, there is to be ſomewhat remaining of the

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one that preceded it, as well as ſomewhat of the beginning of that which is to follow.

2°. The number; this regulates the intervals and pauſes, prepares the finals, and preſides over the intonations.

3°. the variation. Variety, which mankind are ſo fond of in every thing, is more eſpecially neceſſary in this article. As every one is here a connoiſſeur, if the actor makes a wrong geſture, a falſe accent, or miſtakes a cadence, he may expect to be hiſſed. On the other hand, they rarely fail to applaud for a remarkably true or expreſſive geſture or tone of voice. But if he is eternally dwelling upon the ſame inflections, if his motions and cadences are always alike, the ſpectator becomes tired and inattentive, his eyelids drop, and he falls aſleep. There muſt then be variety; and that not only in the things themſelves (which is a rule never to be departed from) but even in the repetition of the ſame thing. A conſtant return of the ſame words, if they bring with them a return of the ſame geſtures and tones, becomes very ſoon inſipid and diſguſting.

Laſtly, There is a propriety, clearneſs, and truth, in tones and geſtures. This latter qualification (ſeems indeed) to include the other two. For here, when the expreſſion is true, as it has nothing in it of artificial, or what ſuppoſes acquired knowledge, it muſt in itſelf be juſt and clear.

clear. Propriety or juſtneſs is an exact agreement of the expreſſion with the thing expreſſed. Now in this agreement conſiſts truth; ſo that the geſture and tone, to be true, ſhould, either the one or the other, and frequently both, riſe with the thought, proceed with it, and adapt themſelves to all its inflections and degrees, and this is termed juſtneſs.

They ſhould likewiſe be ſprightly and free. Whatever has the appearance of ſtudy, or embarraſſment, carries with it an air of falſity and artifice. Conſtraint betrays weakneſs or diffidence, conſequently the orator ſhould always ſhew a freedom and eaſe in his action. Theſe ſeveral qualities are all included in the idea of truth.

And this truth it is which we have elſewhere ſtiled Simplicity, and which, if it ought to be obſerved in the words and turns employed by the orator, who makes uſe of a language of human invention, much more ought it to be preſerved in the language of nature itſelf.

But here, as in painting, there is truth, and beautiful truth: for if there is a reſemblance between any two kinds, it is between painting and declamation; ſince the one is the model, and the other the copy: I ſay the one, without any particular diſtinction, becauſe if nature is the painter's model, painters ought, in their turn, to be the models for elegant declamation. What excellent

cellent leſſons are there for a good actor found in the paintings of Le Brun, Le Sueur, and Pouſſin, where the figures are all ſo many pantomimes, ſo much the more admirable, that they are not indebted for their expreſſion to a ſet of geſtures which mutually aſſiſt each other, but to one ſole geſture only. By this ſingle geſture was to be painted all the ſoul of Alexander, and the grief of the mother of Darius; and this geſture might be ſufficient to draw tears from the eyes of every beholder.

What emotions then muſt we not experience, from ſeeing a ſubject that is true, real, and actually exiſting, repreſented by an orator in his own perſon, which is a living and animated model, inſtead of being repreſented on canvaſs, and to hear him join ſpeech, and every accent of nature to thoſe geſtures, that, even without that addition, made ſuch an impreſſion on us?

Becomingneſs, or decency, (πρέπον) is that part which influences all the others, and preſcribes the rule and bounds for whatever is acted or ſaid. It teaches the ſpeaker what is required of him from the ſubject; the place where he is, the audience to whom he is ſpeaking, the thought he is expreſſing; and laſtly, what he owes to his own age and condition. This, in a principal manner, regulates the movement of the diſcourſe.

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The greateſt part of thoſe who attempt to ſpeak in public, are without the leaſt idea of this movement, or at leaſt give little or no attention to it. It is nevertheleſs to this movement, which the ancients ſometimes called by the name of Rhythmus, that the force and ſoftneſs of the expreſſion is wholly owing.

The Greeks had two ſorts of movements, the one gentle and agreeable, ſuch as is found in the life of the peaceful citizen, whoſe heart is in action, but without any diſturbance: this they called ἦθος; the other was lively and impetuous, as where a paſſion is raiſed, this was the πάθος and hence is derived the term Pathetic.

Theſe two movements ſhould alternately have the rule in every diſcourſe, according as the deſign of the ſpeakers is either to inſinuate gently, or to attack with vigor, and bear down all reſiſtance. Weak and imperfect orators accuſtom themſelves to one uniform declamation, which they have taken from the model of ſome perſon who might perhaps have been eminent in other reſpects, but was moſt aſſuredly wrong in this. They pronounce with equal vehemence the exordium and the diviſion, the narrative and the proofs. They are like a wheel put out of order, which nothing can ſtop. If by chance they make any alteration in the movement, it is done ſo unſkilfully, that they betray

betray the badneſs of their taſte every time they attempt it. As they have nothing farther in view, but to unburthen their memory of a troubleſome load, they are perpetually pouring forth the ſtreams of thoughts as they occur, without once conſidering that they ought to repreſent in themſelves the paſſions they mean to raiſe in others; and that theſe paſſions are like fire; of a light and ſubtle nature; and that the lighteſt breath, or the moſt trifling idea that paſſes through the mind, will change their colour, motion, and direction.

Of all movements, the moſt proper and moſt eloquent is that which diſcovers the confidence of the orator, on the goodneſs of his cauſe, and his certainty of being able to preſent it in ſuch a manner, as to perſuade the minds of his hearers. It is this movement which conſtitutes what is ſtiled the *authoritative tone*, when the orator, fully maſter of himſelf, and his ſubject, diſcovers a noble confidence, and a ſecurity of ſucceſs. This tone inſpires the audience with reſpect for him, and adds double credit to the proofs he brings. Whereas he who ſuffers himſelf to be carried away by his ſubject, leaves us room to ſuſpect him either of lightneſs or incapacity. Such an one may be compared to a rider, who is unable to manage the reins of an unruly horſe. And all he

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can hope for at the end of his career, is to deſtroy the good opinion his hearers might have had of him, and ſee himſelf at length obliged to yield the victory to his rival.

Some orators think they have a more proper delivery, and a tone fit for declamation, when they give their voice its full ſcope, and ſing out all their words. But this clamorous tone only diſtracts the hearer's attention. His head is, as it were, ſtunned with the noiſe, and his mind undergoes a mere paſſive agitation, like that of a man who is in a thoughtful mood, and ſees and hears many things without heeding or obſerving them. Sometimes where the place itſelf is too confined, it racks the voice, and throws it back upon the ſpeaker, which occaſions a ſort of cacophony, and confounds the auditor, that he is obliged to exert all his efforts to hear what is ſaid, this calls off his attention, and greatly weakens the impreſſion that might otherwiſe be made on his mind.

There is no one art in which there are a greater number of different parts than in eloquence; and there is at the ſame time hardly any one which we ſtudy leſs, and conſequently where we are all liable to run into great errors.

The mind of the hearer might very well be a *tabula raſa*, free from every prejudice, and like ſoft wax, ſuſceptible of every impreſſion; and with all this, not yield to truth itſelf, propoſed

poſed in the manner it is every day propoſed, under the appearance of falſhood.

And beſides, moſt frequently the auditor comes covered with an armour of defence, to ward off all the ſtrokes that may be levelled at him. He bids defiance to the orator, he waits for his attack, he ſits as judge upon his art and addreſs, determined to parry all his blows, or turn them back upon himſelf. In this ſituation the mind is attentive to the leaſt ſlip, diveſts the argument of all its force, and totally overthrows the deſign of the orator.

It is to be wiſhed that an orator, eſpecially a divine, fully ſenſible of the grandeur of his ſubject, and the importance of his own function, and bearing the good of mankind in his boſom, would take upon him to preſent us with the truth in a plain, eaſy, and lively manner, and with that pure heat and light which are its conſtant concomitants. But inſtead of this manly vigor, which would call for a Demoſthenes, we have a ſet of half-formed artiſts, who meaſure the force of eloquence by their own weak abilities, and think they have done every thing in a parcel of pretty expreſſions, ſwelling phraſes, or ſparkling witticiſms; and when with great pains and labour they have brought all theſe wretched trifles into an heap, they throw them out to the audience.

dience juſt as they are guided by inſtinct, or by the imitation of ſome model choſen by chance.

There are many who will perhaps be aſtoniſhed to hear of ſo many difficulties in the art of declamation But our obſervations are addreſſed to thoſe only who are able to comprehend all the nobleneſs of their art, and propoſe to carry the prize in it.

There is no art but what requires ſome effort to attain it, and if any one deſerves it in particular, this certainly does. We ſee young people for whole years under the care of maſters, to learn them to come in and go out of a room, or to give and return a compliment in the moſt graceful manner, and yet it ſhall be left wholly to nature or common inſtinct, to give that propriety and addreſs, which is ſo neceſſary to a man who is ſet in view to an aſſembly of people, who judge in the moſt rigorous manner of his every word and action. This nature, which it is pretended ſhould be left to itſelf, if it is juſt in itſelf, will never loſe any part of its excellence by being cultivated; but, on the contrary, acquire an additional ſtrength and beauty.

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SECT. II.

Of NARRATION.

CHAP. I.

What Narration is.

A Narration is an exact and faithful expoſition of an event, that is to ſay, an expoſition which ſets forth the whole of the event, as it really is. For if it adds to, or diminiſhes from it, it is not exact, and if it ſets it forth otherwiſe than it really is, it is not faithful.

Every narration is a picture of the event which is the ſubject of it. Le Brun and Quintus Curtius have both of them painted the battles of Alexander: the one by arbitrary and inſtitutive marks, which are the words; the other by natural and imitative marks, which are the ſtrokes and coloring. If they have both of them exactly followed the truth, they are both hiſtorians: if they have blended falſhood with truth, they are poets, at leaſt in the fictitious part of their work. It is the character of a poet to mingle falſhood with truth, with this reſtriction only, that every thing appear of a piece.

——— Sic veris falſa remiſcet
Primo ne medium, medio ne diſcrepet imum.

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Whoſoever propoſes a narration, is placed as it were in the middle between truth and falſhood. He is naturally deſirous of intereſting his hearers, and as this depends greatly upon the grandeur and ſingularity of the things he relates, it is very difficult for a man of a lively imagination, whoſe ſubject is removed at ſome diſtance from the preſent time, and is in itſelf pliable, to attach himſelf ſo ſtrictly to truth, in his narration, as not to wander from it a little now and then. He ſees his pardon written in the eyes of an admiring audience, who are always better pleaſed with affecting probability, than dry unornamental truth. How is it poſſible then, under ſuch circumſtances, to obſerve a ſcrupulous exactneſs?

If we are cautious with reſpect to facts, where the falſhood may be eaſily detected, we are however at full liberty with regard to the cauſes. We may at pleaſure produce the greateſt and moſt important effects from the ſmalleſt principles, either as they are ſo in themſelves, or by their diſtance in point of time. We may diſcover their moſt imperceptible connections and dependencies, bring to light what was hidden, and by ſeparating a ſlight circumſtance from the reſt of its concomitants, make it ſerve to unravel the greateſt undertakings. By this means we ſhall acquire the honor of appearing quick-ſighted, to have made deep reſearches, and to have penetrated the mazes

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of the human heart, and conſequently the kind acceptance and admiration of moſt readers. Now this, as any one may judge, is not a fault that weak or ſilly heads can commit. But however near it may approach to a virtue, it is nevertheleſs a vice.

Narration is in its higheſt point of beauty and perfection, when to fidelity and exactneſs it adds brevity, plainneſs, and raiſes that ſort of concern which is ſuitable to it.

We have obſerved before * that brevity is neceſſary in a narration, and likewiſe that it is never prolix while it ſays no more than what is neceſſary. It is the buſineſs of the ſpeaker to know the limits of his ſubject. What relates to the plainneſs of the narration has been already diſcuſſed, in ſpeaking of the plainneſs in a diſcourſe. As to the concern or intereſt proper to it, that has been already defined, in the beginning of the ſecond volume, under the article of Epic poetry. We ſhall only obſerve, that the intereſt of a true narration is infinitely greater than that of a fabulous one, becauſe hiſtorical truth makes as it were a part of ourſelves, it is the portrait of our fellow-creatures, and conſequently our own fables are only the fancy-pieces of imagination, mere ingenious chimeras; they may indeed affect

* See vol. I.

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us, becauſe they are imitations of nature, but as imaginations they will affect us much leſs ſenſibly than the truth. *In omni re procul dubio vincit imitationem veritas.* Quintil.

CHAP. II.

The different kinds of narration.

THESE we ſhall reduce to three, *viz.* oratorial narration, hiſtorical narration, and familiar narration. We have ſpoken of the firſt of theſe, under the head of oratory, and of the laſt in treating of fable. We ſhall therefore confine ourſelves at preſent to hiſtorical narration.

The characters of this kind of narration differ according to the different kinds of hiſtory: now there is the hiſtory of mankind conſidered in their relation to the deity; this is the hiſtory of religion: there is the hiſtory of mankind in their mutual relations to each other; this is profane hiſtory: and laſtly, there is natural hiſtory, or that which treats of the productions of nature, and of her various changes and appearances.

The hiſtory of religion is divided again into two kinds; the one ſacred hiſtory, written by men inſpired from heaven; the other, eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, written by men with the aſſiſtance of natural knowledge only.

CHAP. III.

The character of ſacred hiſtory.

IF we are deſirous of knowing hiſtory in all its grandeur and dignity, we muſt look for it in the holy writings. Here the author, diveſted of every ſentiment but what immediately relates to his ſubject, and devoted wholly and entirely to the truth he is ſetting forth, preſents it to us ſuch as it really is, with that candor and ſimplicity that are proper to it. Here is no leaning to one ſide or the other, no artifice made uſe of to ſtir up love, pity, ſurprize, or admiration: the brightneſs of truth works on our minds unaſſiſted by the arts of eloquence. How ſublime is the account of the creation of the univerſe, and at the ſame time how ſimple! And yet could there have been a fairer occaſion for diſplaying the treaſures of genius and art, than in beginning the hiſtory of the world? God might have been repreſented as marking out one ſpot in the immenſity of ſpace, for the bodies he was about to create, and another in eternity for the æra of of time, ſeparating by his incomprehenſible power, the ſpace which divides being and nonentity, and afterwards arranging the ſeveral parts of created ſubſtance, with a wiſdom, regularity, and magnificence, worthy of himſelf. But ſuch a pom-

a pompous and ſhining train of ideas would have rendered the truth of the writer ſuſpected. We ſhould have been apt to believe him taken up with himſelf as well as his ſubject. Had the Almighty any need of being glorified by him, after having created the world and ſtampt it with the ſeal of his attributes, or did he want thoſe high-flown praiſes which only diſcover the weakneſs or ignorance of the admirer? It was himſelf who dictated to Moſes, and ſimplicity characteriſes the expreſſion "In the beginning God created "the heavens and the earth"; the ſame ſimplicity reigns in ſetting forth the ſeveral circumſtances, "Let there be light, and there was light"; Let the earth produce every kind of plant and beaſt, the air all ſorts of birds, and the waters every kind of fiſh "And it was ſo."

Was there any neceſſity of explaining the manner in which theſe were formed, by entering into all the minutiæ of phyſical diſquiſition, to gratify the empty curioſity of a vain and reſtleſs mind, that forgets the chief object and principal end for which it was created, for the ſake of barren ſpeculations? God would not have it ſo; becauſe this knowledge belongs alone to the workman; and as man is not charged with the care of theſe ſublime matters, it was needleſs to inſtruct him in the ſcientific principles. It is the part of an all great and good God to reſerve to

himſelf the explanation of this ſacred ænigma, and to leave to man to enjoy theſe bleſſings, and render thanks to his benefactor in pliant admiration.

The moving parts of the narration are conducted with the ſame ſimplicity. The life of Joſeph, which is a model in this kind, owes all its beauty to its ſimplicity, and the critical ſituation it repreſents. Real beauties theſe, not to be ſupplied by the utmoſt efforts of art.

The narration of the New Teſtament has the ſame character: there is no affected diſplay of knowledge or erudition; no pointing out of facts, nor labored reflections to aſſiſt the reader in finding out the extent and greatneſs of the ſubject: the ſame ſpirit that dictates the text, will be the interpreter for thoſe who read in faith and humility. We find none of that inquietude which accompanies an author when left to the guidance of his judgment in the choice of facts and circumſtances. On the contrary, we perceive a pen, in full confidence, tracing out events, and leaving them to defend themſelves againſt the attacks of incredulity. Who can deny that a wonderful child was born at Bethlehem, as was foretold by the prophets? wiſe men from the eaſt came to pay him homage: to whom did they addreſs themſelves? To king Herod, who being unable to tell them the place of him they were

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in ſearch of, aſſembles the doctors of the law, to learn from thence what the prophets had declared on this head. But, as if this was not ſufficient evidence, the wiſe men go up to Bethlehem: the king, alarmed with jealouſy, waits with impatience for their return; and finding himſelf deceived, explains the ſacred oracles in his own manner; and fearing leſt this child ſhould one day deprive him of his crown, determines he ſhall periſh: but not knowing where to find him, he commands all the children of the ſame age in Bethlehem to be put to death; hoping to include this infant in the general maſſacre. A general cry is raiſed againſt this inhuman edict; it is heard through the whole Roman empire, and fills it with horror. Was there any need for the hiſtorian who related this event, to add any thing of his own to the plain truth, to render it more probable?

In other hiſtories, the writer is obliged to ſupply the place of truth where it is wanting: he muſt ſuppoſe a chain of circumſtances, and have recourſe to the action of cauſes: he cannot proceed a ſtep without his memorials in his hand, which often require to have their authority ſupported by other vouchers; theſe may indeed be ſometimes inconteſtable in their kind; but they are likewiſe as frequently obſcure, equivocal and myſterious, and in a manner contradict one another

other. In ſacred hiſtory, the author appears to have every thing before his eyes, and adjuſts his narration accordingly.

Though the inſpired book is not made for a model for other writers, but only to teach man what he is, and how he ought to act agreeable to the views of his creator; yet it is certain that nothing can be more perfect in the hiſtorical kind. It is exact, faithful, certain, ſimple and impartial. It is truth itſelf, that appears naked and without diſguiſe.

We ſhall not take notice in this place how far the ſubject is intereſting it itſelf. There cannot be any thing more noble, grand, and ſpirited, nor more full of a greater variety of incidents, in any other hiſtory whatever. It is, with reſpect to other hiſtorical narrations, if I may be forgiven the expreſſion, what the epic is to the other kinds of poetry: ſince it has the full right of preſenting us with the wonderful; by ſetting forth the actions of God himſelf, the laws of his juſtice, the extent of his power, the treaſures of his wiſdom, and the ſublimity of his deſigns. It contains the principles and development of the true religion. It ſets forth in the cleareſt light the fundamental maxims of the law of nature: It teaches men of all ages and conditions the means of aſſuring to themſelves everlaſting happineſs. It contains the needful as to all nations, and ſhews their origin

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and various eſtabliſhments; it caſts a light upon the obſcurity of upwards of thirty centuries; it furniſhes us with a clue to extricate ourſelves from the labyrinth of fabulous ages; and explains to us thoſe valuable monuments the human-kind had loſt the ſenſe, though it had always been the depoſitary of them: in a word, this book of books, is the hiſtory of heaven and earth, and of all that they contain; and whatſoever we meet with out of this ſacred regiſter, is nothing but repetition of the ſame facts and precedents, or elſe the effect of uncertainty, error, and vain erudition, of no uſe to the happineſs of mankind.

CHAP. IV.

Of eccleſiaſtical hiſtory.

ECcleſiaſtical hiſtory differs from the profane only in its ſubject. Here the writer is at his own liberty, has no helps but from his own knowledge, and his talents for diſcovering the truth, and ſetting it forth to others; but as he treats of matters relative to Chriſtianity; he is more than any other hiſtorian under an obligation to animate his narration with that ſpirit of ſimplicity and ingenuouſneſs which ſo properly belongs to a religion that in a ſpecial manner renounces all vain pomp and idle oſtentation. Mr. de Fleuri has perfectly well preſerved this cha-

racter in his eccleſiaſtical hiſtory. In reading him, we think we hear the depoſition of a prudent and faithful witneſs, which he delivers with the utmoſt candor, and free from all prevarication, conſequently, ſuch as it really is. His ſtile has ſomething of that venerable majeſty in it which we experience in the ſacred writings. When he ſpeaks of the deſigns of God, it is with a becoming dignity, and he treats his miniſters with due circumſpection. He praiſes or condemns according to the actions; and every where gives proof of a juſt underſtanding, an inlightened piety, and a ſound heart. If he ſometimes touches upon a reflection in his way, he preſently returns again to his ſubject, and reſumes the character and functions of the faithful hiſtorian and unbiaſſed witneſs.

As it is not our intent to take notice of all the famous hiſtorians in this kind, nor to lay down rules for the ſtudy of hiſtory; but only to give the characters of the ſeveral kinds of hiſtory, their qualities, and different objects; the reader muſt not be ſurpriſed to ſee us make ſo quick a tranſition from the one kind to the other. It is enough if we give a definition, and ſometimes quote a model.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of profane hiſtory.

PRofane hiſtory is the picture of paſt ages, preſented for the inſtruction of thoſe which are to come. Or, to define it with Mr. de la Mothe, who ſpeaks of it in the ſtile of an orator, it is the repreſentation of the perpetual ſeries of revolutions in the affairs of mankind; of the riſe and fall of empires, manners and opinions, which are continually ſucceeding each other; in a word, of that rapid, though inſenſible motion, which carries every thing away with it, and is continually changing the face of the earth.

It is divided into general and private hiſtory.

A general hiſtory, ſhould be the hiſtory of human kind as they have been ſpread over the habitable globe ſince the beginning of the world. Although there is no undertaking conſidered as ſuch, but what the induſtry of mankind may accompliſh, by uniting their ſeveral powers at a neceſſary period, yet it ſeems almoſt impoſſible to compoſe an univerſal hiſtory that ſhall take in the people of all ages, and all places. A hiſtory I ſay, not a chronology, with ſome particular circumſtances, for this has been often enough done. An univerſal hiſtory, ſhould include the baſis of the hiſtories of all nations reduced each into

an extent proportioned to the body of the whole. In ſuch a work, the hiſtory of a large monarchy ſhould make moſtly the ſame figure as that of a province in the hiſtory of a kingdom; the reſpective parts ſhould be all proportioned, fitted, and placed according to their ſymmetrical relations with each other, and with the whole; and ſo diſpoſed, as to be in a conſtant ſtate of compariſon: and, in like manner, as time in its courſe ſweeps away in one general flood all the generations which exiſt at one period, ſo ſhould the current of ſuch an hiſtory be as an univerſal picture of human kind, to repreſent not only the relations which ſubſiſt at one time between the cauſes and effects that occupy the theatre of the world, but alſo the firſt cauſes, more or leſs obvious, of the cataſtrophes reſerved for the next ſucceeding ages.

But before taking up the pen, it would be neceſſary to collect the accounts of time in all the different nations, the monuments of their tranſactions; to be certain of their authenticity, and to underſtand them in their true ſenſe. Then there would be nothing more required than to form a large ſociety of learned men, to infuſe into them all one ſoul and ſpirit, and to communicate this again by a kind of metempſychoſis, into the continuators, till the whole work was compleated. Mr. de Thou has written the general hiſtory of one

one age. But he has confined himſelf to Europe and the foreign events which had a relation to that part of the world.

Mr. de Boſſuet has given us the ſketch of an univerſal hiſtory; but his ſcheme is too much confined to the view in which he principally undertook his work: a view worthy of a biſhop, who was a philoſopher and a divine enriched with the moſt valuable erudition.

God made all things for his glory, that is to ſay, for himſelf; and all created beings find their true perfection in the relation which they hold with the author of their exiſtence. Thus all the changes which happen to human kind, are ſubject to the views of divine providence, and one of theſe views has been ſince the fall of man, to reſtore him to his firſt ſtate by the means of revealed religion. The chain of ſecondary cauſes is compoſed of an infinite number of links, which proceed from and return to this principle as to their ſtreſs-point.

From theſe reflections, equally allowed by ſound philoſophy and by true faith, Mr. Boſſuet takes his departure, and entering into the views of the deity, he looks down upon the earth, and thoſe who inhabit it; marks the movements by which they tend to, or wander from the end appointed for them. The firſt deſign of God was to render man happy, through innocence and

free-will; man made himſelf a ſlave by ſin: the ſecond deſign of God was to free him from his chains, and reinſtate him in the way of innocence and happineſs. And it is with this deſign that he has ſubjected to his will all the changes that happen amongſt mankind.

This reaſoning of Mr. Boſſuet's has two parts: the firſt is, that God has ſeen fit to eſtabliſh one religion, by which man may be reſtored to his rights. The ſecond, that he ſees fit that there ſhould be revolutions and changes in human affairs. Either there is a ſubordination in theſe two decrees, or there is not. If there is, Mr. Boſſuet's plan, by which he makes the revolutions of human kind ſubordinate to the eſtabliſhment of the religion of nature, is an admirable one; and to ſhew that it is impoſſible but there ſhould be ſuch a ſubordination, it will be ſufficient to reflect that we cannot conſider the ſoul of man, as properly man, independent of an actual relation to its happineſs, which conſiſts in its union with God, and conſequently, that all the minds that influence the motions of human-kind, however wide they may be of the end they are deſigned for, are all brought back by providence to that one end which they ought to have propoſed to themſelves in all thoſe actions; laſtly, that all the actions of man, as well thoſe which are under the dominion of grace, as thoſe which are under

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the rule of nature, do neceſſarily enter into the ſyſtem of God's wiſdom in man's deſtination.

Moreover, if, as it cannot be doubted, there are final cauſes in the revolutions brought about among men, what more reaſonable object can theſe revolutions be ſuppoſed to have, than to turn man to his maker, his benefactor, and his happineſs, and conſequently to bring him to the knowledge of a religion, without which there can be no happineſs for any of the ſons of men?

This ſublime idea is the animating principle of Mr. Boſſuet's work; it diffuſes itſelf through all the parts, and thus preſents the moſt noble, magnificent and regular picture, that was ever yet conceived in hiſtory: that is, the relation between the revolutions of every empire and kingdom, and the changes which have happened to all nations, and the eſtabliſhment of the church of Chriſt. The execution of this ſublime deſign, ſhews the boldneſs and ſtrength of the author's pencil. As he was capable of conceiving it, he has been able to fill it. Every thing is worthy of the great Boſſuet, and the exalted idea he had of religion, and of his own office about the perſon of a young prince whom he was to make fully ſenſible that kings, who often think themſelves gods on earth, are only the inſtruments which the deity makes uſe of to puniſh or reward a peo-

ple, and by that means to bring them back or ſtrengthen them in the way to which he has called them.

CHAP. VI.

Private hiſtory.

THAT which is called private hiſtory, in contradiſtinction to the general hiſtory of the world, may itſelf be general when oppoſed to other hiſtories, whoſe object is more confined. For inſtance, the hiſtory of a kingdom compared with that of a province, and that hiſtory of a province with that of a city, may (though improperly) be termed general hiſtories.

It is eaſy to conceive, that the more extenſive the field of hiſtory is, the more minute the objects therein will appear; for by placing ourſelves in the center of things, the objects leſſen in proportion to their diſtance. Thus ſome that would ſhew themſelves in a more limited proſpect are not to be perceived at all; while others, which would appear in a ſtriking light, are but juſt perceivable; laſtly, others, which would engage the reader's whole attention, employ but a ſmall part of it. It is for the writer therefore to place himſelf in the juſt point of view of his work, and properly to graduate the proportions of the ſeveral objects in his piece, agreeable to the rules of perſpective.

ſpective. If he undertakes to give the hiſtory of a kingdom or an empire, he muſt correctly deſign, and carefully point out, whatever had any influence on public affairs, or ſerved to the purpoſes of thoſe charged with the adminiſtration of that kingdom. Magnificent ſeats, ſtriking ſhows, noble works, inundations, &c. belong more properly to a journal, as Tacitus tells us: and it is only required of the hiſtorian to mention them tranſiently.

Hiſtories of empires and kingdoms, ſhould be written only by philoſophers or miniſters of ſtate, or rather by philoſophers that have themſelves been miniſters; then we might expect to ſee the ſprings of paſſions, and thoſe of politics, unfolded, with equal juſtneſs, together with the relation of cauſes, with their effects; and at the ſame time behold the ſprings of humanity that actuate in all kinds of governments, as well as thoſe which belong to the particular government of people, according to their proper characters. We ſhould ſee that one power actuates all men in general, whilſt another puts in motion only republican ſpirits, or thoſe accuſtomed to monarchy, that ſome means weakens or extinguiſhes public virtue, honour, the reſpect due to government, &c. &c.

Xenophon, Thucydides, Titus Livy, and Tacitus, were all of them provided with materials

rials of this kind, when they ſet about writing hiſtory, which, in their works, retains a part of its original character, and which was to conceal morality and politicks under the covering of facts: in imitation of the poets, who concealed, under the veil of fiction, all the myſteries of philoſophy. Theſe writers have not contented themſelves with barely giving us a liſt of events, according to the order of times and places, but have compoſed compleat treatiſes of politicks, taken from the good or bad conduct of the people whoſe hiſtory they have wrote, and without appearing to have any other deſign than to relate facts, or intereſt the reader by regular deſcriptions of extraordinary undertakings, they have found means to inſtruct the mind, to form the heart, and to lay open to our view the whole of moral philoſophy.

There are ſome hiſtories confined to a ſingle extraordinary event; ſuch as Catiline's conſpiracy, the revolution of Portugal, or the ſiege of Dunkirk; in theſe it is neceſſary to make ſome preamble, in order to uſher the reader into the narration. An epic poet has a right to tranſport himſelf inſtantly into the midſt of things he is to relate; frequently too he begins near the end, reſerving to himſelf ſome pleaſing turn for inſtructing the reader in what he is ignorant of, and deſires to know: but the hiſtorian, ever grave and methodical, cannot indulge himſelf in

liberties

liberties of this kind. Chronology is his light and guide, and he ſcrupulouſly follows it in every ſtep: therefore, in theſe diſtinct hiſtories, it is proper that the hiſtorian ſhould make his reader acquainted with times, places, manners, intereſts, and characters; he ſhould then, in the midſt of theſe circumſtances, exhibit the form of the event he is to relate, and follow it through the development and progreſs, till he has conducted it to the end. Theſe paſſages in a work are always pleaſing, becauſe at the ſame time they have the merit of truth, they poſſeſs part of the qualities of poetry. There is the unity of action; a beginning, middle, and end; and the whole together forms a body whoſe parts are regularly adjuſted, and all its members properly proportioned; ſo that there is nothing wanting but the poetry of the ſtyle, the wonderful, and ſome of the ſtudied diſorder of art, to make it an epic poem.

There are other hiſtories that are confined to the life of a ſingle perſonage. If that of a prince, it is the ſubject of a *real hiſtory*, (ſuch is the hiſtory of Lewis XIV. and Alexander the Great) provided that the perſon is conſidered rather in his public than private character; for, to dwell as long upon the circumſtances of his private conduct, as upon his management of public affairs, would be more properly what we call a *Life*.

The

The ancients had a peculiar taſte for Biography. Actuated by reſpect and gratitude for illuſtrious men, and conſidering that the honorable memory which the dead leave behind them, is the only good that remains to them in the world they have quitted, they made a pleaſure and duty of ſecuring to them this ſmall advantage. I would take up arms in defence of the honour of the illuſtrious dead, ſays Cicero, as they took them up to defend the lives of their fellow citizens. Hiſtories of this kind are never-dying leſſons of examples and virtue, dedicated to human kind. Pictures and ſtatues that repreſent the corporeal lineaments of great men, are confined to the houſes of their deſcendants, and ſhewn only to a ſmall number of friends; but panegyrics, drawn by a ſkilful pen, repreſent the ſoul itſelf, with all its virtuous ſentiments; they are eaſily ſpread abroad, paſs into all languages, fly through all parts, and ſerve as originals in all ages.

Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch, and Suetonius, preferred this ſpecies of narration, to hiſtories of a greater length. They exhibit their heroes in all the various circumſtances of life; and they particularly engage thoſe who are deſirous of knowing mankind. What need has the peaceable citizen, the man of letters, or of the long robe, to have always before his eyes the warriour, who takes towns, fights battles, or reſtores peace

to

to the countries he has depopulated? Such things may do well enough for thoſe buſy minds who delight in noiſy events; but for him who deſires to know the man himſelf, he will be infinitely more affected and pleaſed with the private amuſements of an Octavius, an Auguſtus, and the perſonal ſtrokes of a Henry IV. or Lewis XIV. than with all their public victories and triumphs.

Suetonius, and Cornelius Nepos, contented themſelves with giving us a ſingle perſonage at a time, Plutarch has choſe a more extenſive plan, and one more intereſting to a philoſophic mind. He has drawn a parallel between the great men who ſhone in the ſame qualifications. With him Cicero appears in competition with Demoſthenes, Hannibal with Scipio. The reader directing his attention alternately to the ſeveral parallels, judges of the degrees of vice and virtue in each; and thus inſenſibly exerciſes his mind, thinking only to follow the writer who draws him along with him. This hiſtorian is by many preferred to all others, on account of the great underſtanding that appears throughout his work, and a ſolid philoſophy turned wholly to virtue. In a word, becauſe he paints mankind in the moſt lively colours.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The ſtile of hiſtory.

THE hiſtorical text ſhould, from its nature, be in the indirect form, that is to ſay, the hiſtorian ſhould relate what was done or ſaid by the actors he introduces on his theatre, without making them ſpeak themſelves. However, it having been obſerved that the more the actors themſelves ſpeak, the more lively and animated the narration becomes, hiſtorians, in proportion as they refined on the art, thought fit to borrow ſome part of the poets manner, and changed the form of their narration, which was before too monotonous, into the dramatic.

Sometimes they cite the very words of their perſonages, and then they introduce an original title into hiſtory. Inſertions of this kind ſhould always appear to deſerve a place by their importance; every word of Alexander, Auguſtus, or Lewis the Great, though always ſuch as were worthy of thoſe great princes, yet are not worthy of a place in hiſtory. Titus Livy has given us the very terms of the firſt declarations of war, and the treaties of peace between Rome and its neighbouring ſtates: Salluſt has copied Catiline's letter to Mallius, and has given us Cato's ſpeech, as well as that of Cæſar. Paſſages like theſe will always

ways pleaſe, while they are of a moderate length, and are ſufficiently nervous; not to need being reduced or weakened by an abſtract.

Sometimes hiſtorians take upon themſelves to deliver ſpeeches which were made, or even to make ſuch, though they never were originally ſpoken, and this to repreſent with greater clearneſs the cauſes that led to an undertaking. In this caſe, the author, after the manner of the poet, places himſelf in the midſt of the circumſtances, from whence he beholds the actors; he adopts their character, their ſpirit, and their ſentments; and, in this purely artificial enthuſiaſm, he endeavours to ſpeak in the manner they themſelves would probably have ſpoken. This was the prevailing taſte of Livy. Full of fire and genius, he could never guard againſt the temptation of haranguing, whenever the leaſt occaſion offered. This became a kind of neceſſity with him, but ſuch a neceſſity as we ſhould have been ſorry he had not complied with. All thoſe hiſtorians, who have followed his example, have met with the ſame applauſe as the poets, when they have ſucceeded well in painting the manner. Provided the foundation of this kind of drama is wholly furniſhed from hiſtory, the reader methinks cannot but be pleaſed with an artifice which enlivens the relation, without injuring truth.

To this embelliſhment of the hiſtorical ſtile, is added that which riſes from the thought. It is impoſſible but that, in handling facts for a long time, and conſidering them under all their different appearances, a multitude of ideas of all kinds ſhould ariſe to the author, which will eſcape the reader, who only curſorily paſſes over the objects. Beſides, according to the prevailing character and taſte of the writer, theſe ideas are either moral or political, full of humanity, or mixed with rancor, inclining to lawful ſubordination, or aſpiring to independance. Now the facts, in paſſing through the mind of the hiſtorian, take, in ſome meaſure, the ſtamp of the man. However, we cannot but be ſenſible theſe beauties are nearly allied to vices. What need has the reader of your reflections, if they are purely yours, and do not ariſe from the ſubject? If they do not ariſe from the ſubject, content yourſelf with letting me know it, or at moſt point out to me the foundation of the reflection I am to make. If you are for ever ſetting before me maxims and ſentiments, and preach in every page as ſo many of our modern hiſtorians do, however well written your hiſtory may be, I ſhall grow weary of being continually leſſoned, and by degrees ſlip away from my maſter, and leave him to preach in his pulpit by himſelf.

A fault of this kind is, generally ſpeaking, the child of a truly virtuous mind, which, with a great deal of imagination, has laid in a ſtock of philoſophy, and a connection with moral principles in every thing; theſe it greedily lays hold of, and cannot prevail with itſelf to loſe a maxim or a reflection which appears to pleaſe by its happy turn.

Lively images appear with ſtill greater luſtre in hiſtory, than the thoughts; they are frequently recurring, and occupy the chief place in a diſcourſe.

By theſe are facts painted, as the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii, the plague of Rome, the arrival of Agrippina with the aſhes of Germanicus, or Germanicus himſelf ſtretched on his death-bed.

They likewiſe deſcribe the lineaments of the perſon, the character of the mind or the manners, as thoſe of Cato, Cataline, Piſo, *&c.* However, the more rigid maſters in rhetoric inſiſt that mankind ſhould be deſcribed rather by their deeds than by words. Accordingly, Homer and Virgil, who may juſtly be eſteemed models of the beautiful, in what concerns narration, are extremely cautious of meddling with theſe intereſting portraits, where the writer amuſes himſelf with ſketching out ideas, which ſhould be left to the reader to make, after the relation of the facts, ſuppoſing him

him an intelligent perſon; it is for him to draw by conſequence the character of the actors, which have been exhibited to him. What neceſſity is there to take him always by the hand, or carry him along with you through every part of your project? If you would keep his attention awake, the beſt way is to give him ſomething to exerciſe it: ſet him a taſk, provided it is not too difficult, he will perform it with a ſenſation of pleaſure to himſelf, and be thankful to the author for the good opinion he had of him.

After what we have already ſaid upon elocution, what remains with regard to the minuter diſquiſition of the hiſtorical ſtyle, may be reduced to a very ſmall compaſs. In the firſt then, we may perceive that no figures of oratory ſhould be introduced, becauſe thoſe figures are made to expreſs the paſſions; now an hiſtorian has no paſſions, he has neither friends nor enemies, relations nor country; he has nothing to prove, nothing to overthrow; he neither accuſes nor defends: all his buſineſs is to ſhew the thing as it is. *Nihil iratum habet, nihil invidum, nihil atrox, nihil mirabile, nihil aſtutum; caſta, verecunda, virga interrupta quodam modo.* Cic. Tacitus and Salluſt ſeem to have poſſeſſed this qualification in a greater degree than Livy. In reading him, we perceive that he was a Roman; in his writings, we eſteem Hannibal, we admire him, but we dread

dread him, becauſe we love Rome. After all, this defeat was a beauty to the Romans, and who is philoſopher enough to dedicate his work only to mankind, or to poſterity?

We do not mention Quintus Curtius, who, properly ſpeaking, has only compoſed the panegyric of Alexander, nor yet Xenophon, who pretends only to give a model of a perfect king. This latter is beyond diſpute the moſt plain and natural of all hiſtorians, if we except Cæſar, who in this, as in every thing elſe, was the greateſt man of his age. He is not curled nor nicely trimmed up, ſaid Cicero, but he is infinitely more beautiful than if he was. Studied turns, forcible expreſſions, and ſhining thoughts, belong rather to an orator, who is deſirous of drawing upon himſelf a part of that attention which is due only to his ſubject, than to a man of good underſtanding. All ſuch trappings rather diſguiſe than adorn the hiſtorian.

The chief qualification of the hiſtorical ſtile, is to be rapid; the hiſtorian ſhould always haſten to the event; and this maxim of Horace belongs in a peculiar manner to him.

Eſt brevitate opus, ut currat ſententia, neu ſe,
Impediat verbis laſſas onerantibus aures.

It ſhould likewiſe be properly adapted to the ſubject. General hiſtory is not to be written in the

ſame

ſame ſtile as private hiſtory; it is a kind of continued diſcourſe; and conſequently abounding with numbers and periods. Livy and Tacitus are more lofty than Cornelius Nepos: But the character of the writer often contributes as much to give a greater or leſs degree of elevation to the ſtile, as the ſubject itſelf, for notwithſtanding the utmoſt endeavours, a man can never ſo far neglect himſelf, as not to ſeaſon things a little by his own taſte; and indeed, when all is ſaid, what other rule has a writer to guide himſelf by? all the matter is, for that taſte to be good.

CHAP. VIII.

Of natural hiſtory.

CHancellor Bacon, in that admirable performance, in which he gives us a picture of the poſſible perfection of the ſciences, divides natural hiſtory into three branches, the firſt of which relates to the regular works of nature, that is to ſay, thoſe wherein the common laws of nature appear to be followed; the ſecond, to her deviations, that is, thoſe works wherein ſhe ſeems to have departed from her cuſtomary method; the third concerns arts, that is, thoſe works wherein nature is employed or imitated by man's induſtry. In a few words, the liberty, licence, and chances of nature, or the conſtant productions

ductions in the ſame kind, which are every day renewed; the extraordinary phænomena which from time to time ſtrike our eyes, and aſtoniſh our imaginations; the works which the addreſs or efforts of the human mind draw forth from the foundations of nature; theſe are the proper objects of natural hiſtory.

Whoſoever undertakes to ſtudy or write in this kind, ſhould conſider that the univerſe is the temple of the deity. If, as a celebrated heathen obſerves, when we preſent ourſelves before the altars, we approach with down-caſt eyes, and aſſume all the exterior of modeſty and reverence, how much greater deference and reſpect ought we to ſhew, when about to examine the ſtars, the heavens, and even the gods themſelves. We ſhould be diffident of ourſelves, we ſhould dread to affirm what we do not know, or to obſcure what we do. This important piece of council comes from no leſs a man than Ariſtotle. Plato, deeply penetrated with this ſentiment, begins his diſſertation on nature by an invocation of the deity. True philoſophy was never aſhamed of ſhewing piety and reſpect towards the ſupreme being, even when the philoſophers themſelves had but an imperfect knowledge of him.

Neither the plan nor object of this work, require us to enter into a large detail on this head,

it will be ſufficient to inform young people, that it is a ſtudy no leſs agreeable than uſeful.

It is by the ſtudy of natural hiſtory that we diſcover final cauſes, and the views of the creator with reſpect to man, that we learn to know the bleſſing's we receive from the ſupreme being, and to pay him the tribute of thankfulneſs, which is due to him. What object can be greater, or more capable of exalting the worth of natural hiſtory? But this is not the only one.

It likewiſe affords the greateſt aſſiſtance to agriculture, commerce, phyſic, and all the arts; it makes us acquainted with the productions of different countries; it furniſhes us with new ideas on the method of employing thoſe materials we have; it unites the people of different nations with each other, by the reciprocal communication of their riches; it renders us inhabitants of all places, in the ſame manner as civil hiſtory, makes us contemporaries of all ages.

Ariſtotle having convinced his pupil, Alexander the Great, of the great beauty and importance of natural hiſtory, including the character and diſtinctions of the different kinds of animals, that prince, in the midſt of his triumphs, and in ſpite of the noiſy eclat of his fortune, took care to furniſh the philoſopher with a collection of all the different kinds unknown in Greece, that by this means he might extend the boundaries

ries of the ſciences as well as thoſe of his own empire, to which he joined a circumſtantial account of their formation, feeding, and manner of life and induſtry. Ariſtotle then made the comparative anatomy of theſe with that of the human ſtructure, and at one glance, in departing from what we ourſelves are, he ſhewed the conformities or difference in the number, ſtructure, poſition, and uſe of the parts. He had written forty books upon this ſubject, of which there are only ten remaining, but theſe give us ſufficient reaſon to regret the ineſtimable loſs of the others. "This "work, ſays Mr. de Buffon, in his preface to natural hiſtory, "appeared to my eyes like a ta- "ble of matters extracted with the greateſt care, "from ſeveral thouſands of volumes in all kinds; "it is the moſt learned abridgment that was ever "made; if ſcience is indeed the hiſtory of facts: "and even ſuppoſing Ariſtotle to have taken from "all the books in his time, what he inſerted in "his, yet the plan of the work, its diſtribution, "the choice of the examples, the juſtneſs of the "compariſons, and a certain turn of thinking, "which I think I may call the philoſophic cha- "racter, all this will not permit us to doubt an "inſtant that he was himſelf infininitely richer "than thoſe from whom he borrowed".

Theophraſtus, a diſciple of Ariſtotle, made a collection of all that was known in his time con-

cerning the hiſtory of plants; we have ſtill a fragment of this work remaining, by which it is eaſy to judge of his manner of treating this ſubject.

Pliny the Elder, ſo named to diſtinguiſh him from Pliny the Younger, his nephew, whoſe letters are ſtill extant, has drawn up a plan of natural hiſtory, which ſeems to ſurpaſs human abilities. "His hiſtory (ſays the modern naturaliſt I juſt quoted) "excluſive of the hiſtory of ani-"mals, plants, and foſſils, takes in the hiſtory "of the heavens and the earth, of phyſick, trade, "and navigation, and that of the natural and "mechanic arts; and what is very aſtoniſhing, "Pliny is in every part equally great—His work "is as various as nature herſelf."

The ſciences which we receive from antiquity, joined to the reſearches of modern naturaliſts, the great collections in the cabinets of moſt princes in Europe, and thoſe which are the properties of a number of private perſons who have a taſte this way, together with the curious anecdotes collected by learned men and travellers, will ſoon enable this age to boaſt a more copious, more exact, and more compleat natural hiſtory than any that has yet appeared.

SECT.

SECT. III.

CHAP. I.

Concerning the epiſtolary ſtile.

EPiſtolary writing is no other than the ſtile of oratory reduced to the level of common converſation, conſequently, there are as many kinds of lettters as there are of orations.

In a letter we may adviſe, diſſuade, exhort, comfort, requeſt, recommend, reconcile, diſcuſs; and then ſuch letter is of the deliberative kind. We may accuſe, compaſſionate, menace, or demand reparation for injuries; then it is in the judiciary kind: or we may praiſe, blame, relate, congratulate, thank, *&c.* and then it is in the demonſtrative.

There are two kinds of letter-writing; the philoſophical, in which ſome ſubject of literature is freely diſcuſſed; and the familiar, which is no other than a ſort of converſation between abſent perſons. *Abſentium mutuus ſermo.* The ſtile of theſe ſhould reſemble the manner we would ſpeak in to the perſons themſelves, were they preſent. In philoſophical letters, which are properly diſſertations or diſcourſes addreſſed to a friend, we may ſometimes riſe with the ſubject according to circumſtances.

But here it ſhould be obſerved, that a ſimple ſtile and a familiar ſtile are not the ſame thing. We uſe the ſimple ſtile when writing to perſons greatly above us, but not the familiar. Whatever is familiar is ſimple, but whatever is ſimple is not familiar.

Familiarity ſuppoſes a certain friendly union, an open and unlimited correſpondence with the perſons, and a degree of equality, in virtue of which, we are under no conſtraint in what we ſay, as we are ſure of its being well received, and that if there are any defects in it, they will be overlooked or pardoned. Perſons who are greatly our ſuperiors, are ſo nice in their feelings with regard to the reſpect which is their due, that it is very difficult to eſcape their obſervation, if if we are at all wanting in it. The leaſt wrong word, negligence, or impropriety, is remarked, elt, and cenſured.

With regard to ſimplicity of ſtile, we find it thus characteriſed by Cicero, in his Orator.

"The ſimple ſtile is void of all elevation, conformable to the laws of cuſtom, and in appearance very little different from the common and vulgar way of ſpeaking, though in the main there is a greater diſtance between them than we ſhould at firſt imagine. The leaſt eloquent think they can readily imitate it. In fact, nothing appears more eaſy to attain, than a

free

" free current ſtile, but upon experience it will " be found quite otherwiſe. *"

What makes it appear ſo very eaſy to be imitated, is, that the words are proper and the turns natural; that is to ſay, that the plain term is made uſe of, and the phraſe ſeems to range itſelf. This character ſhines forth with particular luſtre in the letters of Madame de Maintenon, lately publiſhed, than which nothing can be more eaſy, ſoft, natural and beautiful.

" Although this kind of writing does not ſeem " to require any great ſtrength or body, yet it " ſhould always have ſuch a certain degree of " vigor and good plight, as may ſhew it to be in " ſound health."†

Poverty, dryneſs, and ſimplicity, of ſtile, are three things very different; there is a melting ſimplicity, in which each thought has its proper extent, and the thread of the diſcourſe is always ſufficiently kept up, but without ſuperfluity.

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* " Summiſſus eſt & humilis, conſuetudinem imitans " ab indiſertis re plus, quam opinione differens. Ita- " que eum qui audiunt, quamvis, ipſi infantes ſint, ta- " men illo modo confidunt ſe poſſe dicere. Nam ora- " tionis ſubtilitas imitabilis illa quidem videtur eſſe " exiſtimandi; ſed nihil eſt experienti minus." *Num.* 23.

† " Etſi enim non plurimi ſanguinis eſt, habeat tamen " ſuccum aliquem oportet, ut, etiamſi illis maximis viri- " bus careat, fit, ut ita dicam integrâ valetudine." *Ibid.*

" Let us firſt free it from the ſervitude of " number." *

There are, it is known, numbers that properly belong to an oratorial diſcourſe.—But the ſimple ſtile is not ſubject to their laws, it proceeds free and void of reſtraint. It is the too great luxury of numbers that makes the principal defect of Balſac's letters. He makes uſe of ſounding words, harmonious turns, and progreſſions: all which are miſplaced in a familiar letter. This obſervation is ſufficiently cleared up by what we have already ſaid on number and harmony in rhetoric.

" We may likewiſe add, that it is not ſhy " of the meeting of vowels, nor endeavours after " an artful combination of words, to render the " conſtruction periodical: but has that air of " negligence and occaſional *hiatuſes* which is very " agreeable, inaſmuch as it ſhews the writer " more occupied with things than words." †.

We avoid the meeting of vowels in poetry; and in regular proſe, any one who has an ear will keep them as diſtant from each other as

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* " Primum igitur eum è vinculis numerorum eximamus." *Ibid.*

" † Verba etiam verbis quaſi coagmentare negligat. " Habet enim ille tamquam hiatus concurſu vocalium " molle quiddam, & quod indicet non ingratum negli- " gentiam, de ſe hominis, magis quàm de verbis labo- " rantis." *Ibid.*

poſ-

poſſible; but in a letter, we are apt to neglect thoſe little attentions, and the readier, as we do not ſeek to cloſe our ranks, in order to make a ſingle impreſſion by the union of ſeveral forces.

" Being now freed as to what relates to the " ſtructure and combination of the words, let us " ſee what it has to obſerve in other reſpects. For " although theſe ſhort and unconnected phraſes " require care, yet art ſhould by no means ap- " pear in it. For a negligence of this kind is " always moſt pleaſing. It is with ſimple elocu- " tion, as with many women who look beſt in " an undreſs; always agreeable and moving, " without affecting to appear ſo; it diſdains the " vain additions of dreſs, and jewels, and prefers " native ſimplicity to every foreign ornament. *"

Madame de Sévigné ſays the ſame thing in her way. " The princeſs of Tarente is always ſay- " ing ſhe is going to write to you; ſhe cuts her

* Sed erit videndum de reliquis; cùm hæc duo ei liberiora fuerint, circuitus, conglutinatioque verborum. Illa enim ipſa contracta, & minuta, non negligenter tractanda ſunt, ſed quædam etiam negligentia eſt diligens. Nam ut mulieres eſſe dicuntur nonnullæ inornatæ, quas idipſum deceat; ſic ac ſubtilis oratio etiam incompoſita delectat. Fit enim in utroque, quo ſit venuſtius, ſed non ut appareat. Tum removebitur omnis inſignis ornatus, quaſi margaritarum: ne calamiſtri quidem adhibebuntur: fucata verò medicamenta candoris, ruboris, omnia repellentur. *Ibid.*

" pens very carefully, for her writing of cere-
" mony is a piece of floriſhing, not to be done
" off-hand. We ſhould have enough to do, my
" dear child, if we were to ſet about making
" true lover's knots to all our D's and L's. *

" Propriety alone, joined to the natural
" graces, is ſufficient. †"

And who has united theſe two qualities in a higher degree than Madame de Sévigné?

" To render it lively and agreeable, it muſt be
" intermixed with ingenious thoughts, that ſeem
" to break upon us unexpectedly ‡. " The
" princeſs is going back to Rennes, to be with
" the des Chaulnes, who have ſent to know if
" we will accept of their reſpects. She has ſent
" them the anſwer ſhe thinks proper in her own
" language. As to me, I have anſwered them
" no, for that I propoſe accompanying the prin-
" ceſs, to pay my reſpects to them, and more-
" over that the princeſs intends making them an
" abſolute preſent of this viſit, without the leaſt

* " La Princeſſe de Tarente dit toujours qu'elle va vous
" écrire: elle taille ſes plumes, car ſon écriture de cérémo-
" nie eſt une broderie qui ne ſe fait pas en courant: nous
" aurions bien des affaires, ma fille, ſi nous nous mettions à
" faire des lacs d'amour à tous nos *D*, & a toutes nos *L*."

† Elegantia modo & mundita comianebit. *Ibid.*

‡ Acutæ crebræque ſententiæ ponentûr, & neſcio un-
de ex abdito erutæ. *Ibid.*

" intention

" intention of drawing hither all the pomp and " parade with which they are ſurrounded. She " is quite delighted that I have, in ſo merry " a manner, rid her of all that trouble.—I have " ſhut the temple of Janus. Methinks this is " no bad application *." This alluſion to the temple of Janus, which was ſhut as a token of a general peace through the Roman empire, comes upon us unexpectedly; *the making a preſent of a viſit*, is a ſingular turn. Theſe unlooked for ſtrokes proceed from a fruitfulneſs of genius, and a peculiar turn of mind. Madame de Sévigné abounds with theſe, and they make the principal charm of her letters. But one muſt copy all her letters, to collect the ſeveral ſtrokes of this kind, with which they abound. She is quite of a different caſt from Voiture and Pliny, whoſe letters are learned, ſtudied, artfully turned, and regularly proportioned; whereas, with Madame de Sévigné all is native beauty, and that freedom of mind and heart, that ſays every thing without reſtraint.

* " La Princeſſe s'en retourne à Rennes auprès des " Chaulnes, qui ont envoyé demander ſi nous voullons de " leurs reſpects. Elle a mandé ce qu'elle a voulu en ſon " langage. Moi, j'ai mandé que non, & que j'irois avec " cette Princeſſe leur rendre mes devoirs, & que même " elle leur donnoit en pur don cette viſite, n'ayant nul deſ- " ſein d'attirer ici l'éclat qui les environne. Elle eſt ravie " que tout en riant, je la défaſſe d'un tel embarras. . . " J'ai fermé le Temple de Janus. Il me ſemble que voilà " qui eſt fort bien appliqué."

" Laſtly,

" Laſtly, we ſhould be very cautious how we " employ the treaſures of eloquence; I mean, " thoſe ornaments, of which ſome conſiſt in the " thoughts, and others in the words. * "

The epiſtolary ſtile admits all the figures of words and thoughts, but admits them after its own manner. It has metaphors for every condition, and even its ſuſpenſions and interrogations, and for this reaſon, that theſe turns are the expreſſions of nature herſelf.

" There ſhould be no places of words, nor " change of letters, for the ſake of introducing " a grace, or the affectated arrangement of every " member of a period, to make them tally with " each other, or bring about the ſame cadences; " leaſt theſe apparent ſnares and ſtudied beau- " ties ſhould betray too much art, and ſpeak too " plainly a deſire of pleaſing †."

" Every advantageous uſe may be made of a " nice and delicately ſeaſoned pleaſantry: of " this there are two ſorts, the one of which is

* Verecundus erit uſus oratoriæ quaſi ſupellectilis. Supellex eſt enim quodam modo noſtra, quæ eſt in ornamentis, alia rerum alia verborum. *Num.* 24.

† Huic acuto fugienda ſunt, paria paribus relata, & ſimiliter concluſa, eodemque pacto cadentia, & immutatione litteræ quaſi quæſitæ venuſtates; ne elaborata concinnitas, & quoddam ancupium delectationis manifeſto deprehenſum appareat. *Num.* 25.

" called

" called gaiety, the other conſiſts in what we " term *bons mots*, or ſallies of wit. The firſt is " employed when we relate an agreeable ſtory, " and the latter to give ſome ſprighly or home " ſtroke, or to turn another into ridicule *."

Gaiety can diffuſe itſelf over all kinds of objects, however ſerious, or melancholy in themſelves. There is always a way of preſenting them with grace. Madame de Sévigné, in the midſt of the grief for the loſs of Mr. de Turenne, in which all France was involved, ſays pleaſantly, *that the piece that killed him, had been loaded from all eternity*; and amidſt the racks and anguiſh of bodily pain, ſhe writes thus to her daughter: †

" Gueſs,

* Huic generi orationis aſpergentur etiam ſales, qui in dicendo mirum quantum valent: quorum duo genera ſunt, unum facetiarum, alterum dicacitatis. . . . . Altero utetur narrando aliquid venuſtè, altero in jaciendo mittendoque ridiculo. *Num.* 26.

† " Devinez ce que c'eſt, ma fille, que la choſe du " monde qui vient le plus vite, & qui s'en va le plus len- " tement; qui vous fait approcher le plus près de la " convaleſcence, & qui vous en retire le plus loin; qui " vous fait toucher l'état du monde le plus agréable, & " qui vous empêche d'en jouir; qui vous donne les plus " belles eſpérances du monde, & qui en éloigne le plus " l'effet; ne ſauriez-vous le deviner? c'eſt un rhuma- " matiſme. Il y a vingt-trois jours que j'en ſuis malade. " Depuis le 14 je ſuis ſans fiévre & ſans douleur; & dans " cet état bienheureux, croyant être en état de marcher,

" qui

" Gueſs, my dear child, what is the thing in " the world that comes the quickeſt, and goes off " the ſloweſt; that brings you the neareſt to " health, and removes you the fartheſt from it; " that throws you into the moſt agreeable ſitua-

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" qui eſt tout ce que je ſouhaite, je me trouve enflée de " tous côtés . . . .& cette enflûre qui s'appelle ma guéri- " ſon, & qui l'eſt effectivement, fait tout le ſujet de " mon impatience . . . . Avant que de fermer ce paquet, " je demanderai à ma groſſe main, ſi elle veut bien que je " vous écrive deux mots . . . Adieu ma très-aimable, " je vous conjure tous de reſpecter avec tremblement ce " qui s'appelle un rhumatiſme . . Voici le Frater qui peſte " contre vous depuis huit jours, de vous être oppoſée à " Paris au reméde de Mr. de Lorme.

De Monſieur de Sévigué.

" Si ma mere s'étoit abandonnée au régime de ce bon " homme, & qu'elle eût pris tous les mois de ſa poudre, " elle ne ſeroit point tombée dans cette maladie qui ne " vient que d'une réplétion épouvantable d'humeurs : " mais c'étoit vouloir aſſaſſiner ma mere que de lui con- " ſeiller d'en eſſayer une priſe . . . . Vous moquez-vous, " mon frere, de faire prendre de l'antimoine à ma mere? " Il ne faut ſeulement que du régime, & prendre un pe- " tit bouillon de ſéné tous le mois . . . Ma mere s'écrie, " ô mes enfans, vous êtes fous de croire qu'une maladie " ſe puiſſe déranger ! Ne faut-ill pas que la providence " de Dieu ait ſon cours? Et pouvons-nous faire autre " choſe que de lui obéir? Voila qui eſt fort Chrétien; " mais prenons-toujours à bon compte, de la poudre de " Mr. de Lorme."

" tion

" tion imaginable, and at the ſame time hinders
" you from enjoying it; that flatters you with
" the moſt pleaſing hopes, and keeps you the
" longeſt from the accompliſhment of them.
" Cannot you gueſs? Do you give it up? Why,
" it is the rheumatiſm. I have had it theſe three
" and twenty days; ſince the fourteenth of the
" diſorder, I have been free from the fever and
" pains, and in this delightful ſituation, thinking
" myſelf ſtrong enough to walk, which is the
" whole of my wiſhes; I find myſelf ſwelled all
" over, feet, legs, hands, arms; and this ſwel-
" ling, which they call my cure, and in effect is
" ſo, is the ſole occaſion of all my preſent diſ-
" quiet.

" Before this packet is ſealed up, I ſhall ven-
" ture to aſk my great hand, if it will pleaſe to
" write a line or two to you; I am afrain it will
" not comply; but I do not know, perhaps it
" may.

" Adieu, my dear and beſt loved child, let me
" beg of you to have a reverential awe of that
" thing called a rheumatiſm; methinks this is the
" moſt important matter I have to recommend
" to you at preſent. Here is your brother who
" has been railing at you this week for ſpeaking
" againſt M. de Lorme's powder when you was
" at Paris.

Monſieur

Monſieur de Sévigné.

" Had my mother complied with the regimen
" preſcribed her by that honeſt man, and taken
" ſome of his powders once a month, as he
" would have had her have done, ſhe would not
" have had this diſorder, which is wholly owing
" to an over repletion of humours: but it was
" killing our mother to adviſe her to try a ſingle
" doſe; and yet after all, this dreadful medicine,
" that makes people ſhudder at its very name;
" that is compoſed, Lord bleſs us! of antimony;
" that is an emetic; works as gently, and with
" as much ſafety, as a glaſs of any of the purg-
" ing waters, and without the leaſt gripings or
" uneaſineſs, and has no other effect than that
" of making the head a little lighter, inſomuch,
" that you are ready for making verſes after it, if
" you take ever ſo little pains: but no, it muſt
" not be taken; are you mad, brother, to think of
" giving my mother antimony! She wants no-
" thing but a little dieting, and a cooling purge
" once a month: this was your ladyſhip's ſtrain.
" Your ſervant, ſiſter o'mine; I am downright
" angry, when I think that we might have ſaved
" our mother this terrible diſorder, had ſhe been
" prevailed upon to have taken this powder,
" which is the moſt ſpeedy reſtorative in the
" world,

" world, whatever ſhe may be pleaſed to ſay " againſt it in her impatience.

" Are you fools, children, ſays my mother, " to think that a diſtemper is to be put out of " its courſe! Muſt not God's will be done? Is " it not our duty to ſubmit? All this is talking " like a very good Chriſtian, to be ſure; but ſtill " give me de Lorme's powders."

We ſhould be extremely reſerved on the head of pleaſantry, becauſe it is never good unleſs well placed, and it is difficult to ſtrike the mark juſtly in a letter, as one ſhoots at ſuch a diſtance. The ſureſt method, at leaſt where one is not upon the moſt intimate footing, is to confine oneſelf to good ſenſe, which is ſuitable to all times and all places, and requires not the aſſiſtance of concomitant circumſtances.

As to *bons mots*, or ſallies of wit, it is ſtill more dangerous to let them fly at random, becauſe they are too frequently accompanied with a ſpice of maliciouſneſs. Repeat the *bons mots* of others if you will, or relate part of ſome droll adventure, to enliven your letter; but then take care to do this in ſuch a manner, as to throw from yourſelf the leaſt imputation of malice or ill nature. For though this may paſs off favorably for you at the firſt reading, yet who knows whether it may not be retorted upon you afterwards in private, and by comparing theſe ſtrokes with others that may have

eſcaped

eſcaped you, a concluſion may not be made on the whole, very little favorable to your character, of honor and humanity? We ſhould always be cautious of furniſhing arms againſt ourſelves.

A proper ſenſe of our own ſtation, and that of the perſon to whom we addreſs ourſelves, is the firſt ſtep neceſſary to ſpeaking well, and conſequently to writing well. This will direct us in what we ought to ſay, and the manner of ſaying it. This will dictate to us the things, the turns, and the expreſſions. If we depart ever ſo little from this rule, we ſhall become diſagreeable; ſelf-love always knowing when it has juſtice or wrong done it: therefore it is, above all things, neceſſary to fancy ourſelves in the preſence of thoſe to whom we are writing.

We have within ourſelves relations of all kinds; relations of equality, and relations of ſuperiority. With reſpect to thoſe of ſuperiority, there are an infinite variety of degrees and combinations of duties, reſpect, friendſhip, tenderneſs, gratitude, and intereſts, paſt, preſent, and to come, real and poſſible; of fear, and hope; in a word, relations to the being, fortune, and condition of the two perſons who correſpond with each other. A neglect in any one of theſe, will make us appear either fools or coxcombs. If a ſuperior makes himſelf of too great conſequence,

his

his letter creates him an enemy; if an inferior appears too abject, he will be trampled upon: if an equal gives himſelf airs of pride, he is ſure to be humbled. He who is too forward in aſking, is ſuppoſed to be too full of himſelf; and he who aſks in a baſhful manner, is cenſured as having too mean an opinion of himſelf, or perhaps of being proud. The man of underſtanding will chuſe the juſt medium, and keep to that.

When you are only to praiſe, applaud, congratulate, or return thanks, you may give a looſe to your pen; you run no danger of offending thoſe you write or ſpeak to. Delicate minds indeed are pleaſed to have this nicely turned, and the impreſſion lightly made, ſo as to appear only therein in *en paſſant*, and in ſuch manner as they may be left at liberty to perceive or not perceive the intended praiſe, to give or refuſe their acceptance, to anſwer it or paſs it over in ſilence, to acknowledge a part of it, and indulge the reſt in ſecret. But even though all this nicety ſhould be wanting, they will readily forgive it, in conſideration of the good intention.

When buſineſs is the ſubject, all flouriſhes are dangerous: we are very apt to be entangled in a multitude of periods. Proper terms, ſimple turns, and brevity above all, are the moſt ſuitable on theſe occaſions. Madame de Maintenon is an excellent pattern in this part of the epiſtolary

ſtile.

ſtile. She always ſays what is proper, ſays it well, and ſays only that.

When the heart dictates, the expreſſions flow faſter than the pen. But when we write to indifferent perſons, or with reſtraint, the imagination refuſes its aſſiſtance, we ſtop ſhort, and are at a loſs for words. In thoſe unfortunate moments, we muſt have recourſe to art, wait a while and conſider in general of what we have to write, repreſent to ourſelves the perſon to whom we are about to write, and the kind of ſtile moſt likely to pleaſe, and then proceed to write on.

Every one is acquainted with his own ſtrength, and deficiency. Thoſe who cannot write off-hand, will do wiſely to throw their ideas together upon a looſe paper. It is even neceſſary for young people, at their firſt beginning, to retouch their letters, till they have acquired a habit of being exact, and we readily pardon the appearance of art and caution in their ſtile; which, though a defect, is ſtill preferable to tedioufneſs, repetition, obſcurity, or grammatical errors. And here let it be inculcated, that frequently a ſingle word is ſufficient to give an unfavourable idea of one's underſtanding, ſentiments, or education. A young perſon who writes, ſends his picture abroad into the world.

The attentive peruſal of Cicero's letters to his friends, thoſe of Pliny, and eſpecially thoſe of

Madam

Madame de Sévigné * will afford the young beginner great helps towards attaining a good ſtile. But it ſhould likewiſe be obſerved, that it is not right to be confined to any one particular model. Every one ſhould take what appears moſt ſuitable to him, and in the beſt manner he is able. I do not think it poſſible to compoſe a letter by rule. The ſentiment alone gives law here, and ſentiments and rules ſeldom do well together, at leaſt they do not eaſily accommodate themſelves to each other.

One of the greateſt faults in a letter is over-length. There are ſome people who are for ever going on, and never get to their journey's end. It is much better to be too ſhort, than to be flat and tireſome.

Minds accuſtomed to nice contractions, are frequently too refined, and apt to run into metaphyſical ſtrokes. A thought never loſes, by having a proper body given it.

The letters of learned men ſometimes ſavour too much of ſtudy and erudition; every thing is ſtrictly exact and regular; but this exactneſs often makes them ſtiff and dry.

Young people for the moſt part abound in needleſs details; they write for themſelves, with-

* The letters of this accompliſhed lady, in 8 volumes, are now rendering into Engliſh by the tranſlator of this work: the 4 firſt vols. which are already publiſhed, have met with ſome approbation from the public, and are to be had of *Coote* in *Paternoſter-Row*.

out

out ſcarcely thinking of the perſon to whom they are writing, and the whole is one continued confuſion.

People in high life, who are accuſtoned to a genteel expeſſion, ſpeak in their letters with the utmoſt eaſe and dignity. All they write breathes the agreeable air of the place they frequent. Theſe are the only people to whom reſerve adds graces.

It is ſaid that we ſhould write as we ſpeak, but that is on condition that we ſpeak juſtly. Perhaps we ought to write better than we ſpeak, even though we ſhould ſpeak well. We have more time to ſelect and range our ideas. What danger is there in entertaining a good opinion of our friend, and giving him a good opinion of us? But he is my friend; I ſtand upon no ceremony with him: that is to ſay, you reſerve your regard and politeneſs for ſtrangers, for your enemies perhaps, or for thoſe who are indifferent to you. Yes, ſurely, we ought to ſecure the eſteem of our friends before that of others. This is not at all too much in friendſhip. And frequently in a correſpondence of this nature, a little politeneſs and regard ſhewn, will go farther than our more ſolid merits.

But I perceive it is high time to quit this dogmatical ſtile, which my plan has at times obliged me to aſſume, and particularly in this ſmall article, wherein I have taken upon me to give ſome inſtructions to young people, in relation to one of the moſt important parts of their education.

However,

However, to rid them of myſelf, I would gladly here preſent them with a few of Cicero's or Pliny's letters, or thoſe of Seneca. If they were not works already in every one's hand, or if I thought there was yet a neceſſity of entering into any farther details, after what we have already ſaid on this ſubject. It is in theſe works, and in the ſchool of the world, that they muſt learn how to write, and not from a book of precepts, which can neither furniſh them with the means nor model of ſentiment.

[The Engliſh epiſtolary writers the moſt in eſteem, are Sir William Temple, Dr. Swift, and Mr. Pope; the firſt of theſe is undoubtedly the beſt model for letters of buſineſs, as poſſeſſing the happy talent of blending the light and agreeable with the dull and cramped ſtile, deemed almoſt inſeparable from matters of this nature. Swift has all the freedom and pleaſantry of a man writing at his eaſe, except when he touches upon political matters, and then he is apt to throw too much of the acid into his compoſition. Mr. Pope pleaſes us as it were by force, for at the ſame time that we cannot but diſapprove of the apparent deſign of pleaſing, which ſhews itſelf in his writing, we are ſo charmed by the happy cadence of his periods, and the agreeable harmony of his numbers, that we forgive the one; for the ſake of the ſatisfaction we receive from the other.]

SECT. IV.

Principles of Tranſlation.

IT is now in general agreed, that tranſlating the writings of the ancients is, if not the ſole, at leaſt the plaineſt, the ſhorteſt, and the ſureſt means of becoming well acquainted with them and their language. It is alſo agreed, that a tranſlation ought exactly to expreſs the original; that it ſhould neither be too free nor too ſervile; that it ſhould neither deviate into long circumlocutions, which weaken the ideas, nor adhere too ſtrictly to the letter, which ſtifles the ſentiment. But as theſe looſe and general principles are but of ſmall uſe when one comes to performance, we ſhall preſent ſome particulars to the younger claſs of readers, for whom theſe ſheets are principally deſigned.

In tranſlating, the chief difficulty lies not in comprehending the author's thought: this is uſually attained by the aſſiſtance of good editions, of commentaries, and, above all, by examining the mutual relations and connections of the ideas: but when we come to expreſs, in another language, the things, the thoughts, the expreſſions, the turns, the ſtrain, of a work; to give the things, ſuch as they are, without adding, diminiſhing, or miſplacing; the thoughts, in their co-

colors, their degrees, their ſhades; the turns, which impart fire, ſpirit, life, to the diſcourſe; and to exhibit the expreſſions, natural, figurative, ſtrong, copious, genteel, delicate, *&c.* and all this after a model rigorouſly ſtrict, and yet would be obeyed without conſtraint; there is required, if not as much genius, at leaſt as much taſte, to tranſlate well as to compoſe. Nay, perhaps even a greater degree is neceſſary.

The author who compoſes, wholly guided by a ſort of inſtinct, is always free; and by his ſubject preſenting him ideas, which he may accept or reject at his pleaſure, is abſolute maſter of his own thoughts and expreſſions. If the thought does not pleaſe him, or if the expreſſion be not ſuitable to the thought, he may reject both: *quæ deſperat tractata niteſcere poſſe, relinquit.* The tranſlator has nothing in his own power; he is obliged in every thing to follow his author, and to ſubmit to all his variations with an unreſerved compliance. This may be conceived by the variety of ſtrains neceſſarily found in the ſame ſubject, and ſtill more in the ſame kind of writing. In a ſubject whoſe parts are regularly diſpoſed, and placed in juſt harmony, we ſee the ſtyle riſing and falling, ſoftening and ſtrengthening, contracting and extending, without any deviation from the unity of its fundamental character. Terence has, from one end to the other, a ſtyle

perfectly adapted to comedy: it is always ſimple and elegant. But how different are the degrees of ſimplicity in the mouth of Simon, of Davus, of Pamphilus, of Myſis! how unlike are they when theſe actors are calm or affected! with one paſſion or with another! To expreſs all theſe degrees, a tranſlator muſt have thoroughly felt them; afterwards have the command, to an uncommon pitch, of the language which he wants to enrich with foreign ſpoils. What opinion then ought we not to have of a tranſlation performed with ſucceſs?

The firſt thing neceſſary to a perſon who intends to tranſlate, is, thoroughly to underſtand the genius of the two languages which he propoſes to handle. He may acquire this knowledge by a ſort of perception reſulting from the thorough acquaintance that he has with them. But would it be impertinent, to throw ſome light upon the means of perception, and to examine whether there be no method to facilitate his labor, no criterion by which one may determine his ſucceſs?

The object of this examination can regard neither the quality nor multiplicity of the words; ſince there can be no rule as to theſe two points. The words are already ſettled; and we muſt take them as they are. We are therefore limited to taking a view of the different ſtructure of the

words in the two languages, and to inveſtigate the cauſes of what is called a *Galliciſm*, an *Angliciſm*, a *Latiniſm*.

This inquiry will inform us, 1. Whence ariſes the ſuperiority of the Latin language over the French and Engliſh, in energy and fervency of ſtyle. 2. What are the means by which we may come near the manner of the Latins. 3. From theſe we may infer the rules which ſeem neceſſary to be followed in the tranſlation of Latin authors.

CHAP. I.

Of the Latin conſtruction.

WE hear it ſaid every day, and all authors agree, that the Latins had more advantages than we in their conſtruction. We are obliged, ſay they, to follow continually the ſame courſe; nominative, verb, regimen, in one eternal round, which never varies. The Latins, on the contrary, maſters of their arrangement, placed their words as they pleaſed, whether the intention was, to delight the ear, to enlighten the underſtanding, or to captivate the heart. Sometimes a verb made its appearance in the firſt place, ſometimes an adjective, ſometimes an adverb, according as the ſentence required it,

either to advantage its harmony, or add to its energy.

But what conſequence are we to draw from this? That the Latins make inverſions whenever they pleaſe; that they are ſubjected by no law; whereas, on the contrary, with us the natural order is an iron rule, invariable, inflexible.

The flexibility of the Latin conſtructions, and the harſhneſs or inflexibility of ours, ſhould apparently have produced a concluſion in favor of the Latin: and preciſely the contrary has happened. It has been ſaid, the Latin language is more copious and more flexible than either the French or Engliſh; and that, of the two, the former conforms itſelf leſs than the latter to the order of nature. "In the Latin conſtruction," ſays father Cerceau, "provided the words which "ſhould enter into the compoſition of a ſentence "be there collected, it is very often of little im-"portance in what order they are placed, and "what rank they poſſeſs. That which is placed "in the front of the period, would often make as "good a figure if put in the rear: ſo that, by "throwing the words of a ſentence confuſedly "into a hat, and drawing them out one after "another, like lottery-tickets, their arrangement "would be found always to approach to regu-"larity enough. Our language (the French) "admits no ſuch licence, and is more confined

"and

" and ſtraitened in its diſpoſition. This is what ſome " people object to, as an imperfection. I ſhall, " without difficulty, grant it is ſo, as ſoon as it is " made appear to me, that, to ſpeak in the ſame " order we think, is a defect. For my part, I " have hitherto thought, that he ſpoke beſt who " made himſelf the moſt intelligible; and that he " rendered himſelf the moſt ſo, who left leaſt to " the conception of thoſe to whom the diſcourſe " is addreſſed. The diſorder, and almoſt ar- " bitrary diſpoſition of words, which the Latin " conſtruction permits on this head, is ſomewhat " laborious to the hearer. He muſt ſpell (if I " may ſo ſay) every word, and put in order, " in his own mind, what we preſent in diſorder " in the diſcourſe; whereas our language ſaves " the hearer that trouble, by preſenting to him " the ideas in the natural order which they ought " to aſſume. This is an advantage which our " language has over the Latin, and over ſuch lan- " guages as reſemble it. I do not intend by this " to diſparage the Latin language, which I have " ſtudied all my days. But it muſt yield to ours " in regularity and plainneſs of conſtruction."

This conſequence, which, compared with the premiſſes, will appear ſingular, is a clear proof, that we are not in a proper ſituation to judge rightly whether the Latin conſtructions be more natural than our own. Cuſtom is a ſecond nature.

It has long been called ſo, and it is never more truly ſo, than in the matter of language. I am writing from left to right, and I think it ridiculous that a Hebrew ſhould write from right to left. It is yourſelf, the Hebrew tells me, who are ridiculous. You do not ſee your writing till it is done, and it is no longer time to rectify it; your hand and your pen hide it from you: whereas we, beginning from right to left, ſee the ſtroke as it is forming. Laugh, if you will, at this reaſoning; but ſtill it is true, that, to judge only by imagination, our antipodes would be deemed to have their heads downward, and we to have the prerogative of bearing ours aloft.

The ſame thing may poſſibly have happened in what we are pleaſed to pronounce concerning the Latin conſtruction; and this diſcompoſure and inverſion of the natural order, aſcribed to them, may be rather owing to ourſelves. Let us ſee whether there be at leaſt any thing which may render the doubt rational.

This queſtion, more important than might be believed at firſt ſight, is the key to almoſt all the beauties which depend upon the arrangement of words. In carefully diſcuſſing it, will be ſeen the order in which the thoughts and the expreſſions ſhould be placed; and the ſecret mechaniſm which conſtitutes the grace and energy of diſcourſe. We ſhall diſcover, beſides, the principles

ciples of the differences obſerved in languages, the reaſon of their contrary proceſſes, and what they gain or loſe by following different ſyſtems.

Neither the Greek nor the Latins had it in their power to inveſtigate this ſubject; becauſe the arrangement of the words being founded on the ſame principles in the Greek and in the Latin languages, it ought to have been the ſame in the good authors of both languages; and when it was not ſo, the writers alone were to be blamed.

But before we examine, whether the Latins follow the natural order or not, it is neceſſary to know what that order is, and what are its methods of procedure.

We, in the firſt place, obſerve, that expreſſions are to thoughts what thoughts are to things. There is between them a kind of generation, which carries the reſemblance from ſtep to ſtep, from the firſt principle to the laſt term. Things produce thought, and give it its external appearance: thought, in its turn, produces expreſſion, and preſcribes to it its proper form. Thought is an interior image, which is the immediate object of the mind. Expreſſion is an exterior one, which ſhows thought in ſome arbitrary or natural ſigns which repreſent it. Thought and expreſſion then, are both images. But the perfection of every image conſiſts in its reſemblance to that which it repreſents; and this reſemblance, when

it is perfect, ſhould exhibit not only the things, but the order in which they are found. For example, if my thought repreſents to me a man, it is not enough that it paints to me arms, a head, legs; it muſt alſo place theſe members in their proper poſition, that is to ſay, as they really are in the man repreſented, without which the image is reckoned falſe.

It is, then, upon the arrangement of the things, and their parts, that the order and arrangement of the thought depend; and upon the order and arrangement of the thought, and its parts, depend the order and arrangement of the expreſſion. And this arrangement is natural or not, in the thoughts and in the expreſſions, which are images, when it is or is not conformable to the things, which are models. And if there are ſeveral things which follow each other, or ſeveral parts of the ſame thing, and if they be otherwiſe arranged in the thought than they are in nature, there is an inverſion or confuſion in the thought; and if, in the expreſſion, there is ſtill another arrangement than in the thought, there will be a further confuſion. Whence it follows, that inverſion muſt either be in the thoughts or the expreſſions; and that it cannot be in either but by interverting the natural order of the things repreſented.

What

What is, then, the arrangement of the thing in nature?

It is a received maxim among all philoſophers, That the object moves the power, and that the ſoul cannot be inclined to any thing without having known it before. And does not common ſenſe alone tell us, that the ſtring of the inſtrument muſt be ſtruck before it will return the ſounds? The object, then, towards which it is meant to incline us, by the diſcourſe, muſt be preſented to us before any thing elſe; ſince it is that which is to perſuade us, and produce our conſent.

What is it that paſſes within us, when we are determined to any movement? I ſee an object; I diſcover in it qualities which pleaſe or diſpleaſe me; according to which I am inclined to it or fly from it. There is then firſt in me, a knowledge of the object and its qualities; afterwards comes the movement. I know before I am moved. This is what paſſes within me.

If I want to make another man know, that he ought to ſhun or purſue any object, I ſhall begin by ſhowing him that object. Afterwards I will give him to underſtand how he ought to act with reſpect to it. The order which I followed for myſelf, is likewiſe to be followed for him; ſince his machine is compoſed like mine, and ſince it is actuated by the ſame ſpring. — I

ſaw a ſerpent, I fled: ſo I muſt firſt give him an idea of the danger, if I would have him of himſelf determined to avoid it.

This proceſs is farther proved by the order of our expreſſions, when we ſpeak by geſtures. I am at table; I want to aſk ſome bread. After having rendered attentive to my expreſſion the perſon who can give it to me, ſhall I begin by pointing at myſelf? Shall I not rather point out to him the object, in order afterwards, by bringing back my geſture to myſelf, to indicate to him the action which I deſire of him? I ſhall ſay then, in the language of geſture, *Panem præbe mihi*, and not, *Donnez moi du pain*, "Give me "ſome bread."

The emperor Domitian was ſingularly dexterous in ſhooting with the bow. He made his arrows paſs through between the expanded fingers of a ſlave and did him no hurt. What order muſt he have followed in this action? He muſt firſt have placed the ſlave at the proper diſtance of a butt; afterwards made him preſent his hand open, and the fingers expanded; finally, he ſhot, and the ſlave was not hurt. This arrangement is the ſame when we conſider the action in the deſign only. Domitian ſaid within himſelf, I will have a ſlave placed at a certain diſtance; he ſhall hold up his hand, expand his fingers; I will ſhoot my arrows without hurting him. He executed this

in

in the ſame order, as has been ſaid. This order was then the natural order of the narrative. Conſequently, whoever ſhould take upon himſelf to ſay, *Domitien tiroit des fleches, à travers les doights écartés d'un eſclave, qui lui preſentoit, à une certaine diſtance, la main ouverte*; "Domitian "ſhot his arrows between the expanded fingers "of a ſlave, who preſented to him, at a certain "diſtance, his open hand," would neither follow the order of the deſign, nor the order of the execution. Suetonius has then followed it, when he wrote, *In pueri procul ſtantis, præbentiſque pro ſcopulo, diſpanſam dextræ manus palmam, ſagittas tantâ arte direxit, ut omnes, per intervalla digitorum, innocuè evaderent* *, In the French and Engliſh the action is done firſt; *tiroit*; ſhot; afterwards comes the inſtrument with which it is done, *des fleches*, arrows; then the butt or aim ſhot at, *les doigts écartés*, the expanded fingers; at laſt, *l'eſclave*, the ſlave, ſhows himſelf, *à une certaine diſtance*, at a certain diſtance.

But perhaps I ſhall be told, that this very period I cite neceſſarily preſuppoſes an order anterior to what it preſents. For why ſhould *pueri* be in the genitive, if the mind had not ſeen *pal-*

* The author of *Spectacle de la nature*, who has adopted our principle in his *Mechanique des langues*, applies it in the ſame manner to different examples.

nam before? why ſhould *ſagittas* be in the accuſative, if *direxit* had not alſo been ſeen? But the firſt order of the period in the mind is ſurely the natural order; then that which is found in the ſame period expreſſed by words, is only the order of inſtitution. But there is yet another order, which may be called metaphyſical, and which is more natural than that which the period cited preſents; ſince it is founded upon the very order in which the ideas ariſe and combine themſelves in the mind. But beſides that, what could be anſwered to one who ſhould maintain that the mind takes in ſeveral objects at one view? There would then be no longer any ſucceſſive order to imitate in the expreſſion, and every thing would fall again into anarchy.

Theſe difficulties, let me be allowed to ſay, cannot be any, but to ſuch as have not thoroughly comprehended the ſtate of the queſtion.

It is not the ſubject of our preſent diſcuſſion whether there may be in the mind a grammatical arrangement, relative to the rules eſtabliſhed for the mechaniſm of the language in which we intend to expreſs ourſelves; whether there may not alſo be an arrangement of the ideas conſidered metaphyſically, that is to ſay, as ſubjects, or attributes, or connections; that theſe ideas, in certain caſes, may preſent themſelves all at once, and without any ſucceſſive order, as when the

the eye compriſes at one glance all the parts of a picture. We are not inquiring after the order in which our ideas ariſe in us, but that in which they flow from us, when, annexed to words, they are arranged in regular ſucceſſion, in order to inſtill perſuaſion in our hearers. In a word, we are ſeeking the oratorial order, the order which paints, the order which affects; and are ſaying, that this order ſhould be the ſame in narration, as that in the things related; and that, in caſes where the intention is to perſuade, if we would make the hearer conſent to what we are ſaying to him, we ought to determine the ſtations of the objects by their degree of importance; and conſequently give the firſt place to the words which contain the moſt intereſting object. We have proved, that this order is that of nature; let us now prove, that the Latin language follows it, and of courſe the Greek. It is known theſe two languages have the ſame genius, and the ſame flexibility in their conſtructions.

The moſt important object in an oratorial propoſition is, either the ſubject; or the verb, which ſignifies the action; or the adverb, which expreſſes the manner of the action; or, finally, the attribute, on which the object of the action depends. Thus the verb, the adverb, the ſubject, the attribute, the regimen of the attribute, will have by turns the firſt place in the propoſition,

ſition, according to their degree of importance with relation to the deſign of the ſpeaker. And here let us conſult authors themſelves.

Firſt, we have already ſaid, that if the ſubject was the chief point, it would appear at the head of the ſentence.

Populus Romanus, *Luculio imperante, ſibi Pontum aperuit.* Cic. "It is the Roman people "who," *&c.*

Una ſalus *victis nullam ſperare ſalutem.* Virg.

Felix qui *potuit rerum cognoſcere cauſas.* Virg.

Metius ille *eſt ductor itineris hujus.* Metius idem *hujus machinator belli.* Metius *fœderis Romani Albanique ruptor.* Liv.

Primus *ſentio mala noſtra.* Primus *reſciſco omnia.* Primus *porro obnuncio.* Ter.

When Scevola wants to inform Porſenna that he is a Roman, he ſays, Romanus *ſum civis*, "I am a Roman." Liv.

When Gavius, from his croſs, cries out, "I "am a citizen," he ſays, Civis *Romanus ſum.* Cic. Why this difference of conſtruction of the ſame three words? The principle in queſtion ſufficiently points out the reaſon. The quality of a Roman was, in the one, the principal object; in the other, it was that of a citizen.

2dly. If the principal object is the action itſelf which is doing, or done, the verb which expreſſes it ſhows itſelf firſt.

Fuiſti

Fuiſti *apud Leccam*, Diſtribuiſti *partes Italiæ*. Statuiſti *quo quemque proficiſci placeret*. Delegiſti *quos Romæ relinqueres, quos tecum educeres*. Deſcripſiſti *partes urbis ad incendia*. Confirmâſti *ipſum jam eſſe exiturum*. Dixiſti *paululum, &c.* Inventi ſunt *qui te, &c.* Cic. Cat. 1.

Dolebam ac vehementer angebar, *cum*, &c. Cic.

——Ibant *obſcuri ſola ſub nocte*. Virg.

——Perſonat *hæc ingens latratu*. Virg.

3dly. If the chief attention is due to the object of the action, as happens almoſt continually, then the regimen is before the verb.

Extinctum nymphæ crudeli funere Daphnim *Flebant*.—— Virg.

Cœlum, non animum, *mutant qui trans mare currunt*. Hor.

Tantam manſuetudinem, tam inuſitatam clementiam, *nullo modo præterire poſſum*. Cic.

Examples of this kind are ſo common, that it is needleſs to multiply quotations: there are few Latin ſentences in which we do not meet with ſome.

4thly, and laſtly. If we treat of the manner of the action; the adverb, or circumſtance, that comes in place of it, will appear in the front.

Ruinâ *reſtinguam incendium meum*. Sall.

Si quantum *in agro locisque deſertis audacia poteſt*, tantum *in foro*. Cic.

Ne

Ne cupide *emas*. Cato.

Non bene *conveniunt*, *nec in una ſede morantur*,
Majeſtas et amor. Ovid.

Tandem aliquando, *Quirites*, *Catilinam*, &c. Cic.

But wherefore this method of arrangement? Becauſe, in modal propoſitions, it is the mode or manner which is the object of the ſpeaker.

Nay more, of two nouns found together, it is the moſt intereſting that preſents itſelf the firſt. Diuturni *ſilentii*. *Neque* turpis *mors* forti *viro accidere poteſt*, *nec* immatura *conſulari*, *nec* miſere *ſapienti*.

When oppoſition is the ſubject, we will ſay, *Litora litoribus*; *arma armis*; *ruſticus urbanum*; *murem mus*; *veterem vetus*; *hoſpes amicum*.

But leſt it ſhould be imagined that theſe ſhort examples have been diſcovered only in conſequence of a nice ſearch, apply the ſame principle to longer paſſages. If it is true, it ought to hold every where.

Every body knows this beginning of Cicero's firſt oration againſt Catiline, *Quouſque tandem abutere*, *Catalina*, *patientiâ noſtrâ*? "How long then, Catiline, will thou abuſe our patience?" The firſt object is an adverb of time, which denotes that the patience is exhauſted. The ſoul of the period is a ſentiment of indignation and impatience; and that ſentiment is not expreſſed in this phraſe by any term but *quouſque tandem*. The

abuſe

abuſe does not come till pretty far after; becauſe, if one be pretty full of indignation at that abuſe, it is by reaſon of its too long continuance. *Patientia noſtra* is neceſſary to the meaning, it is true, but, placed in its preſent ſituation, it has in itſelf only a ſubordinate force.

Quamdiu etiam furor iſte tuus nos eludet? Quem ad finem ſeſe effrenata jactabit audacia? This is preciſely the ſame arrangement; becauſe the main of the thought and ſentiment is the ſame: *Quouſque, qamdiu, quem ad finem. Furor iſte tuus,* ſhould be before *eludet*; becauſe that object is the cauſe which produces the indignation. This, however, is not ſaying, that *eludet* ſignifies little: every thing is ſtrong in this oration: but there are more intereſting objects than that which this word repreſents. Why then, in the following member, is not *audacia* placed before *jactabit?* That order does not ſeem to agree with the principle. The difficulty will diſappear, by making a ſhort remark. *Effrenata* marks and poſſeſſes the place of *audacia*, which was only put to the end for the number and cadency. A remarkable final was neceſſary: *jactabit*, which of three long ſyllables, and which has the laſt faint, would not have ſtruck briſkly, like *audacia*, whoſe ſound, with the final dactyle, cauſes a ſhrill break of the voice. We ſhall hereafter ſpeak of the changes which

which harmony occaſions in the application of this principle. Let us proceed.

Nihilne te nocturnum præſidium palatii, nihil urbis vigiliæ, nihil timor populi, nihil concurſus bonorum omnium nihil, &c. moverunt? "Nothing is capable of touching you: it is the *nihil* which denotes the invincible obſtinacy of Catiline; the enumeration of the things which ought to move him is altogether comprehended in it: *nothing.*

Patere conſilia tua non ſentis? Is not *patere* here the verb which plays the principal part, and which ought to ſtrike Catiline the moſt?

Conſtrictam jam omnium horum conſcientiâ teneri conjurationem tuum non vides? Conſtrictam preſents the idea of confinement; *omnium horum conſcientia*, is but a ſort of adverb, expreſſed by ſeveral words, to explain the manner of confinement or reſtraint. *Quid proximâ, quid ſuperiore nocte egeris? quos convocaveris?* Theſe are the circumſtances: they are all preſented before the verb, becauſe the queſtion is about them, more even than about the verb which follows, *Quem noſtrum ignorare arbitraris?*

O tempora! O mores! the exclamation claims the precedency.

Senatus hoc intelligit; conſul videt; hic tamen vivit. Tranſlating this is ſufficient to make the principle appear. "Even the ſenate is informed

"of

" of it; the conſul ſees it; and yet this man ſtill " lives."

Vivit! " Yes, he lives!"

Immo vero, etiam in ſenatum venit. " Nay, he " does more, he comes into the ſenate." It is the circumſtance of the place, *the ſenate.*

What does he there? *Fit concilii publici particeps: notat & deſignat oculis ad cædem unumquemque noſtrûm.* The matter is about action, the verb is firſt.

Nos autem viri fortes. This is another arrangement. Here is an imputation to be caſt; upon whom? upon thoſe who are at the helm of the ſtate: " And we who love the commonwealth, think we do enough for her," *&c.*

It is needleſs, I ſuppoſe, to puſh the detail farther. We find it verified in almoſt every part of Cicero, Livy, Salluſt, Terence, Plautus, *&c.* and that very perceptibly, eſpecially in the animated paſſages.

But there have been ſome places cited to us, in which the application of this principle does not appear juſt. *Tu iſtis faucibus, iſtis lateribus, iſtâ gladiatoriâ corporis firmitate, tantum vini in Hippiæ nuptiis exhauſeras, ut tibi neceſſe eſſet, in populi Romani conſpectu, vomere poſtridie.* Cic.

This very example falls in with the rule. The object upon which the orator inſiſts, is the ſtrength of Anthony's conſtitution, in order to procure

procure a judgment from thence of the exeſs of his debauch.

Here is another one taken from the oration againſt Verres. *Stetit ſoleatus prætor populi Romani, cum pallio purpureo, tunicaque talari, mulierculâ nixus in littore.* It is certain, ſay thoſe who make the objection, that the principal idea here is, *mulierculâ nixus in littore.*

But the queſtion is, What is the firſt object that ſtrikes? It is a man ſtanding, *Stetit.* Who is this man? It is the prætor of the Roman people: This is what ſtrikes us firſt, and what makes the ſequel intereſting. For if this man, who is pointed out to obſervation, were not a Roman magiſtrate, very little attention would be given to the circumſtances in which he appears. It is the contraſt of the man's functions with his conduct which ſtrikes us. It was proper, then, to preſent the man firſt, and afterwards the man's behaviour, painted according to the gradation of nature.

The ſame will hold good with all the other examples: by looking narrowly into them, we ſhall find that the difficulty exiſts only in appearance.

But it will be ſaid, if this principle is juſt, nothing can be eaſier, at leaſt to one who has a metaphyſical head, than to frame Latin ſentences: he might proceed with his rule in his hand, and the ſucceſs of the operation would be infallible.

It is true, that their conſtruction becomes much

eaſier

eaſier and more certain by this means; nevertheleſs, all the difficulties are not removed. For even the metaphyſician himſelf, will find, in the application of this principle, puzzling variations, occaſioned by the way in which objects are mutually mingled, concealed, obſcured, involved, diſguiſed, in our thoughts; ſo that there always remain, at leaſt in certain caſes, ſome parts of the difficulty.

In the ſecond place, there is one thing which perplexes this regular arrangement, and by which, I think, may be explained every thing that may be found contradictory to our principle. This is number and harmony. It is for the ſake of theſe, that the Latin authors diſcompoſe the natural order of the ideas, and conſequently of the expreſſions, eſpecially when the diſorder which it occaſions gives leſs trouble than exerciſe to the mind. We have, by the by, preſented an example of this in the period of Cicero, where *audacia* is put at the end, though it ought to have been before the verb; and therefore forbear to cite any other here, that we may not inſiſt too much upon minute particulars.

From the many examples quoted, it appears that the Latin language conſtantly follows the oratorial order, and that it is doubtleſs for that reaſon, that it has ſo much fire, ſo much ſtrength, ſo much paſſion, being aſſiſted in its progreſs by all

all the impetuoſity of the heart, which proceeds in the ſame direction as itſelf.

But will it on this account be leſs philoſophical? There are thoſe who pretend it will. However, to perſuade us of this, it would be neceſſary to prove, that the order of the words ought to be different in philoſophy and in eloquence; that it is better, and more clear in itſelf, to ſay, in a philoſophical treatiſe, *Sol eſt rotundus*, than *rotundus eſt ſol*; in fine, that the Latin language, which performs the greater part, in bending itſelf to the progreſs of the paſſions, ſhall not be able to perform the leſſer, by ſimply following that of the underſtanding.

CHAP. II.

Of French and Engliſh conſtruction.

IF it appears more probable that the Greeks and Latins followed the natural order, there is the ſame degree of probability, that, on our part, we invert it; ſince we follow an order contrary to theirs, and put at the end what they put at the beginning.

But whence comes this diſorder with us? Here we are to enquire into the cauſes of it, and to unfold them as clearly as poſſible.

The Latins had but one reaſon for inverting the natural order, of which we have ſpoken;

ken; this was the harmony. Their language, more flexible than ours, aſſumed all the forms of their ideas, and repreſented them without any change, almoſt as in a mirror. As they had caſes properly ſo called, and as they were not afraid of taking the principle of the action for the object, if it happened that the object ſhould be placed before the principle, they followed the oratorial order, without dread of ambiguous or contrary meanings. Thus in this phraſe, *Patrem amat filius*, they were not afraid that the father, who is the object, ſhould be taken for the principle; or that the ſon, who is the principle, ſhould be taken for the object. Their termination gives them a fixed quality, and a certain mean-meaning, without owing any thing to the place they poſſeſs. It is not the ſame in French, or in Engliſh, in this phraſe, *Le fils aime le pere*, "The ſon loves the father." The father and the ſon are governing or governed according to the place preciſely which they poſſeſs; and if they be placed the ſame way as in the Latin, they will have a quite contrary meaning.

Patrem amat filius.
Le pere aime le fils.
The father loves the ſon.

So that it is to their reſpective poſition that they owe the quality of an object, or of a principle.

Another reaſon yet is, that in French, and in Engliſh,

Engliſh, we have a multitude of auxiliaries, whoſe place is not eaſy to regulate, and which might occaſion us interruptions in certain caſes. Theſe are the two principal cauſes which have thrown us into this kind of irregularity of conſtruction, an irregularity which we ſhun however as often as our language permits. This we ſhall ſee below.

In order thoroughly to inquire into this matter, ſo intereſting with reſpect to us, it will be neceſſary to recur to the cauſe of the genius of languages. Every language, it is ſaid, has it own. Allowed. But firſt it ſhould have been ſaid, that there is a general one drawn from the nature of mankind.

Men are generally the ſame in all places, and in all times, being all endowed with a thinking and a perceptive faculty, of which they communicate the interior movements to each other, from motives of neceſſity, conſequently they ſhould all be inclined to make this communication in the ſhorteſt and ſureſt method: for neceſſity has not two ways. As ſoon as this gives its orders and ſpeaks, it goes directly to the fact. No diſtinction, neither of countries, nor of times. It is a ſpring placed in every mind, which actuates and moves them all in the ſame manner. And ſuppoſing that there is an exterior machine, to repreſent their movements, as often as the ſame object

ſhall

ſhall agitate thoſe internal ſprings, there will thence reſult, if not as lively, at leaſt as many expreſſions in that exterior machine, and they will be there every where multiplied and arranged according to the number and order of the impulſes of the ſpring within. It plainly appears that this exterior machine is ſpeech.

If ſpeech be conſidered before its diviſion into Greek, Latin, Arabick, *&c.* and in the idea of its poſſible perfection, we ſee it ſhould follow, ſtep by ſtep, the head and the heart; that it ſhould render literally the thought, its circumſtances, its light, its fire, its parts, with their configurations, their connections, their degrees. It is a portraiture in which our mind ſhould ſee itſelf externally, whole and entire, ſuch as it is in all its poſitions, in all its movements.

If it be divided, and conſidered, not in its poſſible perfection, but as it really is in its exiſtent forms; every form may be conſidered in two lights; with regard to the particular genius of the nations according to the climates which they inhabit; and with regard to the particular compoſition of the ſounds which conſtitute one language in diſtinction from to another.

It is plain, that if languages be conſidered with reſpect to the particular genius of the people, there will always be the ſame order in the ideas, and conſequently in the expreſſions? becauſe men

are every where men. All the difference that can be found in them, will be in their greater or leſs degree of vivacity or energy. The people who have moſt fire and vivacity, may expreſs fewer things, and leave more to be gueſſed by their hearers; becauſe, ſatisfying themſelves with the chief heads of the ideas, which they will expreſs with energy, they will leave to the diſcernment of the hearer the other ideas, which might retard them awhile, and hinder them from coming to the point ſo ſoon. Such as are more flegmatic or dull, will take all the time neceſſary for expreſſing ſucceſſively all their ideas, principal and acceſſory, with all their circumſtances: for hitherto we ſuppoſe that the language accommodates itſelf to all the thoughts, to their parts, to their manner of being. Now, we do not ſee two different arrangements. It is the ſame both in the ideal, and in the actually exiſtent language, conſidered only with reſpect to the peculiar genius of the people. And it muſt indeed be the ſame; ſince there are good reaſons for its being ſo, and none for its being otherwiſe.

Hitherto we find the neceſſity alone of the ſpeaker regulating the language, and the arrangement of the words; and this maſter has every where and conſtantly the ſame method, whoſe great and only principle is intereſt or convenience.

We

We muſt then look for the cauſe of the different arrangements of words ſomewhere elſe; and this will be found in the ſecond manner of conſidering particular languages.

The particular languages in being are very remote from poſſible and ideal perfection. They have all the ſame aim, which is, to paint diſtinctly and exactly in the minds of the hearers what exiſts in the mind of the ſpeaker; and theſe two qualities include all the perfection of language. But there are ſome who have fewer colors than others, or who have them leſs ſtrong, or leſs eaſy to reduce and to blend, in order to produce the ſhades, which ſhould be the ground-work of the differences in languages.

All languages conſiſt in ſounds. The ſounds being repreſented in ſuch or ſuch a way, belong to one language or to another, by a certain analogy, which unites them, and forms of them a kind of body, the whole of which is called a language. Now, theſe repreſented ſounds are multiplied more or leſs, which occaſions copiouſneſs or poverty; they are more or leſs ſtrong, which occaſions energy or weakneſs; they have more or leſs flexibility, which produces ſmoothneſs, perſpicuity, preciſion.

We are acquainted with the ſource of the different conſtructions. This is what forms the particular genius of languages, with regard to the

arrangement of the words, and what obliges them to deviate from nature more or leſs, according as they are more or leſs forced to it by penury, weakneſs, or inflexibility. And here will be found the reaſon of the difference between the French and Latin arrangement.

Before entering upon the compariſon of the two languages, let me be allowed to examine, in a few words, what is the number and nature of the parts admitted into diſcourſe.

All words are repreſentations of our thoughts, juſt as our thoughts are the repreſentations of objects. As objects are either ſingle, making one whole, ſeparated from every other object; or connected, and having a relation to other objects; there ſhould be in our minds two ſorts of repreſentations; the one, of objects conſidered as ſingle; and the other, of the ſame objects conſidered as having a relation to others: which conſtitutes two ſorts of thoughts; the one, to repreſent objects; the other, to repreſent their relations. From whence reſult alſo two ſorts of words; the one called, *names*, (nouns) and the other *verbs*. I might then define the noun, a word which denotes an object conſidered as alone; and the verb, one which denotes the *ratio* or relation of objects between themſelves. I ſhall endeavour to juſtify and explain theſe two definitions.

The

The moſt ſimple object about which the mind can employ itſelf, is what in French is denoted by the word *être*, and in Engliſh by that of "*being*;" which is a name when an article or pronominal adjective is joined to it, *un être*, "*a being*." It is the baſis of all the attributes that any one thing whatever can receive. A thing muſt be, before it can be in ſuch or ſuch a manner.

In like manner, the moſt ſimple relation that can have place between two objects, is that which is expreſſed alſo by the ſame word *être*, "to be," or "being," but without an article or pronominal adjective; and then it is a verb: *Dieu eſt bon*, "God is good." This relation is likewiſe the baſis of all the other relations which can be found between any objects; and, conſequently, of all which we can poſſibly conceive in our minds, and which we expreſs by words: wherefore it has been called a (verb) *ſubſtantive*. It is the ſingular one of its ſpecies. Why has not the name *être*, "being," the ſame privilege of a ſingular ſubſtantive among the names (or nouns)? Let me be allowed to conſider it as ſuch for ſome minutes; and conſequently let me look upon all the other names as real adjectives, at leaſt in compariſon with this.

They are ſo in effect, as may eaſily be proved. If I ſay, [*un*] *être étendu*, "[an] extended being," it is owned there is in theſe two words a

ſubſtantive and an adjective. If theſe two words could be united into one, would not that word, though ſingle and one, be an adjective? This union is performed in the word *corps*, "body." Say, [*un*] *être étendu, vivant*; "[a] being extended, living;" there are two adjectives: one ſingle word expreſſes them; *plante*, "plant." Say, [*un*] *être étendu, vivant, animé, raiſonnable*; "[a] being extended, living, animated, rational;" there are four of them in one ſingle word, *homme*, "man." Are not theſe names real adjectives, at leaſt in compariſon of the name *être*, "being?"

But cuſtom has not thought proper to give them that denomination: it has been reſerved for ſuch as ſignify ſeparable qualities; whether eſſential, which are called a difference, and which, annexed to the genus, conſtitute the ſpecies; as the word *raiſonnable*, "rational," joined to *animal*, which is the genus, conſtitues the ſpecies called *homme*, "man:" or accidental, which are applied to the ſpecies; as that which is ſignified by the word *bon*, "good," which may either be or not be, joined to that of *homme*, "man." Theſe adjective words have been prepared, like ſupplemental pieces, to be added either to the generical or to the ſpecifical word. But they make with it in reality but one word; juſt as in the expreſſion, *man*, the words, *being*, *living*, *animated*,

nimated, *rational*, make but one. It is this unity of expreſſion which is the foundation of the concord of the ſubſtantive with the adjective, in gender, in number, and in caſe, where there are caſes in languages.

In the ſame manner as the ſubſtantive name *être*, "being," the baſis of all other names without exception, may bear very numerous acceſſories; ſo alſo the ſubſtantive verb *être*, "be," which marks the moſt ſimple relation of union between two objects, is the baſis of a great many other relations in verbs. The chief of theſe relations are thoſe of action and paſſion; which has given riſe to the active and paſſive voices in verbs. Then thoſe of time, of manner, of command, and ſometimes of place. Theſe relations, added to the ſimple one expreſſed by the ſubſtantive verb *être*, "be," have occaſioned the quality of adjective verbs to be given to all other verbs.

The Hebrews, in their verbs, had many advantages over the Greeks and Latins, as to thoſe ſorts of relations. They ſaid in one ſingle word, not only, "I have taught, I have been taught;" but alſo, "I have taught exactly, I have been "taught exactly, I have been ordered to teach, "I have been ordered to be taught, I have "taught myſelf." And with this alſo they ex-

preſſed the times, the genders, and the numbers.

The French and Engliſh languages, on the contrary, are obliged to employ a great many auxiliaries to expreſs all thoſe relations: an auxiliary for the active, at leaſt in moſt part of the moods; the verb *avoir*, "have;" an auxiliary for the paſſive, the verb *être*, "be;" often theſe two auxiliaries together, *j'ai été enſeigné*, "I have "been taught;" an auxiliary for the perſon, *je*, "I," *tu*, "thou," *il*, "he"; an auxiliary for certain moods, *que*, "that, let;" to theſe add, peculiar to the Engliſh, "may, can;" and an auxiliary for certain times, "ſhall, will, might, "could, ſhould, would." If there be added to the verb beſides, the adverb *exactement*, "ex- "actly," which is likewiſe an auxiliary, to denote the manner, the French or Engliſh verb, attended by all that retinue, *j'e-ai-été exactement enſeigné*, "I have been exactly taught," will be to the Hebrew verb, which expreſſes all theſe relations in one ſingle word, what to the concrete name *homme*, "man," is this expreſſion, which is its definition, *un être étendu, vivant, animé, raiſonnable*, "a being extended, living, "animated, rational."

The Greeks and Latins keep a ſort of medium between the Hebrews and the Engliſh and French. They have not near ſo many auxiliaries as we,

and

and they have more than the Hebrews. They have no auxiliary verbs but in ſome tenſes of the paſſive. They have no perſonal auxiliaries. We ſhall ſee the conſequences which will reſult from theſe obſervations. But previous to this, there is yet one other remark to be made.

It is, That names have no relation between themſelves, and govern one another only by the interpoſition of a verb, either of the ſubſtantive verb, or ſome of the adjective verbs, expreſſed or underſtood. If, I ſay, excluding the ſubſtantive verb, *un homme bon*, "a man good," theſe two ideas will not be connected; they will only be ſet beſide one another. If I do not exclude it, it is then underſtood, and the expreſſion, *un homme bon*, "a man good," is equivalent to this, *un homme qui eſt bon*, "a man who is good." When the relation is ſimple, that is to ſay, expreſſed by the ſingle ſubſtantive verb *être*, "to be," it has then but two terms; the one, from whence the relation commences, and the other, where it terminates. *Dieu eſt bon*, "God is good:" and in that caſe, as there is an identity between theſe two terms, which are united and blended together by the ſubſtantive verb, it has not been thought neceſſary, in any language, to have any exterior difference between the terms. We ſay, in French and Engliſh, *Dieu eſt bon*, "God is good;" in Latin, *Deus eſt bonus*. But when

the relations are active or paſſive, that is to ſay, when, beſide the ſimple relation, there is found that of action in one term, and of paſſion in the other; then ſome exterior difference was neceſſary to be put between the term acting, and the term acted upon. A grammatical piece of metaphyſics which needs an example. This Latin ſentence, *Pater amat filium*, if reſolved, is all one with *Pater eſt amans filium*: the ſimple relation is *Pater eſt amans*; the active relation which is joined to the ſimple, is that of *amans*, which paſſes upon *filium*. The ſimple relation, for the reaſon lately mentioned, requires no exterior difference; but the active relation requires ſome in one or other of the terms, if there be danger of confuſion. Who could underſtand the meaning of this propoſition. *Pater amat filius?* Which of the two terms is here the agent? It cannot be gueſſed.

Let us now draw ſome conſequences.

It follows from the above obſervations, That there are but three neceſſary parts of ſpeech; the name (noun) and the verb, which expreſs objects and their relations, and which conſtitute what is called the propoſition; and the conjunction, which ſerves to connect the propoſitions together, to make them a coherent diſcourſe.

Adverbs are but modificative auxiliaries, which we may ſometimes do without, and which are ſome-

ſometimes found included in other verbs, For example, *Aller fort vite*, 'to go very quick,' is expreſſed by the ſingle word *courir*, 'to run.' They are to the verb what the adjective, which expreſſes the accidental qualities, is to the noun; an acceſſory: which is ſometimes incorporated; as in the example which I have juſt cited. So it enters into the compoſition of the verb, and may be reckoned as one of its parts.

Prepoſitions are likewiſe of the ſame kind: they may be conſidered as ſeparate characters to add to ſubſtantives the manner of ſignification peculiar to the adverb. An example will alſo demonſtrate this obſervation. You ſay, *juſtement*, 'juſtly'; it is the laſt ſyllable which is the adverbial characteriſtic: put the prepoſition *avec*, 'with,' before the name *juſtice*, 'juſtice,' it will give the ſame manner of ſignification to the ſubſtantive *juſtice*, 'juſtice,' that the ſyllable *ment*, 'ly,' gave to the adjective *juſte*, 'juſt.' Thus the prepoſitions are reducible to the adverb. They have been invented to ſtand inſtead of it, to exerciſe its function, with the aſſiſtance of the ſubſtantive; becauſe herein was found the advantage of variety: and beſides, by this means might be ſpared ſome adjectives derived from adverbs, which would have appeared harſh and diſagreeable.

It follows, 2*dly*, That in a ſimple propoſition, that is to ſay, where the relation is ſimple, there is only the principle, the term, and the connection of the one with the other. The principle is called *a ſubject*; the term, *an attribute*; the connection, *a verb*: *Dieu eſt bon*, 'God is good.' In a propoſition expreſſing an active relation, there is, beſides, an object: *Le pere aime le fills*, 'the father loves the ſon;' that is to ſay, the father is loving the ſon. *The father* is the the ſubject, *is* the verb, *loving* the active attribute, and *the ſon* the object of the action. In the paſſive, the object is put in a contrary order: The father is loving the ſon; in the paſſive, the ſon is loved by the father. This is the whole machine of language, with all its pieces, and all its ſprings.

It follows, 3*dly*, That, in general, all adjectives ſhould be placed beſide their ſubſtantives, and all adverbs beſide their verbs, and that the verbs, and what depends upon them, ſhould, uſually, be ſituated between the ſubject and the object, or the object and the ſubject, according to the order intended to be followed, metaphyſical or oratorial, ſuppoſing that the underſtanding and affections have each their form of proceeding, and method of arrangement.

It follows, 4*thly*, That the French and Engliſh languages having an eſſential difference from the Latin in their conſtructions, as every body allows;

lows; and that having none in the nature, either of their conjunctions, or of their prepoſitions, or of their adverbs, but only in the verbs and names; it can only be in theſe two parts of ſpeech that the reaſon of that difference is found.

Nouns have, in Latin, terminations, which denote their modifications and relations, active or paſſive. This is what they call *caſes*. The Engliſh and French have no caſes; they have nothing intrinſic but the mark of number and of appropriation, which is the letter *s* in the plural, and, in Engliſh, in circumſtances ſimilar to thoſe in which the Latins uſe their genitive. As to what concerns relations and modifications, they have an article, ſometimes ſimple *le*, *la*, *les*, 'the'; ſometimes compounded with a prepoſition *du*, *au*, which is equivalent to *de le*, *à le*, 'of, to, from, 'at, by, the.'

In their verbs, the Latins had found the means of incorporating into one ſingle word, not only the action, but alſo the perſon, the number, the time, the manner. As to us, we muſt ſometimes have three auxiliaries to expreſs all theſe parts; a particle, *que*, 'that;' a perſonal pronoun, *je*, 'I;' a verb, *aie*, 'may have;' and, finally, the verb, which expreſſes the ſpecies of action, *aime*, 'love,' *que j'aie aimé*; 'that I may have loved;' in Latin, *amaverim*.

This

This twofold difference obſerved, let us examine if it is from thence that the difference of our arrangement ariſes.

But why do we almoſt continually put the regimen of the active verb after the verb itſelf, when the Latins put it before? The Latins did it to follow the order of the affections, which is the natural order, when the aim is perſuaſion. They could do ſo, becauſe the inflections of their caſes determined their names in a certain manner to be governing or governed. They could ſay, *Patrem amat filius*; but we, not having theſe inflections to expreſs the love of the ſon towards the father, cannot ſay, *Le pere aime le fils*, 'The father loves the ſon:' we muſt by all means ſay, *Le fils aime le pere*, 'The ſon loves the father.'

We have no other order to follow if we intend to be underſtood; the neceſſity of it is perceptible in active relations.

It is true, we follow the ſame order in ſimple relations, *Dieu eſt bon*, 'God is good;' though there be not a neceſſity to diſtinguiſh the object and the principle of the action. But to this it may be anſwered, That this order has only been followed by analogy, to comply with that which the active verbs require, and not to make too great variety in our conſtructions. Our old authors ſaid, in imitation of the Latin conſtruction,

Un chien malade étoit, 'A dog ſick was.'

Quand

Quand coëffée la dame étoit, 'When dreſſed the 'lady was.'

Inſenſibly that kind of arrangement prevailed over that of the active verbs, which recurs moſt frequently. And it was the more readily adopted, becauſe when we ſaid, *Dieu eſt bon*, 'God is 'good;' the ſubject and the attribute being intimately united, and made the ſame by the affirmation, it was almoſt a matter of indifference to alter the metaphyſical arrangement.

Wherefore do the French and Engliſh chuſe the actives, whereas the Latins prefered the paſſives? The paſſive was muſical in Latin; it had but one word, and that of a length proper for harmony: *Videbam Cæſarem; a me Cæſar videbatur*. In French and Engliſh, *Je voyois Céſar*, 'I ſaw Cæſar;' and in the paſſive, *Céſar étoit vu par moi*, 'Cæſar was ſeen by me.' We have here five words, moſtly monoſyllables, which all oppoſe the harmony, and ſeem to mince the thought.

Why do we prefer infinitives to the other moods? Becauſe they rid us of ſome particles which would be in our way. We chuſe rather to ſay, *J'ai été pour vous voir*, 'I have been to 'ſee you,' than, *J'ai été pour que je vous viſſe*, 'I have been for that I might ſee you.'

Why in antitheſes or oppoſitions cannot we ſet the ideas by one another, like the Latins? Becauſe

cauſe our auxiliaries, our articles, our negatives, occaſion a claſhing, which diſpleaſes the ear, and perplexes the mind. *Adeſt vir ſummâ auctoritate et fide Lucullus, qui ait ſe non opinari, ſed ſcire; non audiviſſe, ſed vidiſſe; non affuiſſe, ſed egiſſe.* Would we ſay, *Voici un citoyen digne de foi, s'il en fut jamais, Lucullus, qui ne dit pas qu'il croit, mais qu'il ſait; qu'il a oui dire, mais qu'il a vu; qu'il étoit préſent, mais qu'il l'a fait lui meme?* 'Here is a citizen worthy of the higheſt credit, Lucullus, who does not ſay that he believes, but that he knows; that he has heard ſaid, but that he has ſeen; that he was preſent, but that he has done it himſelf.' What ear could bear ſuch a conſtruction? Would we not rather ſay, *Voici Lucullus, qui ne dit point, Je crois, j'ai oui dire, j'étois préſent; mais, Je ſai, j'ai, vu, c'eſt moi qui l'ai fait:* 'Here is Lucullus, who does not ſay, I have heard, I was preſent; but, I know, I ſaw, it was I who did it;' and thus we ſhould acquit ourſelves in a far more ſpirited manner. The immenſe extent of the application is viſible, and how many theſe two differences properly noted may operate in the conformation of phraſes.—But to proceed.

If there are only thoſe two ſources of different conſtructions, they ſhould then be nearly the ſame in caſes where thoſe differences do not ſubſiſt. The conſequence is juſt, and it is true: we

we recur to the order of the Latins as often as we can.

In French there are but three or four pronouns which have an accuſative of a different termination. Theſe are conſtructed exactly after the manner of the Latins, *Moi*, *toi*, *ſoi*, *lui*, *elle*, and the relative *qui*, have in the accuſative, *me*, *te*, *ſe*, *le*, *la que*. They do not ſay, *Je vois moi*, 'I ſee I;' *Je vois toi*, 'I ſee thou;' *Il voit ſoi*, *il voit lui*, 'he ſees he;' *Il voit elle*, 'He ſees 'ſhe;' but, *Je me vois*, *je te vois*, *il ſe voit*, *il le voit*, *il la voit*. This relates to the French language; the Engliſh keeps to another order of conſtruction.

If we change our active into a paſſive, as there is one of the two nouns which has a character ſpecified by a prepoſition, we reſume the Latin order. *Patrem amat filius*; in the active, *Le fils aime le pere*, 'The ſon loves the fa-'ther;' in the paſſive, *Le pere eſt aimé par le fils*, 'The father is loved by the ſon.'

There is the ſame principle and the ſame term of action, in the three phraſes. One of the three has taken a particular arrangement, becauſe it could not do otherwiſe: the two others, not being forced by any neceſſity, have followed the ſame order, which is the natural; this is perceptiple. But to be ſtill more ſenſible of it, let the inverſion be made of the French paſſive, *Par le fils*

fils eſt aimé le pere, 'By the ſon is loved the fa-'ther;' which anſwers for the meaning to this, *Le fils aime le pere*, 'The ſon loves the father.' One perceives the difference of the two arrangements. *Par le fils eſt aimé le pere*, 'By the ſon is 'loved the father,' is as harſh there, as *Filius amat patrem*, would perhaps have been to the Latins. The paſſive inverted offends, becauſe not cuſtomary, and not founded in reaſon: the active inverted does not offend, for the two contrary reaſons.

Of two ſubſtantives, the one governed and the other governing, the governing always goes firſt; becauſe it contains the principal idea; that which chiefly is intended to be preſented to the mind. *La beauté du printems*, 'The beauty of the 'ſpring;' *La difficulté de l'entrepriſe*, 'The diffi-'culty of the enterpriſe;' *La grandeur de Dieu*, 'The greatneſs of God.' The Latins follow the ſame order. They never invert it, but on account of the harmony. The French and Engliſh, both invert it alſo in poetry.

Every name governed only by a prepoſition is placed in French and Engliſh as in Latin, ſometimes in the beginning, ſometimes in the end, and ſometimes in the middle of the phraſe; and the prepoſition is as rarely after its regimen in theſe two modern languages as in the ancient. *Le monde Dieu par a été créé*, 'The world *God by* was 'created,'

'created,' is not ſaid in French nor in Engliſh; nor, DEO A *mundus eſt conſtitutus*, in Latin.

There is no reaſon that conjunctions or interjections ſhould deviate from the oratorial order; they are every where in all languages placed in the ſame manner.

Adjectives joined to ſubſtantives are placed interchangeably before or after each other. The intereſt of the ſpeaker is ſeldom very perceptible in this caſe. And if there be ever ſo little reaſon for harmony, for perſpicuity, or for preciſion, to put either of theſe parts of ſpeech before the other, it is equally done in Latin and French. [Sometimes, but more rarely, in Engliſh.]

However, there are adjectives which are always placed before the ſubſtantive, and others always after. But then they may be regarded as making an inſeparable part of the ſubſtantive, like a part of an expreſſion compounded of two words. Thus we ſay, *Le pont neuf*, 'The new 'bridge;' *La place royale*, 'The ſquare royal, 'King's ſquare;' *Un pere de famille*, 'A father of a family;' *Un gallant homme*, 'A man of ho-'nour;' *Un bon enfant*, 'A good fellow, an ho-'neſt fellow, a good child.' This union takes place not only between adjectives and ſubſtantives, it extends ſometimes even to whole phraſes. Our mind ſees at one glance a whole thought comprehending ſeveral objects. To expreſs it, we

muſt

muſt ſometimes have five or ſix words, becauſe a ſingle one is not ſufficient. If theſe words are perſpicuous, exact, harmonious, and flowing, they make together, in ſome ſort, but one ſingle word or expreſſion: they are retained as ſuch: they are compoſed of words, as other words are of ſyllables. Such is this line of Boileau:

J'appelle un chat un chat, et Rolet un fripon,

'I call a cat a cat, and —— a knave.'

It is in theſe caſes moſt frequently that the ſimplicity, the fire, and conſequently the beauty of elocution conſiſts. This has been obſerved above.

We ſhall not ſay, that in narration we follow the ſame order as the Latins, with regard to the propoſitions. Things in the main have every where the ſame arrangement. We ſay every where, *Ad ſepulchrum venimus; in ignem impoſita eſt; fletur. On arrive au tombeau; on la met ſur le bucher; on pleure:* 'We came to the place of 'ſepulture; ſhe was put on the pile; they weep.' It is, as you ſee, the ſame chain; and if there is any difference, it is in the arrangement and particular configuration of the links that form it.

It is the ſame with the arguments. We proceed in them every where from the more to the leſs known; and however long the Latin or Greek periods be, we can render them into French

French and Engliſh of the ſame length, without the leaſt diſcompoſure of the conjunctions.

By all this detail of proofs, it appears certain, that we do not deviate from the Latin order, but when we want *caſes*, or are embarraſſed by too many articles, prepoſitions, and auxiliaries. However, as names and verbs continually occur in diſcourſe, the interverſion occaſioned by them is ſufficient to form an order in language quite different from that where there are *caſes* properly ſo called, or variety of terminations.

It may be objected, in favor of the French and Engliſh conſtruction, that it paints the action as it is performed: the principle moves firſt, and afterwards tends to the object which it reaches. Thus we ſay, *Le pere aime le fils*, 'The father 'loves the ſon;' this is the order of execution.

But in the execution itſelf, the ſight of the object, that is to ſay, of the ſon, is neceſſarily before the love of the father. The old axiom has been cited, *Ignoti nulla cupido*. Nature left to herſelf advances farther and faſter than the moſt ſubtile metaphyſics; ſhe goes directly to the end ſhe propoſes; ſhe takes thence her motives, her means, and thence ſhe ſets out.

All we have ſaid confirms the concluſion which we have drawn above in favor of the Latin language; nevertheleſs, we muſt not think that we have not alſo ſome advantages over it, by the preciſion

ciſion which our articles give to our phraſes; in which they determine the objects, and ſeem to point them out. For example, the ſingle word *pain*, 'bread, or loaf,' in this phraſe, *Panem præbe mihi*, may be rendered in three ways; *Donnez moi un pain*, 'Give me a loaf, or bread;' *Donnez moi le pain*, 'Give me the bread, or the 'loaf;' *Donnez moi du pain*, 'Give me ſome 'bread, or ſome of the loaf.' The Latins have not ſo much preciſion.

In ſuperlatives the Latins cannot ſpecify the relative ſuperiority. *Maximus* ſignifies *très grand*, 'very great,' and *le plus grand*, 'the greateſt;' but thoſe two ſuperlatives in French and in Engliſh ſignify two kinds of excellence, the abſolute and the relative. One may be *très grand ſeigneur*, 'a 'very great nobleman,' without being *le plus grand ſeigneur*, 'the greateſt nobleman.'

A like obſervation may be made on the auxiliaries of verbs, which are as it were their articles. The characteriſtics of the moods, tenſes, perſons, are incorporated into the Latin verbs, *amabit*, *amabitur*: with us theſe characters are ſeparated; *il aimera*, *il ſera aimé*, 'he will love, he 'will be loved.' We reap an advantage from it in interrogations. The Latins are obliged to have recourſe to a particle, *an amavi? amabitur-ne?* or elſe they are reduced to expreſs them only by the tone of the voice. To repreſent this expreſſion,

ſion, the French only invert the arrangement of the characteriſtic of the perſon, *aime-t-il*, 'does he love?' *aimera-t-il*, 'will he love?'

Beſides, we ſeparate the auxiliary, to incorporate in ſome ſort the adverb with the verb, whoſe ſignification it modifies: *Il ſera tendrement aimé*, 'He will be tenderly loved;' which is lively and energetical.

But it will be ſaid, we have not the advantage of that ſuſpenſion, which the verb referred to the end of the phraſe ſo wonderfully operates in Latin. *Tandem aliquando, Quirites, L. Catilinam furentem audaciâ, ſcelus anhelantem, peſtem patriæ nefariè molientem—— ex urbe ejecimus.* Nothing can be more pleaſing to the mind.

If we have not that, we have another, which the Latins have in common with us. They put ſeveral governed, we ſeveral governing, words, before the verb.

Mais hélas! ces pieux devoirs que l'on rend à ſa memoire, ces prieres, ces expiations, ce ſacrifice, ces chants lugubres qui frappent nos oreilles, et qui vont porter la triſteſſe juſques dans le fond des cœurs; ce triſte appareil des ſacrés myſteres, ces marques religieuſes de douleur que la charité imprime ſur vos viſages, me ſont ſouvenir que vous l'avez perdue. 'But alas! theſe pious duties paid to her memory, 'theſe prayers, theſe expiations, this ſacrifice, 'theſe mournful ſongs which ſtrike our ears, and 'which

'which are filling our inmoſt ſouls with melan-
'choly; this ſad pomp of ſacred myſteries, theſe
'religious tokens of grief which charity imprints
'on your countenances, remind me that you have
'loſt her.'

I mention only that kind of ſuſpenſion, becauſe it is the ſingle one in which the Latins can vye with us. We have, as well as they, all thoſe which ariſe from the diſpoſition of the ſubject, the arrangement and connection of the things, the oratorial turns, the periods, and the figures. We have thoſe of harmony, which require in ſome caſes a ſeries of a certain extent, according to the manner in which a ſentence is expreſſed. For example, this of M. Flechier: *Je ſai que ce n'eſt pas en vain que les princes portent l'epée; que la force peut agir quand elle ſe trouve jointe avec l'équité; que le Dieu des armées preſide à cette redoutable juſtice que les ſouverains ſe font à eux-mêmes; que le droit des armes eſt néceſſaire pour la conſervation de la ſociété; & que les guerres ſont permiſes pour aſſurer la paix, pour protéger l'innocence, pour arrêter la malice qui ſe débor de, et pour retenir la cupidité dans les bornes de la juſtice:* 'I 'know it is not in vain that princes wear the 'ſword; that power may act when joined with 'equity; that the God of hoſts preſides over that 'awful juſtice which ſovereigns do to themſeves; 'that the law of arms is neceſſary for the preſer-

'vation

'vation of ſociety; and that wars are allowable 'to ſecure peace, to protect innocence, to ſtop 'overflowing wickedneſs, and to retain ambi-'tious deſigns within the bounds of juſtice.' In this ſentence we obſerve the progreſs of a harmony that grows at every incident phraſe, and which concludes with a final phraſe, whoſe parts are alſo in the ſame harmonical proportion: if in ſuch caſe the mind is not ſuſpended by the thought, it is ſo by the meaſure which the ear requires; and frequently that ſuſpence is ſufficient to oblige us to follow the orator to his propoſed concluſion.

Such are the French and Engliſh languages, compared with the Latin, on the article of conſtructions. The Latins, and not we, proceed in the natural order of perſuaſion. We have already ſhown the cauſes, we ſhall now endeavour to deduce the conſequences with reſpect to the art of tranſlating.

CHAP. III.

Rules of the art of Tranſlating.

A general principle.

If it be true, that we never deviate from the Latin arrangement but when we are forced ſo to do, either by the meaning itſelf, by the perſpicuity of the expreſſion, or by the harmony; it thence follows, that we ought to return to the

Latin order as often as we have not one of theſe three reaſons; and ſo that all the Latin conſtructions are not exotic in French, nor all the French in Latin *. Languages are like men, who have one common nature which unites, and peculiarities which ſeparate them. Thus, all the conſtructions which, eſtabliſhed on the intereſt, or point of view, of the ſpeaker, find, in the words of either language, no real obſtacle to cauſe them to take another turn, ought to be preſerved in the tranſlation: and it will only be in the contrary caſe that one ſhall be obliged to change them, for fear of committing a Galliciſm, if he writes Latin, or a Latiniſm, if he writes French.

What is a Latiniſm? What is a Galliciſm?

It is eaſy to anſwer theſe two queſtions, after what has been ſaid. I am making a ſpeech in Latin: inſtead of following the natural order of the ſentiment, the habit I have contracted, in ſpeaking French, of following another, on account of the indigence of that language, obliges me to make the ſame conſtruction in the Latin phraſe. I then commit a Galliciſm. I ſhould

* It will be found that the moſt part of what follows, is equally applicable to the Engliſh as to the French language, which general obſervation I chuſe to inſert here, that I may avoid the too frequent repetition of the ſame words in the tex

have

have ſaid, *Præclaras artes admiror*; but as, in French, I am accuſtomed to ſay, *J'admire les beaux arts*, 'I admire the polite arts.' I ſay alſo in Latin, *Admiror præclaras artes*. And in ſpeaking French and Engliſh, becauſe I am entirely devoted to the reading of Latin authors, and ſay, *Felix eſt qui ſapit*; I ſay likewiſe in French, *Celui là eſt heureux qui eſt ſage*, 'He is happy who is wiſe;' I ſhould have ſaid, *Heureux celui qui eſt ſage*, 'Happy is he who is wiſe.'

There is then a Galliciſm in the Latin, when one follows in it the arrangement which the French took only on account of its peculiar conſtitution: and there is a Latiniſm in the French, when ſuch Latin arrangements are followed in it as the French cannot eaſily admit. Thus a Latiniſm, an Anglicism, a Galliciſm, a Hebraiſm, *&c.* ſignify only peculiarities of languages which have been, without reaſon, tranſferred into other languages.

As languages conſiſt of two things, words, and their arrangements, they have alſo two ſorts of peculiarities; that of the words, and that of their turns, and ways of expreſſion; and, conſequently, there is another ſort of Galliciſm in Latin, or Latiniſm in French: it is that which occurs in the words themſelves, and which bears ſome reſemblance with barbariſm. For example, if one ſhould Latiniſe a French word, and ſay, *Vivacitas ingenii, vivacité d'eſprit*, 'livelineſs of

'wit;' *vivacitas* is not native Latin in that ſenſe: or, if one ſhould Frenchify a Latin word not yet adopted by good cuſtom, as *gloriole*, 'ſomewhat vainglorious;' *exprimer*, 'to expreſs;' *telle coutume obtient*, 'ſuch a cuſtom prevails;' the words *exprimer*, *obtenir*, have a meaning which takes after the Latin. We are not talking here of that Galliciſm, or Latiniſm, becauſe we ſuppoſe the tranſlator ſufficiently maſter of the fundamentals of his language, and that he is acquainted with the words of it.

It follows from what has been ſaid above, that the firſt principle of tranſlation is, *To leave the turns of expreſſion ſuch as they are in the author, when the two languages equally admit them.*

If Terence ſays, *Accipit bene*, why ſhould not we tranſlate, *C'eſt un homme qui reçoit bien*, 'He 'is a man who entertains well,' or, 'receives one 'kindly?' If we meet, *Hoc mihi incommodat*, why not ſay, *Cela m'incommode*, 'That incom-'modes me?'

Egredere ex urbe, Catilina, libera rempublicam metu: Sortez de la ville, Catilina, delivrez la république de ſes craintes, 'Depart the city, Cati-'line, deliver the republic from its fears.'

Ariſſimâ moderatione, maluit videri bonas invenisſe, quam feciſſe. It is Tacitus who is ſpeaking of the diſcretion of Agricola, with regard to the ſoldiers

diers who had been put uuder his command. *Par une moderation qui a peu d'exemples, il aima mieux paroitre les avoir trouvés, que remis, dans leur devoir:* 'From a very unuſual moderation, 'he choſe rather to appear to have found them 'dutiful, than to have made them ſo.'

It is ſo likewiſe with the poets.

His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono,
Imperium ſine fine dedi.

Je ne limite ni les tems ni les lieux, l'empire que je leur ai donne eſt ſans bornes: 'I limit neither 'the times nor places, the power and authority 'which I have given them is boundleſs.

Credita res: captique dolis, lacrymiſque coacti:
Quos neque Tydides, nec Lariſſæus Achilles,
Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinæ.

On le crut: et on vit prendre, par la ruſe et par des larmes feintes, ceux qui ni le fils de Tydée, ni le héros de Lariſſa, ni dix années de guerre, n'avoient pû domter avec mille vaiſſeaux: 'It was believed: 'and they were deceived with wiles, and van-'quiſhed with feigned tears, whom neither Ty-'deus's ſon, nor the hero of Lariſſa, nor ten 'years war, had been able to ſubdue with a thou-'ſand ſhips;' or, 'whom neither Tydeus's ſon, 'nor Achilles of Lariſſa, nor ten long years, nor 'a thouſand ſhips, had conquered.'

Non fluvii ſtrepunt,
Hibernâ nive turgidi,

On n'entend plus fremir les fleuves, groſſis par les neiges de l'hyver: 'The rivers no longer roar, 'ſwelled with the winter ſnow.'

It is unneceſſary to purſue the detail further. Let us draw from this principle ſome conſequences, which may ſerve as ſo many particular rules of the art of tranſlation. It follows,

I. That the order of the things, whether facts or reaſonings, is not to be altered; ſince that order is the ſame in all languages; ſeeing it depends on the nature of man, rather than on the particular genius of nations.

II. That we ought alſo to preſerve the order of the ideas, or at leaſt of the members. There has been a reaſon, how nice ſoever to inveſtigate, which has determined the author to uſe one arrangement rather than another. Perhaps it was the harmony; but it was alſo often the energy; though nothing that is energetical can be deficient in harmony. Cicero had ſaid, *Neque poteſt is exercitum continere imperator, qui ſeipſum non continet.* M. Flechier, who has tranſlated that thought like an orator, not having been able to preſerve the order of the ideas, has at leaſt preſerved the order of the members: he has ſaid, *Quelle diſcipline peut établir dans ſons camp, celui qui*

qui ne peut regler ſa conduite? 'What diſcipline 'can he eſtabliſh in his camp, who cannot re-'gulate his own conduct?' He was too ſenſible of the energetic turn of Cicero's expreſſion, to ſay, *Un général qui ne regle point ſa conduite, ne peut regler une armée:* 'A general who cannot regulate 'his own conduct, cannot regulate an army.' On the other ſide, if he had tranſlated the ſentence thus, *Un général ne peut regler une armée, qui ne peut ſe regler lui-même,* 'A general cannot 'regulate an army, who cannot regulate him-'ſelf,' he had committed a Latiniſm. So this example affords us a double leſſon.

III. That the periods ſhould be preſerved, how long ſoever they be; becauſe a period is but a thought, compoſed of ſeveral other thoughts, connected together by intrinſic relations; and this connection is the life of thoſe thoughts, and the principal object of the ſpeaker. In a period, the different members have a reſpect to each other, and their relations form a kind of harmony. If the phraſes be interrupted or divided, we may have indeed the thought; but then we have it without the coherence of principles, of conſequences, of proof, or of compariſon, which they had in the period, and which conſtituted its prevailing character. There are methods of reconciling every thing. Periods, though ſuſpended in their different members, have nevertheleſs

pauſes, where the meaning is almoſt finiſhed, and which give the mind the relaxation it wants. Here is an example of it taken from Cicero's oration for the poet Archias. *Sed ne cui veſtrûm mirum eſſe videatur me, in quæſtione legitima, et in judicio publico, cum res agatur apud prætorem populi Romani, lectiſſimum virum, et apud ſeveriſſimos judices, tanto conventu hominum ac frequentiâ, hoc uti genere dicendi, quod non modo a conſuetudine judiciorum, verum etiam à forenſi ſermone abhorreat; quæſo à vobis, ut in hac cauſa mihi detis hanc veniam, accommodatam huic reo, vobis, quemadmodum ſpero, non moleſtam; ut me, pro ſummo poeta, atque eruditiſſimo homine dicentem, hoc concurſu hominum literatiſſimorum, hac veſtrâ humanitate, hoc denique prætore exercente judicium, patia mini de ſtudiis humanitatis ac literarum, paulo loqui liberius, et in ejuſmodi perſona, quæ propter otium ac ſtudium minime in judiciis periculiſque tractati eſt, uti prope novo quodam et inuſitato genere dicendi.*

Let us endeavour to tranſlate this period without dividing it.

Mais comme l'affaire que je plaide eſt une queſtion de droit, une cauſe publique qui eſt portée au tribunal du préteur du people Romain, et devant les juges les plus auſteres, et que cependant j'ai deſſein de la traiter d'une maniere peu conforme à l'uſage du barreau; j'ai, Meſſieurs, à vous demander une grace, que vous ne pouvez me refuſer, eû égard à la condition de

celui

celui que je defends, et dont j'éſpere que vous ne vous repentirez pas vous-même; et c'eſt, qu'ayant à parler pour un poete célébre, pour un ſavant, en preſence de gens de lettres, devant des juges ſi polis, et un préteur ſi éclairé, vous me permettiez de m'étendre avec quelque liberté ſur le mérite des lettres; et que, comme je repréſente un homme qui eſt étranger dans les affaires, et qui ne connoit que l'etude et les livres, vous trouviez bon que je m'éxprime moi-même d'une maniere nouvelle, et qui pourra paroitre étrangere dans le barreau. 'But leſt it ſhould appear 'ſtrange to any of you, that, in a queſtion of 'law, and in a public trial before the prætor of 'the Roman people, I ſhould, in defending a moſt 'worthy man, before the moſt impartial judges, 'in ſo great an aſſize, and in ſo crouded an au-'dience, uſe this kind of pleading, which is not 'only different from what is uſual in trials, but 'from the ſtyle at the bar; I beg to be allowed 'this liberty, which I hope will not be offenſive 'to you, and is even due to this defendant, that 'in pleading for a celebrated poet, and a perſon 'of great erudition, before this very learned and 'polite aſſembly, and ſo eminent a prætor ſitting 'in judgment, you would allow me to enlarge 'ſomewhat freely upon polite literature and libe-'ral knowledge; and that, repreſenting a man, 'who by reaſon of a ſtudious and inactive life, is 'quite unacquainted with dangers and judicial

'trials, I ſhould expreſs myſelf in a manner 'ſomewhat new and unuſual at the bar.'

This period is of an enormous length. Neverleſs, with the aſſiſtance of the pauſes contrived in it, the mind follows it without difficulty to the very end. If it were divided, the members would ceaſe to have the ſame conformation; and conſequently the tranſlation would be unfaithful. There are, however, caſes, in which too long ſentences may be divided; but then thoſe ſentences are detached, and, if cloſely obſerved, are connected only exteriorly and artificially. They are not properly members of periods.

IV. It follows, That all the conjunctions ought to be preſerved. They are, as it were, the articulations of the members. One ought not to change their meaning, nor their poſition: and if there are caſes in which they are omitted, it is only when the mind can eaſily diſpenſe with the want of them, and when, advancing of itſelf from one phraſe to another, the conjunction expreſſed would only interrupt, without being of ſervice.

V. That all adverbs ſhould be placed beſide the verb, before or after, according as the harmony or energy permits. It is always on theſe two principles that their place is regulated in Latin.

VI.

VI. That ſymmetrical ſentences be rendered with their ſymmetry, or in terms equivalent. Symmetry in diſcourſe is a conformity of ſeveral ideas, or of ſeveral expreſſions. The ſymmetry of expreſſions may conſiſt in the ſounds, in the quantity of the ſyllables, in the termination or length of the words, in the arrangement of the members. Here is a ſentence of Cicero which has all theſe ſpecies of ſymmetry: *Nihil habet fortuna tua majus quam ut poſſis, nec natura melius quam ut velis, conſervare quam plurimos. La nature et la fortune n'ont rien fait de meilleur, ni de plus grand pour vous, que de vous donner, l'une la volonté, l'autre le pouvoir de conſerver des citoyens.* 'Your condition has nothing greater in it than 'to impower, nor your diſpoſition better than to 'incline you to ſave the greateſt numbers.' If one cannot render ſound for ſound, ſubſtantive, verb, adverb, adjective, as they are in the text, he ought, at leaſt, to acquit himſelf by another ſort of harmony.

VII. That bright thoughts, in order to preſerve the ſame degree of clearneſs, ſhould be nearly of the ſame extent of words. If they are contracted, there is danger of obſcuring; if extended, of weakening their luſtre:

Cui non conveniet ſua res; ut calceus, olim
Si pede major erit, ſubvertet; ſi minor, uret.

Hor.

Si je ne ſais point m'ajuſter à ma fortune, c'eſt un ſoulier trop étroit, qui me bleſſe, ou trop large, qui me fait tomber. "If I cannot ſuit myſelf to my "fortune, it will be a ſhoe ſo ſtrait as to pinch, "or ſo wide as to make me fall."

VIII. That we muſt preſerve the figures and forms of the thoughts, becauſe the thoughts are the ſame in all minds: they are capable of taking every where the ſame arrangement, the ſame configuration, the ſame attitude. Thus we tranſlate interrogations, antitheſes, *&c.*

As to the figures and forms of words, ſuch as metaphors, repetitions, cadences of names or of verbs, there is ſome difference to be obſerved: uſually they may be replaced by equivalent expreſſions. For example, when Cicero ſays of a decree of Verres, that it was not *trabali clavo fixum*, we may ſay, that it was not *tellement cementé*, "ſo cemented, rivetted, immoveably fixed," that, *&c.* If theſe figures cannot be tranſmuted, or replaced by equivalents, we muſt then reſume the natural expreſſion, and endeavour to transfer the figure to ſome other idea more ſuſceptible of it, ſo that the phraſe tranſlated, taken altogether, may not loſe any of the ornaments it had in the original.

IX. That the proverbs, which are popular maxims, and which are never but ſhort and pithy ſayings, ſhould be renderedby other proverbs, or

by

by phraſes ſo natural that they deſerve to become ſuch. As they are only concerning things whoſe uſe often recurs in company, all nations have a great many of them in common, if not as to expreſſion, at leaſt as to meaning; ſo one may almoſt always tranſlate them. Madam Dacier has done ſo, very happily, in her tranſlation of Terence.

X. That any paraphraſe is faulty and imperfect; it is no longer tranſlating, it is commenting. However, when there is no other way to communicate the meaning, neceſſity excuſes the tranſlator; one of the two languages is anſwerable for the defect.

XI. That we muſt entirely give up the expreſſion in the text tranſlated, when the ſenſe requires it for perſpicuity, the ſentiment for vivacity, or the harmony for delight. This conſequence becomes a ſecond principle.

XII. Ideas may, without ceaſing to be the ſame, be preſented under different forms, and be compounded or decompounded in the words uſed to expreſs them. They may be preſented by the way of verb, of adjective, of ſubſtantive, of adverb. The tranſlator, if he be embarraſſed, has theſe four methods of extricating himſelf. Let him take the ſcales, weigh the expreſſions on either ſide, poiſe them every way, he will be allowed alterations, provided he preſerve to the thought

thought the ſame ſubſtance, and the ſame life. He will act only like a traveller, who, for his conveniency, exchanges ſometimes one piece of gold for ſeveral of ſilver, ſometimes ſeveral pieces of ſilver for one of gold.

Suppoſe we ſay in Latin, *Aſpirante fortunâ*, it will not be required of the tranſlator to write, *La fortune le ſecondant*, "Fortune aſſiſting him." he will be allowed to ſay, *Avec le ſecours de la fortune*, "With fortune's aid;" he will change the participle into a ſubſtantive. *Arabes, ſi quid imperaret, præſto fuere: les Arabes ſe montrerent prêts d'obéir à ſon ordre*; "The Arabs were ready to "obey his orders." *Eram tunc, et vivebam, et ſentiebam, S. Aug*; *Alors j'avois l'être, la vie, le ſentiment*; "I then exiſted, and was a living, and "a rational being."

If we meet, *fieri ſolet*, the verb may be changed into an adverb, and will throw aſide its properties of a verb: *Il arrive ordinairement*; "It "uſually happens."

Itineri paratus et prælio; *Prét à la marche et au combat*; "Ready for the march and for the fight." This tranſlation is not good French nor good Engliſh. Let us change the ſubſtantives into verbs: *Prét à marcher et à combattre*; "Ready "either to march or to fight;" or "Ready both "for marching and fighting."

Some-

Sometimes the adjective will be changed into a verb. *Ad omne fortunæ munus ſubſiſtite pavidi & ſuſpicioſi: Quand la fortune vous préſente ces faveurs, retenez votre avidité, defiez-vous, craignez:* "At every boon of fortune, ſuſpend your eagerneſs, diſtruſt, fear."

Theſe are very ſimple expedients. I dare, however, undertake that they will never fail of producing their effect, and of opening to the perplexed tranſlator an outlet, which ſometimes coſts him a long and fruitleſs ſearch, when he follows the letter too cloſe.

The French, it is ſaid, are more ſprightly in their diſcourſe than the Latins. When they tranſlate, they ought not to be ſo in a greater degree than their originals. Happy even if they be equally ſprightly. The Latins had neither prepoſitions in the oblique caſes of their nouns, nor auxiliaries in their verbs; they were nimble to run in the courſe. Theſe auxiliaries are to us what ſervants and baggage are to an army. The Latins called them *impedimenta*, "hindrances."

To diſincumber ourſelves of them in part, we take the infinites rather than the other moods *, the participle, and eſpecially the gerund: we

* This will not hold in Engliſh, where the infinitive has the particle *to* prefixed for diſtinction.

ſhun

ſhun paſſives, ſuperlatives, certain conjunctives, (as, *non ſeulement*, 'not only;' *mais encore*, 'but 'even,') when they too much lengthen the phraſe: we cut off the pronouns from the Latin proper names; we ſhorten the encomiums uſually added to them; we introduce looſe and unconnected phraſes, *&c.*

Suſpenſion is very conducive to vivacity of expreſſion. We can introduce it, as we have ſaid, by joining to the nominative of the verb what the Latins joined to the regimen, governed caſe, or object; or, when the phraſe is of a certain extent, by taking the paſſive rather than the active; becauſe, as we have alſo ſaid, our paſſive admits the ſame order of the ideas as the Latin active.

All theſe expedients equally contribute to oratorial harmony; the greateſt part of which conſiſts in perſpicuity and fervency of expreſſion. A phraſe which, with perſpicuity, preſents a beautiful meaning, always pleaſes the ear. The latter is never diſſatisfied but when we offer it ſounds empty, overcharged, or ill matched. For we are not ſpeaking of that harmony which conſiſts in beauty of ſounds. Of theſe the tranſlator can only employ ſuch as he finds in his own language.

As there are in all languages ways of ſpeaking which are incapable of tranſlation; ſuch is this of La Fontaine:

Sixte en diſoit autant quand on le fit Saint Pere,
Un citoyen de Mans, chapon de ſon metier:

we do not pretend that our obſervations can, in ſuch a caſe, be of the leaſt uſe. There are alſo certain things depending on the taſte, and on the manners of the people, which cannot be tranſferred. For example: The Latins had a much greater licence of language than we. They had phraſes and expreſſions which paſſed among them in genteel company, and which with us are low and mean. Sometimes a ſingle one of theſe words or phraſes would deform and diſgrace a whole work of taſte. How could we tranſlate, *Paſtillos Ruſillus olet, Gorgonius hircum?* or the waggiſh trick of Priapus, *Diffiſſa nate pepedi?*

CHAP. IV.

Particular rules.

TO theſe principles, common to all ſorts of works that are tranſlated, may be added others, which ſuit only particular kinds. Theſe kinds may be reduced to three; hiſtory, oratory, poetry.

I. In tranſlating an hiſtorian, it is not enough to adhere to the genius of hiſtory: we muſt alſo follow, as much as poſſible, the genius of the author; without which every thing is *Yorkſhire* in

in a *Yorkſhire* tranſlator. Salluſt is cloſe, conciſe, always elegant, but his elegance has ſomething in it maſculine and vigorous. Livy is alſo compact, he is elegant, he is vigorous; but he has not the ſame kind of preciſion as Salluſt. His ſentences are filled with incident propoſitions, which are connected, interwoven, and form longer periods, and he has a greater fulneſs of ideas, which muſt be conceived all at once. Tacitus is dark, profound, ſometimes enigmatical, full of reflections and philoſophy. His ſtyle is copious, majeſtic, nervous. How different, if compared with Quintus Curtius, or Cornelius Nepos? Here every thing is perſpicuous, graceful, elegant, flowery; every thing is made to pleaſe, at the ſame time that it inſtructs. What a difference too, if viewed with Cæſar's Commentaries, where every thing is ſimple, and excellent only from that ſimplicity? Cæſar is a witneſs depoſing; Quintus Curtius, an ingenious rhetorician painting: Cornelius Nepos, a gentleman writing: Tacitus and Livy are both philoſophers, both hiſtorians; but the firſt ſeems to give more to philoſophy, and the laſt more to hiſtory. Salluſt is a ſtateſman, replete with republican principles; without oſtentation, without pomp: he has more nerves than fleſh; he ſeems to poſſeſs every thing from nature. The tranſlator who is

not

not careful to expreſs all theſe characters, makes a parody rather than a tranſlation.

II. Oratory ſhould always proceed with dignity. Every thing therein ſhould be directed towards perſuaſion: we muſt develop the thoughts, give them a certain extent, ſuſceptible of number and harmony, and capable of ſupporting the orator's action. The tranſlator ought to place himſelf in that point of view; his ear ought to guide him in this, more than in any other kind of compoſition; and all the particular rules given above ſhould be ſubordinate to this. In a tranſlation, one ſhould hear the elevated tone of the orator, and behold the gracefulneſs of his geſtures, and his action.

In hiſtory, the facts muſt be exhibited in a proper ſtrain. In oratory, one muſt expreſs the ſoul, the enthuſiaſm, the progreſs, more or leſs bold, of one whoſe aim is perſuaſion. In poetry, we muſt join to that enthuſiaſm features and images.

III. Here two ſorts of tranſlations are to be diſtinguiſhed. The firſt is, that which expreſſes an author in ſuch perfection that it may ſupply his place, in like manner as a copy of a picture, done by an excellent hand, holds the place of the original. The ſecond is not done to ſupply the place of the author, but only

to aſſiſt in comprehending his meaning; and to prepare the way for the reader's underſtanding him. This ſomewhat reſembles a copper-plate print.

It is allowed, that the firſt ſort of tranſlation is impoſſible as to the poets, whether it be attempted in verſe or in proſe. Proſe cannot expreſs either the number, or the meaſures, or the harmony, which conſtitute one of the great beauties of poetry. And if the tranſlation is attempted in verſe, ſuppoſing the number, the meaſures, the harmony, be rendered, the thoughts, the expreſſions, the turns are altered. An Epigram of Martial may eaſily be tranſlated; becauſe when once we have found a line happily to expreſs the point, we give ourſelves free ſcope as to the reſt. But in attempting to render the entire ſpeeches of Dido, or to deſcend into hell with Æneas, what poetic tranſlator would dare promiſe to expreſs all the features of Virgil's pictures? He might paint monſters, ſhades, places of horror, ſomewhat like a painter who draws a bad portrait. The painter draws always a man, but he does not paint the man wanted: the ſon does not know his father, nor the friend his friend. He might paint his features; that would be nothing ſtill, if he did not expreſs their ſoul, their air, their life, which are the point of excellence in pictures, and which frequently conſiſt

in imperceptible niceties, in pauſes artfully placed, in certain ſlight tranſitions, in tints ſtruck off by pure chance. He may, in the ſame way, by a lucky hit, expreſs two, three, four lines; but all the reſt will be faint and dull, the fruit of an unſucceſsful effort.

It is not in this matter with poetry as with painting: the latter has a great many advantages. The painter who copies, has the ſame ſpecific colors as the original painter; he needs only intelligent eyes, and a good hand. But ſhould we ſuppoſe the poetic tranſlator to have both, he has ſtill got nothing. The words of his language firſt reſiſt in all ways, in their ſyllables, in their ſounds, in the arrangement which they require. The ear expoſtulates, the rhyme is refractory, the meaſure is always too long or too ſhort for the thought. This is true with reſpect to all languages: it is only ſo in a greater or leſs degree in one than in another. Virgil has attempted ſeveral times to imitate Homer and Pindar; yet even Virgil has almoſt continually left them their beſt things. This is ſaid by Aulus Gellius, who proves it by examples. It is a known ſaying of Virgil, that it is more difficult to borrow a line from Homer, than to take from Hercules his club. What would he have ſaid, had it been propoſed to him to tranſlate Homer from one end to the

the other? There are Virgils in our days, who have had more courage, or more ſtrength, than thoſe of former times. They have ventured to wreſtle with a whole army of Herculeſes, and to turn into verſe the whole Iliad, with a ſucceſs which may, probably, excuſe lovers of poetry from ſeeking after that poet in his native tongue.

If the poets cannot be tranſlated to perfection in verſe, there is a way of doing it in proſe, at leaſt with ſome ſucceſs. The poetical tone, which conſtitutes the principal characteriſtic of verſe, may be pretty well expreſſed, provided one is attentive to theſe three points:

1. To expreſs the ideas ſuch as they are, and, if poſſible, with all their force, or at leaſt endeavour to come near the equivalent. Upon that depends a part of the fidelity and exactneſs of the tranſlation.

2. To leave the ideas, if it may be, at leaſt the propoſitions and partial phraſes, in their places. Nothing abſolutely obliges a tranſlator to diſplace the propoſitions. They are the ſame way diſpoſed in all languages; becauſe that diſpoſition depends only on reaſon and underſtanding. Thence ariſes the production of the ideas ſuch as the author gives it: we follow his progreſs; we run, we ſtop, we reſt with him.

3. Laſtly,

3. Laſtly, we muſt endeavour to preſerve the author's way of connecting the thoughts, to point like him, to render period for period, to divide the ſentences when he divides them, &c.

But, it may be ſaid, that it is impoſſible to tranſlate in this manner.

It is by no means ſo. It is impoſſible always to expreſs one word by one word, a word ſhort or long, ſonorous or hollow, quick or ſlow, by another which has abſolutely the ſame characteriſtic. It is impoſſible to render always like fire, like vivacity, like figure, becauſe every language has its own peculiarities. Whence it follows, that it is impoſſible to render every thing, and, conſequently, to give a tranſlation equal in every reſpect to the original. But if, by a falſe prejudice, it be ſtill imagined impoſſible to leave the ideas in their places, and to connect them as they are in the author, what will remain in a tranſlation to repreſent the text tranſlated? The place and connection of the ideas do not depend upon languages; they depend only on the underſtanding, on the common ſenſe or judgment. Now, the underſtanding and rational faculty have the ſame manner of acting with us as with the Latins.

But it may be objected, that if the underſtanding ſhould obey, the language will be refractory,

fractory, and the tranſlation will be ſtiff, dry, and cold. Yes, if we take the rule rigorouſly, and never allow ourſelves in the leaſt to deviate from it: but we only preſent it as a point of view to which we muſt tend by the moſt direct or leaſt indirect line poſſible. Who would not be pleaſed to have all Virgil tranſlated with the ſame taſte as this little paſſage taken from the tranſlation of Abbé des Fontaines?

Si ſine pace tua, atque invito numine Troës
Italiam petiere; luant peccata, neque illos
Juveris auxilio; ſin tot reſponſa ſecuti,
Quæ ſuperi manesque dabant; cur nunc tua quiſquam
Vertere jura poteſt? aut cur nova condere fata?
Quid repetam exuſtas Erycino in littore claſſes?
Quid tempeſtatum regem ventoſque furentes
Æoliâ excitos, aut actam nubibus Irim?

ÆN. X. 31—38.

Si c'eſt ſans votre permiſſion, et contre vos ordres, que les Troyens ont abordé en Italie, qu'ils expient leur audace, et refuſez-leur votre apui: mais s'ils ont été conduits par des oracles, s'ils ont obéi au ciel et aux enfers, comment oſe-t-on aujourdhui enfreindre vos loix et changer les deſtins? Rapellerai-je l'embraſement de nos vaiſſeaux ſur le rivage d'Eryx? Parlerai-je du roi des tempêtes ſolicité; des vents dechaînés

chaînés dans l'Eolie; de tant de voyages d'Iris ſur la terre?

'If, without thy permiſſion, and in defiance of 'thy divine authority, the Trojans have come 'to Italy, let them atone for their offence; nor 'ſupport them with thy aid: But if they came 'in purſuance of ſo many *oracular* reſponſes, 'which powers celeſtial and infernal *both* deli-'vered, why now has any one the power to per-'vert thy commands? or why to found new 'ſchemes of fate? What need I recall to 'mind the firing of their fleet on the Sicilian 'ſhore? or why the king of ſtorms and his 'furious winds raiſed from Æolia; or Iris ſent 'down from the clouds?' *Davidſon's Virgil,*

Whoſoever can be faithful to the order and connection in verſe, much more may he be ſo in proſe.

But that, it may be ſaid, requires great attention, and elaborate efforts.

It is true, no one will tranſlate by wholeſale, and hand over head: they will reckon the pieces: they will weigh them all one after another. But ſtill the effort will not be ſo great as is thought. It is only allowing ourſelves to be led, as it were, by the hand, and following the vein which guided the author in his compoſition. If the text offer a

turn

turn that can be adopted, we adopt that in preference to any other: if it reſiſt, one of the expedients above mentioned is to be tried; if it be ſtill refractory, which very ſeldom happens, counſel is to be taken from the circumſtances; and if ſucceſs be not the iſſue, the difficulty will itſelf be ſufficient to vindicate the tranſlator.

END of the FOURTH and LAST VOLUME.

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